Newly-Created Racial Bias Exception to General Rule that Precludes Jurors from Offering Testimony to Impeach Their Own Verdict, 0717 ALBJ, 78 The Alabama Lawyer 284 (2017)
| Author | By Terrence W. McCarthy and Callie D. Brister |
| Position | Vol. 78 4 Pg. 284 |
By Terrence W. McCarthy and Callie D. Brister
Introduction
The “no-impeachment rule” generally provides that a juror may not testify about statements made during jury deliberations if offered to challenge the validity of a verdict or indictment. This longstanding rule has roots dating back to English common law, and is codified in Rule 606(b) of both the Federal Rules of Evidence and Alabama Rules of Evidence.
While Rule 606(b) lists specific exceptions to this “no-impeachment rule,” the United States Supreme Court has now added a new exception based on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, on March 6, 2017, the United States Supreme Court in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855 (2017), ruled that where a juror makes a “clear statement” indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, other jurors may be permitted to testify about these statements during an inquiry into the validity of the verdict or indictment even if they occurred during jury deliberations.
This article will give a brief overview of the “no-impeachment rule” and a brief summary of the Pena-Rodriguez decision and will conclude with an effort to predict how this decision may impact the Alabama practitioner.
Brief History of the “No-Impeachment Rule” And Rule 606(b)
From a procedural standpoint, the “no-impeachment rule” is most likely to come into play in conjunction with a motion for new trial. If the motion for new trial is based on some form of juror misconduct, the moving party will normally attach supporting affidavits from jurors that describe the misconduct. Victor J. Gold, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6076 (2d ed. 2017). See also, Charles W. Gamble, Terrence W. McCarthy & Robert J. Goodwin, Gamble’s Alabama Rules of Evidence, § 606(b) (Practice Pointer 1) (3d ed. 2014) (“This issue customarily arises when the party attacking the verdict files a motion for new trial and attaches juror affidavits to it.”). The responding party will then likely object and move to strike those affidavits and raise the “no-impeachment rule.”
At common law, long before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Alabama Rules of Evidence, jurors, as a general rule, were precluded from giving testimony (by affidavit or otherwise) post-trial that would impeach their own verdict. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). As Dean Gamble has observed, this general exclusionary rule is based on several policies: (1) to preserve the finality of verdicts, (2) to prevent harassment of jurors and (3) to protect the deliberative process and encourage free discussions in the jury room. Charles W. Gamble & Robert J. Goodwin, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 94.06(1) (6th ed. 2009).
Over the years, all jurisdictions adopted this “no-impeachment rule” in some form. Ultimately, the “no-impeachment rule” was codified in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 606(b) of the Alabama Rules of Evidence.
Federal Rule 606(b) begins with a general exclusionary rule that a juror may not testify about statements made or occurrences during jury deliberations if offered during an inquiry into the validity of the verdict or indictment. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). Three exceptions to this general exclusionary rule are listed in the text of the rule. The exceptions provide that jurors may testify about: (A) “extraneous prejudicial information” improperly brought to their attention, (B) “outside influences” improperly brought to bear on any juror and (C) a mistake on the verdict form.1 Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2).
The Alabama Rules of Evidence became effective January 1, 1996 and while Ala. R. Evid. 606(b) has some differences from the corresponding federal rule, the rules are very similar. The Alabama rule, like the federal rule, contains a general exclusionary rule that prohibits juror testimony about statements made and occurrences during jury deliberations if offered during an inquiry into the validity of the verdict or indictment. Ala. R. Evid. 606(b). The Alabama rule also contains the “extraneous prejudicial information” and “outside influences” exceptions. Alabama’s rule, however, does not contain the “mistake on the verdict form” exception that was added to the federal rule by amendment in 2006.
The “extraneous prejudicial information” exception focuses “upon those instances in which facts, not subjected to the purifying fire of the litigation process, make their way to the jury.” McElroy’s, at § 94.06(4)(a). If a juror, for example, brought in a newspaper or visited the accident scene, Rule 606(b) would allow post-verdict or post-indictment juror testimony. See e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 108 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 1997) (court properly permitted jurors to testify that jurors had secured newspaper accounts that defendant’s employer had pled guilty for same conduct that was underlying defendant’s prosecution); Ex parte Arthur, 835 So. 2d 981, 984-86 (Ala. 2002) (while not referencing Rule 606(b), holding that juror’s consultation with medical textbooks and subsequent injection of this information into jury room was extraneous and prejudicial as a matter of law). See also Mottershaw v. Ledbetter, 148 So. 3d 45, 52-53 (Ala...
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