Networks of Cooperation: Rebel Alliances in Fragmented Civil Wars

• Author: Emily Kalah Gade,Mohammed M. Hafez,Zane Kelly,Michael Gabbay
• Date: 01 October 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719826234
• Published date: 01 October 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Networks of Cooperation:

Rebel Alliances in

Fragmented Civil Wars

Emily Kalah Gade

1

, Michael Gabbay

2

,

Mohammed M. Hafez

3

, and Zane Kelly

2

Abstract

When rebels make alliances, what informs their choice of allies? Civil wars are

rarely simple contests between rebels and incumbent regimes. Rather, rival mili-

tant networks provide the context in which these fragmented conflicts unfold.

Alliances that emerge within this competitive landscape have the power to alter

conflict trajectories and shape their outcomes. Yet patterns of interrebel coop-

eration are understudied. The existing scholarship on rebel alliances focuses on

why rebels cooperate, but little attention is given to the composition of those

alliances: with whom rebels cooperate. We explore how power, ideology, and

state sponsorship can shape alliance choices in multiparty civil wars. Employing

network analysi s and an original dat a set of tactical co operation among S yrian

rebels, we find compelling evidence that ideological homophily is a primary driver

of rebel collaboration. Our findings contribute to an emerging literature that

reasserts the role of ideology in conflict processes.

Keywords

Syria, civil war, fragmentation, alliances, social network analysis, ideology

1

Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

2

Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

3

Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Emily Kalah Gade, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Gowen Hall, Seattle,

WA 98195, USA.

Email: ekgade@uw.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2019, Vol. 63(9) 2071-2097

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719826234

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Civil wars are rarely simple contests between unified rebels and incumbent regimes.

Instead, they usually feature divided rebel movements with multiple factions com-

peting over leadership, territory, resources, and fighters (Bakke, Cunningham, and

Seymour 2012). Forging unity among armed groups is a challenge because credible

commitment problems make binding obligations difficult to initiate and sustain.

Cooperation also involves trade-offs between enhancing one’s power capabilities

and decision-making autonomy, which may incline some rebels to forgo alliances

that diminish their independence. Ideological considerations also affect rebel coop-

eration: factions that harbor competing vis ions for the future are likely to view

alliances with rivals as short-lived exigencies at best. Yet despite these barriers,

cooperation among armed factions does occur. Between 1946 and 2008, 181 of the

345 groups in civil wars, more than 52 percent, “have initiated positive associations

with each other while fighting with the government” (Akcinaroglu 2012, 890).

The prevalence of rebel cooperation alongside competition generates two puz-

zles: why do rebels cooperate and with whom do they cooperate? Literature on rebel

cooperation has focused on the why question. Interrebel alliances emerge between

factions seeking to augment their capabilities and improve their tactical productivity

(Lichbach 1995), balance against their rivals through minimum winning coalitions

(MWCs; Christia 2012), and increase their overall odds of victory by institutionaliz-

ing joint command and control of military operations (Akcinaroglu 2012). Little is

known, however, about the factors that shape the composition of rebel alliances, that

is, with whom rebels cooperate. Civil wars can involve hundreds of rebel brigades,

which could produce countless cooperative alignments. This translates into rebels

having choices when pursuing cooperation to achieve their conflict objectives. What

explains their choice of allies?

In addressing this puzzle, we make distinct theoretical, methodological, and

empirical contributions. Theoretically, we explore three logics of alliance composi-

tion related to ideology, power, and state sponsorship and make predictions about

how they might shape militant collaboration. We posit that ideological proximity in

rebel networks should yield greater militant cooperation than ideological distance,

thus challenging the prevailing assumption that ideology is a minor consideration in

alliance formation (Christia 2012). We operationalize ideology in civil wars along

three dimensions—conflict framing,conception of the ideal polity, and territorial

aspiration—and show that agreement within those issue areas facilitates cooperation

among rebel factions. Through conflict framing, a rebel group identifies whom it is

primarily fighting for and against, casting both in-group and out-groups with respect

to its preferred cleavage whether ethnic, religious, economic, or political. A group’s

conception of the ideal polity identifies its vision for the postconflict social and

political order and its territorial aspiration identifies the boundaries of this future

order. Unpacking ideology into these distinct dimensions allows for a more nuanced

understanding of factional alignments than the classification of rebels into broad

categories such nationalists, separatists, socialists, and fundamentalists.

2072 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(9)