Neo‐patrimonialism and Corruption: Evidence from 8,436 Firms in 17 Countries in Sub‐Saharan Africa

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13023
Published date01 July 2019
Date01 July 2019
580 Public Administration Review July | Augu st 20 19
Abstract: This article introduces four innovations to the literature on administrative corruption. First, it employs
a neo-patrimonialism framework by addressing measurement, identification, and endogeneity issues that beset the
literature. Second, unlike cross-country studies, it uses firms as the unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional
literature, the article uses large-n (n = 8,436) panel survey data of key informants in 17 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. Finally, unlike the conventional literature, the article focuses on a particular type of corruption: the supply and
demand for bribery. The authors find that the uncertainty associated with neo-patrimonialism has a strong, positive,
and significant effect on the propensity of civil servants to demand bribes in exchange for services and for firms to
supply bribes in exchange for winning government contracts. The results are robust to controls on the characteristics of
firms and their regulatory environments. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.
Evidence for Practice
• For donors, there is a higher risk of corruption in politically unstable countries and in specific agencies, such
as utilities and licensing/regulatory agencies.
• For policy makers, ensuring security of tenure and removing uncertainty in the careers of civil servants could
go some way toward minimizing (although not eliminating) the incidence of demand-side bribery. Likewise,
reducing uncertainty in public bidding (through transparent procedures) could reduce the incentives for
firms to supply bribes.
• For researchers, we note that the dynamics of bribery vary between the demand and supply sides, and it is
worth paying attention to the type of transaction involved (demand- or supply-side bribery, embezzlement,
political or regulatory capture, etc.) as well as the data to be used (firm-level, over-time, large-n data as
opposed to country-level, small-n, generalized perception data).
Eduardo Araral
National University of Singapore
Anton Pak
University of Queensland
Riccardo Pelizzo
Nazarbayev University
Xun Wu
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Neo-patrimonialism and Corruption: Evidence from 8,436
Firms in 17 Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
We introduce four innovations to the
literature on administrative corruption.
First, we employ a neo-patrimonialism
framework by addressing measurement, identification,
and endogeneity issues that beset the literature.
Second, unlike cross-country studies, we use the firm
as our unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional
literature, we use a large-n (n = 8,436) panel data
survey of key informants in 17 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, a region closely associated with
neo-patrimonialism and corruption. Finally, unlike
the conventional literature, which assumes that all
corruption is the same, we focus on a particular type
of corruption—the supply and demand for bribery.
Neo-patrimonialism, our explanatory variable, is a
type of regime that facilitates corruption or the abuse
of public power for private gain. Beekers and
van Gool define neo-patrimonialism as a type of regime
“in which ruling elites use the state for personal
enrichment and profit from a public administration
that is patently unstable, inefficient, nontransparent
and that fails to distribute public resources to
large segments of the population” (2012, 1). Neo-
patrimonialism, in fact, has been widely used as a
model to describe politics and public administration
in Africa and developing countries (Beekers and
van Gool 2012; Bratton and van de Walle 1997;
Erdmann and Engel 2006; Pitcher, Moran, and
Johnston 2009; Scott 1972; Solhjell 2013). Clientelism
is an associated concept, defined by Stokes “as giving
material goods in return for electoral support, where
the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is
simply: did you/will you support me?” (2011, 648).
However, neo-patrimonialism as an analytic framework
is faced with outstanding conceptual, methodological,
and empirical issues (see Erdmann and Engel 2006;
Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009). The first issue is
conceptual. Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston (2009) note
that the term “neo-patrimonialism” has been used in the
literature in at least four interrelated ways, and as a result
Xun Wu is professor in the Division of
Social Science and Division of Environment
and director of the Institute for Public Policy
at Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology. He is a policy scientist with
a strong interest in the linkage between
policy analysis and public management. His
research interests include policy innovations,
water resource management, health policy
reform, and anticorruption, and his work
has been published in top journals in his
fields of study.
E-mail: wuxun@ust.hk
Riccardo Pelizzo is associate professor
in the Graduate School of Public Policy
at Nazarbayev University. A political
development specialist, he holds master’s
and doctoral degrees in political science
from Johns Hopkins University.
E-mail: rpelizzo@gmail.com
Anton Pak is a PhD candidate in the
School of Economics at the University of
Queensland. His primary field is applied
microeconometrics, with particular interests
in the economics of health and political
economy.
E-mail: a.pak@uq.edu.au
Eduardo Araral is both an academic
and a practitioner. He has received
fellowships from the research centers of
three Nobel laureates in economics, the
Ostrom Prize for the Governance of the
Commons, and a Fulbright PhD award.
He has published in
World Development,
Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, Governance, Policy Sciences,
and
Water Resources Research,
among
others. His research focuses on governance
issues: corruption, collective action,
common pool resources, water, and new
technologies.
E-mail: ed_araral@nus.edu.sg
Research Article
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 79, Iss. 4, pp. 580–590. © 2019 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.13023.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT