Neoextractivism and Class Formation: Lessons from the Orinoco Mining Arc Project in Venezuela

• Date: 01 January 2019
• Author: Luis Fernando Angosto-Ferrández
• Published date: 01 January 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0094582X18806589
• Subject Matter: Articles

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 224, Vol. 46 No. 1, January 2019, 190–211

DOI: 10.1177/0094582X18806589

© 2018 Latin American Perspectives

190

Neoextractivism and Class Formation

Lessons from the Orinoco Mining Arc Project in Venezuela

by

Luis Fernando Angosto-Ferrández

The Arco Minero del Orinoco (Orinoco Mining Arc—AMO) project, launched in

2016, demonstrates that Bolivarian governments have been unsuccessful in overcoming

extractivism and rentier capitalism as structuring foundations of the Venezuelan state

and its politics, but it simultaneously confirms that these governments remain supported

by a bloc made up of heterogeneous class fractions primarily amalgamated around a

demand for socioeconomic development. Mining extractivism is the focus of a rapid read-

justment of regional and national class formation. The implementation of the Orinoco

Mining Arc project could reactivate government-led redistribution in the short-to-

medium term, reversing the deterioration of living conditions of the popular classes and

potentially reactivating participation of some of their members in small and medium-sized

economic ventures. However, given the political conditions under which the project was

launched, the main immediate beneficiaries (to different degrees) are capital holders, cor-

poratist groups within the state apparatus, and sectors of the indigenous population

directly involved in extractivism.

El proyecto Arco Minero del Orinoco (Orinoco Mining Arc—AMO), lanzado en 2016,

demuestra que los gobiernos bolivarianos han fracasado en superar el extractivismo y el

capitalismo rentista como fundamentos estructurales del Estado venezolano y su política,

pero simultáneamente confirma que estos gobiernos permanecen apoyado por un bloque

formado por fracciones de clase heterogéneas principalmente aglutinadas en torno a una

demanda de desarrollo socioeconómico. El extractivismo minero es el foco de un rápido

reajuste de la formación de clases regionales y nacionales. La implementación del proyecto

Orinoco Mining Arc podría reactivar la redistribución liderada por el gobierno en el corto

a mediano plazo, revirtiendo el deterioro de las condiciones de vida de las clases populares

y potencialmente reactivando la participación de algunos de sus miembros en pequeñas y

medianas empresas económicas. Sin embargo, dadas las condiciones políticas bajo las

cuales se lanzó el proyecto, los principales beneficiarios inmediatos (en diferentes grados)

son los titulares de capital, los grupos corporatistas dentro del aparato estatal y los sectores

de la población indígena directamente involucrados en el extractivismo.

Keywords: Venezuela, Extractivism, Indigenous peoples, Social movements, Orinoco

Mining Arc

Luis Fernando Angosto-Ferrández is a senior lecturer in anthropology and Latin American stud-

ies at the University of Sydney and the author of Venezuela Reframed: Bolivarianism, Indigenous

Peoples and Socialisms of the Twenty-first Century (2015). He thanks Federico Fuentes and the LAP

reviewers for their comments on the first draft of this paper, though he is responsible for any

errors it may contain.

806589LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X18806589Latin American PerspectivesAngosto-Ferrández / Neoextractivism And Class Formation In Venezuela

research-article2018

Angosto-Ferrández / NEOEXTRACTIVISM AND CLASS FORMATION IN VENEZUELA 191

Significant advances by rightist forces since 2015 have led some analysts to

suggest that the so-called Latin American pink tide is in irreversible decline, if

not already over. They include electoral successes such as the presidential vic-

tory of Mauricio Macri in Argentina (November 2015), the wins of the

Venezuelan opposition in parliamentary elections (December 2015), and the

defeat of Evo Morales’s bloc in the Bolivian referendum for constitutional

reform (February 2016). In tandem with other factors such as the ongoing eco-

nomic crisis in Venezuela and the (controversial) impeachment that removed

Dilma Rousseff from the Brazilian presidency, these results are presented as

evidence of a wide-ranging leftist defeat and, indeed, a rightist backlash in

Latin America. The victory of Lenín Moreno in the Ecuadorian presidential

elections of April 2017 did not change the views of those analysts. His electoral

success largely rested on the lingering political capital accumulated by Rafael

Correa during his period as national president and leader of the Alianza PAIS

(Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Alliance—AP), but his narrow victory was

from the outset presented by many as yet another symptom of the decline of

the regional left. The subsequent consolidation of cleavages and opposing fac-

tions within AP, including open confrontation between supporters of Moreno’s

political realignments and supporters of Correa’s heritage, has been taken as

further proof of that thesis.

In this context, debates over the character and prospects of the left in the con-

tinent have been revitalized, and, unsurprisingly, the term “populism” has once

again come to the fore. This term accompanies analyses of Latin American leftist

governments since the so-called pink tide started to take off in 1998 with Hugo

Chávez’s election in Venezuela, and it is now at work in explanations of the

alleged failure of these governments. However, explanations revolving around

populism diverge substantially in their diagnoses of the current Latin American

conjuncture and in the identification of the causes of the alleged rise and fall of

the pink tide. Some scholars have used the term “populism” to conceptualize

forms of leadership and regime building with particular appeal in Latin

America, suggesting that such forms relate to and reproduce particular charac-

teristics of democratic (under)development on the continent (e.g., De la Torre,

2010). Such perspectives have regained traction at present, converging with the

characterization of the new continental left blocs and particularly those of

Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador as undemocratic political deviations (Castañeda,

2006; Weyland, 2013). From this perspective, populism is marked by personalist

leadership, concentration of power in the executive, and debilitation of demo-

cratic institutionality. It is additionally associated with forms of economic policy

focused on maintaining power through the creation of groups of clients/electors

and prone to reproduce rentierism in extractivist countries. These perspectives

relegate competitive elections to a secondary plane, either questioning the legit-

imacy of electoral results or ignoring them as sources of political analysis. Thus

the motivations of those voting and supporting governments labeled “populist”

are disregarded or considered irrational (Lupien, 2015).

The term “populism” is of course used with other connotations as well, for

example, by analysts who reject liberal theoretical premises and identify them-

selves as leftists. These analysts also characterize the governments of countries

such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador as “populist,” but in their commentaries