A new translation of Cuneiform laws.

• Author: Yaron, Reuven
• Position: Book review

Roth's volume is timely and welcome. It is timely because many years have passed since the publication of a comparable set of translations into English, most notably, J. B. Pritchard, ed., Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 3rd ed. with supplement (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969). In the meantime, although very few new documents have come to light, the completion of the AHw and the considerable progress of the CAD have given researchers new insights into the material.(1)

The book is welcome because Roth has made significant improvements on previous attempts, making the work more inviting and thus assuring it a well-deserved success. It is also a handy volume, restricted to one topic only (law collections), and benefiting from just one scholar's translation of materials stemming entirely from Mesopotamia. (In ANET, there were four different translators.) Unlike recent renderings of cuneiform law, Roth runs romanized versions of the original languages parallel to her translations.(2) However, because the volume is directed primarily to a non-assyriological readership, she normalizes, rather than syllabically transliterates, the cuneiform original, thus sacrificing philological accuracy for ease of use (see also below). I am glad to notice, too, that the designation "Code" has been abandoned throughout. If others follow Roth's standard, one may hope to exorcise this persistent misnomer.

But there is a debit side. A glance at the table of contents reveals that one important text, the Edict of Ammisaduqa, has been omitted (for reasons not explained).(3) Also missing is a glossary of words (with their occurrences). Disappointing too is Roth's routine adherence to the faulty division of texts into sections (or "provisions"), both in LE and LH. The issue is indeed addressed in her introductory remarks to the LE ("About the Sources," p. 58): "The provision numbers given here follow those used in the accepted standard publications; when provisions previously kept separate are understood as a single unit, the union is represented by a single slash (e.g., # 17/18) ..." I myself subscribe to both principles, negative ("no change in numbers") as well as positive' ("indicate union by means of a slash").(4) Yet it is observable that Roth's intents have left no mark on her translations, with the result that faulty divisions of texts in LE and LH remain as firmly entrenched as ever.

Following a chronological table (p. ix), two maps (pp. x-xi), and information on weights and measures (pp. xv-xvi), the book opens with a ten-page introduction. This concise and informative introduction is highly recommended, dealing with such topics as the nature of cuneiform script, the Mesopotamian scribal curriculum, the formats and structures of the Law Collections, and the character and function of the Law Collections. Notes about the translations and the rules of transliterations and transcriptions complete this introduction.

Roth's remarks about her translations (pp. 6-8) call for special attention. The first three passages, containing generalities, convey essential information about her technique of translation. Reading them carefully is a must, as the following two cases will illustrate.

Roth explains, that "in order to preserve the appropriate nuances and to convey the different commodities . . . instead of translating 'to pay' indiscriminately throughout" she translates Akkadian saqalum and Sumerian la as "to weigh and deliver" (always used, with silver, gold, tin, among others). I am not sure that the addition "and deliver" - not reflected in the original - is necessary. But no harm is done. The main point is that the rendering "to weigh" is exact and useful. It emphasizes the role played by the act of weighing, at a stage when metal coinage (money that can be counted) did not yet exist. Throughout, Roth remains true to her resolve; yet, at the very last occurrence of saqalum, in LH /281, "to pay" reemerges (twice). Another case: as a rule, Roth renders the phrase ana simtim alakum "to go to (one's) fate"; but in one instance (LH 12), she gives "to die."

These comments may seem petty and pointless, but they do provide us with a lesson: when authors, editors, or translators decide to change a recurring term or formulation, they will occasionally fail to avoid retaining the original language they had decided to abandon. Those who do so (in antiquity no less than at present) will thus often leave clues about what had happened. Historians are not upset by such occurrences; to the contrary, they thrive on them, as they may yield insight on how certain expressions eventually reached us. Thus, regarding the examples offered above, they indicate that there were earlier drafts, employing "to pay" (respectively "to die"), and that Roth opted for "to weigh" (respectively "to go to [one's] fate") after rethinking the problem. It teaches us to keep our eyes open for such minutiae, and to try to explain them?

Much more difficult is the task of rendering awilum (lu). Roth distinguishes primarily two usages of this multifaceted term. Awilum is taken as "usually a term referring to 'man; 'person,' 'someone,' 'anyone; etc." Roth calls it an "unmarked, indefinite subject." All this I accept as correct. Roth goes on to observe that

. . . within some sets of law provisions, lu or awilum is used as a marked subject. . . . Thus, when one provision identifies the subject as an awilum, and the following one varies the provision in identifying the subject as a muskenum or a wardum, it is clear that the awilum is a member of the elite or upper class . . ., consciously opposed by the drafter of the composition to a member of the "commoner" class or of the "slave" class. In . . . such provisions I have translated awilum as "member of the awilu-class" . . . . The translation used in all . . . other cases . . . is "man." (p. 8)(6)

Roth's statement is correct, especially when it applies to the opposing pair awilum - muskenum; but it is dubious when it concerns the juxtaposition of awilum and wardum. Thus, when differentiated from "slave," awilum is a "(free) person," in no way limited to describe a member of the elite, and as such includes a muskenum. In other words, in opposition to the wardum every one else is an awilum. In any case, Roth does not always stay with her own rules. Had she done so, she would have (correctly) employed "man" in LE 17/, 47A, and 58, while employing (wrongly) "a member of the awilum - class" in LE 54/and 56/.(7)

Professor Roth does not require my approval of her English, and choices are often a matter...