New Notice Standard Established in FLSA Collective Actions

AuthorJohn M. McNichols
Pages24-24
Published in Litigation News Volume 47, Number 1, Fall 2021. © 2021 by the Ameri can Bar Association. Re produced with per mission. All rights re served. This info rmation or any porti on thereof may not be c opied or disseminated in any f orm or
by any means or stored in an el ectronic database or r etrieval system w ithout the expre ss written cons ent of the American Bar A ssociation.
New Notice Standard
Established in FLSA
Collective Actions
By John M. Mc Nichols, Litigation News
Associa te Editor
Employers now have expand ed pro-
tection from broad co llective actions
under the Fair Lab or Standards Act
(FLSA). Before a cou rt can authorize
notice of a collective a ction to poten-
tial plaintis , their employer must
have an opportun ity to show that
those plainti s are subject to arbitra-
tion agreemen ts waiving their rights
to sue, the U.S . Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit he ld. Because
notice often drives s ettlement discus-
sions in FLSA coll ective actions, ABA
Litigation Secti on leaders expect that,
if followed, the rul ing will increase
employers’ settlement leverage.
In Bigger v. Faceboo k, a Facebook
employee f‌iled a pu tative collec-
tive action agains t Facebook alleg-
ing violations of th e overtime-pay
requirements. Facebook objected
to the plainti ’s motion to certif y on
the ground that ma ny employees had
signed arbitration agreements waiv-
ing their rights to p articipate. The U.S.
District Cour t for the Northern Distric t
of Illinois grante d the plainti’s motion.
The Seventh Circuit rever sed, hold-
ing that before the di strict court could
send notice to the pla inti’s proposed
group, the employe r should have an
opportunit y to show that individual
members of the g roup were sub-
ject to valid and e nforceable arbitra-
tion agreements. The court reasoned
that although col lective actions can
enhance eci ency by resolving com-
mon issues in a sin gle proceeding, they
also present dan gers, including the
potential for addi ng pressure to settle
simply by increasi ng the number of
claimants, re gardless of the merits of
their claims.
Litigation Section leaders high-
light the decisio n’s emphasis on the
import of notice i n FLSA collective
actions. “ The decision is very impor-
tant because i t focuses on the notice
stage, which is a co ntroversial stage
in this type of cas e,” observes David
E. Gevertz, co chair of the Section’s
Employment & Lab or Relations
Committee. “ The danger to a corporate
defendant in an F LSA collective action
is that the notice can re ally expand
the number of claimants, because it’s
an opt-in format,” agre es Adam Polk,
cochair of the Sec tion’s Class Actions &
Derivative Suits Co mmittee.
The Bigger decisi on is notable in its
willingness to address the realities of
litigation. “T he value of the decision is
that it explicitly ackn owledges what
practitioner s already know, which is
that the collecti ve action notice ca n
be the tail that wags th e dog in wage
and hour case s,” Gevertz comments.
“There is not an i nsignif‌icant cost
to gathering all of th e information
required by the notice , and the notice
will solicit pers ons who may have
other types of cla ims, all of which can
create a host of satellite p roblems for
the employer,” he adds.
Polk agrees that “disproportionate
discovery can be a f actor in this type
of case,” but notes th at the Seventh
Circuit’s reme dy may be unneces-
sary. “In an ordi nary class action, the
existence of arbitration agreements
among potential class members would
be addressed a s a typicality problem.
That would work und er FLSA, too,” he
states. Polk als o warns that by litigat-
ing the validity of a rbitration agree-
ments at the notice s tage, a court
“may be establishing an arbitration
requirement for absent class members,
who may not even be repres ented.
That’s a problem.”
For FLSA litigant s and their coun-
sel, Bigger helps set expectations
about the role that a rbitration agree-
ments will play in litig ation. This deci-
sion “is the f‌irst o ne to lay out the
steps to determine whether arbitra-
tion agreemen ts will limit the scope
of the lawsuit. So for p ractitioners, it
gives us a higher de gree of conf‌idence
when we’re talking w ith a client about
the arbitration ag reements that it has
with its employees ,” notes Gevertz. “If
you’re a plainti ’s attorney, be cog-
nizant of how you def‌in e your class,
as certain pote ntial members may be
subject to arbitr ation. But if you’re a
defense lawyer, get the i ssue of arbi-
trability goin g right out of the gate,
because the c ase gives you an oppor-
tunity to take a stan d at an earlier
juncture,” Polk counsels.
DOJ Can Convict—
But Can It Imprison?
By Ashlee E. H amilton, Litigation
News Contributing Editor
A person convicte d of distributing
marijuana may now a ssert that an
annual rider for congressional appro-
priations bars h is or her federal impris-
onment. In Sandusk y v. Goetz, the U.S.
Court of Appe als for the Tenth Circuit
allowed a man who ha d been impris-
oned for opera ting a medical mari-
juana company to se ek his immediate
freedom on this b asis.
In 2012, Aaron S andusky, who was
the president of a m edical marijuana
cooperative, was co nvicted in the U.S.
District Cour t for the Central District of
California of t wo counts of marijuana
tracking in C alifornia, where medica l
marijuana is le gal. Sandusky was sen -
tenced to 120 months i n prison.
Sandusky f‌i led a motion pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C . § 2255 to set aside
or correct his se ntence. A section
2255 motion mu st raise a challenge
based on alleg ed violations of fed-
eral law. Sandusk y argued that the
Rohrabacher-Farr amendment bars
his incarcerati on because it prohibits
the U.S. De partment of Justice (DOJ)
from using fun ds to prevent states
from “implem enting their own State
laws that authorize the us e, distribu-
tion, possess ion, or cultivation of med-
ical marijuana.”
Sandusky argued that the Federal
Bureau of Prison s, an agency of the
DOJ, violated the amendment by
incarcerating h im. The district court
dismissed his m otion, holding that his
incarceration wa s not an expenditure
of funds that prevente d California
from impleme nting its medical mari-
juana laws.
Because Sandusky was imprisoned
in Colorado, h e f‌iled a petition for writ
of habeas corpu s in the U.S. District
Court for the Di strict of Colorado pur-
suant to 28 U.S .C. § 2241. “A section
2241 petition is f‌iled i n the place of
incarceration a nd directly attacks exe-
cution of a federal s entence,” explains
David Schoen, Montgomery, AL,
chair of the ABA Litig ation Section’s
Criminal Jus tice Subcommittee of the
Civil Rights Litigation Committee.
24 | SECTION OF LITIGATION
THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN LITIGATION
NEWS & ANALYSIS

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