New media entrepreneurs in China: allies of the party-state or civil society?

• Author: Lagerkvist, Johan
• Position: Inside the Authoritarian State

Today more than 500 million Chinese Internet users roam social networking websites. Of them, as many as 300 million are part of a rapidly growing microblogosphere. This article examines the predicament of companies providing social networking services inside China's Great Firewall--specifically, the way in which they handle conflicting demands from the party-state and emerging civil society. In light of the phenomenal growth of microblogging and the Chinese government's tighter control over netizens in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, the issue of social agency comes to the fore. This article asks if the Chinese entrepreneurial class--the so-called "red capitalists"--could become agents of democratic political change. Are Internet entrepreneurs allies of civil society or the government? Based on their current esprit de corps with the state, it is unlikely that they will directly assist social change in the foreseeable future. Yet willingly or not, by providing civil society with tools to challenge the regime, they are becoming key players in the process of creating a more inclusive and accountable politics in China.

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The tumultuous events of the Arab Spring--in which social media tools aided mass mobilization--underscored an emerging battleground between the state and the opposition in today's nondemocratic regimes. Against the backdrop of revolution in North Africa and the Middle East, the People's Republic of China also made global headlines. The feeble attempt to initiate similar protests met with intensified crackdowns by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on dissenting voices in society and the media. (1) Internet censorship in China is a pressing concern for observers of the country's politics, particularly in the run-up to the Eighteenth National CCP Congress in 2012, when President Hu Jintao seems all but certain to transfer the reins of power to Vice President Xi Jinping as both general secretary of the Communist Party and head of state.

This article examines the predicament of social media companies operating within China's heavily restricted Internet environment, behind the so-called Great Firewall. Specifically, the article explores how these companies balance conflicting demands from the party-state and emerging civil society. Google's provision of a "speak-to-tweet" voice connection for activists, after Egypt's former ruler Hosni Mubarak pulled the Internet "kill switch" in January 2011, demonstrated that Internet businesses can do more than indirectly promote free speech. They can also fuel social unrest in authoritarian countries in more direct ways. This role, however, is far from preordained because social media often assist authoritarian rulers in surveilling civil society and stifling dissent? Arguably, the forces that drive democratization today are businesses that provide social media platforms, along with tech-savvy young people, unemployment and a rising middle class.

The article analyzes one of these components: the Internet business sector which is turned, simultaneously, toward two poles of attraction. Is it an ally of the incipient civil society or the state? The sector exhibits both compliant and noncompliant traits. For the party-state, cooperation of social media companies is crucial for reining in public discourse, seen as a threat to social and political stability. At the same time, as facilitators of new tools of information-sharing, social media providers indirectly assist in inciting opposition to the authoritarian information order. This balancing act highlights the broader question of social agency: Could Chinese Internet entrepreneurs go beyond passively facilitating online opinion platforms and become agents of democratic political change?

THE STATE-CAPITALIST POWER ALLIANCE

The question about social agency stems from the widely held assumption of modernization theory--namely, that a society's increasing wealth strengthens the middle class and gives it influence to propel political change. (4) The metrics of private-sector growth in China are certainly impressive. In the past decade, the number of private enterprises increased by 35 percent per year, reaching the current total of over five million. (5) Private companies contribute 66 percent of China's GDP and account for as much as 71 percent of its tax revenues. (6) According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, private companies constituted 73 percent of all registered corporations by the end of 2008. (7)

Researchers have struggled to understand why this phenomenon has not translated into political momentum. Analysis of data collected by lie Chen and Bruce Dickson in 2006 and 2007 from five rich coastal provinces, where about 70 percent of China's private entrepreneurs are located, highlights the extent to which some capitalists have chosen to enter into formal politics. (8) Of the entrepreneurs surveyed, as many as 38 percent were bona fide "red capitalists," that is, members of the Communist Party. A smaller share (18 percent) were deputies to either the National People's Congress or the provincial- and county-level People's Congresses that constitute broader segments of the population.

This alliance between political and economic powers has proved successful for economic growth and restricted the upper and middle classes from pursuing political independence. It has not, however, led to more social stability. The Achilles' heel of this power arrangement is growing corruption--a major source of social discontent. (9) A common grievance of ordinary people is "qian dengyu quan, quan dengyu qian," that is, "money equals power, power equals money."

The reasons for the state-capitalist alliance are twofold. First, incorporating Chinese capitalists into the ruling party and political institutions--thereby making them partners in China's economic modernization--has become a strategic must for the state. Second, preventing the entrepreneurial class from emerging as an independent political force able to support social unrest is a security priority. (10)

Analysts note that the growing economic power of Chinese entrepreneurs has not become a basis for alliance building with the persecuted dissident community. Rather, entrepreneurs have either been co-opted by the CCP or have chosen to ingratiate themselves with political power. (11) To date, however, there has been little explicit analysis of the extent to which business executives in the information- and communications-technology (ICT) sector adhere to the party-state norm on Internet policy. (12) Around the world, Internet entrepreneurs tend to profess libertarian views on free speech and information flows, which raises questions regarding their views about and loyalties toward China. Can we expect capitalists in the ICT sector to be less staunch in supporting the official line? Idealistic pursuit of freedom of expression is just one possible reason for resisting censorship policies. Another could be an unwillingness to restrict further growth of the online market, not to mention the fact that private ownership of these companies may allow for more independent thought and action.

PLUGGING INTO A HARMONIOUS INTERNET

Ever since the Internet in China became commercially successful in the late 1990s, authorities have sought to rein in its ability to provide alternative sources of information to the public. This has been achieved without much pushback from the entrepreneurs--a testament to their generally submissive nature. A common practice of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP is to summon Internet executives to closed conferences and lecture them on the importance of constructing a "healthy" Internet, i.e., a pacified online environment without pornography, hate speech or discussion of contentious topics such as religion and minorities. Many such meetings culminate in joint agreements, with the firms pledging in state-owned media to do their part in attaining this objective. (13)

From the business leaders' perspective, attending these events is a duty that is unwise, if not dangerous, to neglect: failing to come invites suspicion of being weak on the issue of social stability or worse, of having deviant views. Garnering official goodwill by affirming one's commitment to a harmonious online...