New business model needed to replace the status quo.

• Author: Erwin, Sandra I.
• Position: DEFENSE WATCH

In the weapons-acquisition world, the "normal" ways of doing business are frowned upon around the E-ring these days.

And for good reasons: nearly $400 billion in weapon programs' cost overruns; untold billions of dollars spent on hardware that doesn't meet the needs of today's military forces; and a procurement system that is so slow that by the time new technologies are fielded, the war is likely to be over.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has told the military services to banish their Cold War worldview of arms buying. The problem is that no new business model has yet emerged to replace the status quo.

Dozens of acquisition reform studies provided ad nauseam accounts of what is wrong with the system. Congress has enacted reforms that only have led to marginal change. As it is, the Pentagon still fundamentally acquires weapons according to McNamara-era rules.

Gates has not pushed for a complete overhaul of the system--only for the system to make room at the table for nontraditional programs and for rapid acquisitions such as the mine resistant ambush protected armored truck. Gates often cites the MRAP as a case study of how the Pentagon was institutionally unable to respond to urgent needs until he personally intervened. The program quickly ramped up to produce $26 billion worth of trucks at a rate of several thousand per month.

What troubles Gates is that the MRAP feat would not have been accomplished had it not received such extraordinary level of attention from the high command. A similar from-the-top-down effort was needed to produce electronic bomb jammers.

So, can the institutions adapt?

Probably not to the extent that Gates wishes. The MRAP and jammer acquisition models were so far off the mainstream that it would be unrealistic to expect that scale of response from every program, says Roger Smith, former deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for expeditionary warfare. Both projects saw more high-level involvement than any he had ever seen, Smith says. "They threatened a lot of rice bowls."

Executing these programs required unprecedented amounts of legal counsel to ensure actions would not lead to future litigation. Project managers also had to muster support from the weapons-testing office in order to expedite the evaluation of the equipment before it was shipped to war. "We all worked together" but more forcefully than would be the case under normal circumstances, Smith says. Senior officials also personally contacted the chief...