Nelson, Samuel (1792–1873)

• Author: Kermit L. Hall
• Pages: 1791-1792

Page 1791

On March 5, 1845, Samuel Nelson became a Justice of the Supreme Court and judge of the Second Circuit. President JOHN TYLER nominated the New York Democrat in the belief that his record of moderation compiled over twenty-one years in the New York courts, including thirteen as associate and then chief justice of the state supreme court, would resolve eighteen months of wrangling between the chief executive and the SENATE over the high court vacancy. Unanimous Senate confirmation made Nelson the Court's thirty-first justice.

Nelson's most significant contribution to constitutional development involved the admiralty clause in Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. That clause specified that the federal courts should exclusively exercise the ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION. He interpreted the clause to extend federal JURISDICTION while retaining for the states an area of constitutional responsibility. Nelson first suggested the position, later adopted by the full Court in PROPELLER GENESEE CHIEF V. FITZHUGH (1851), that where INTERSTATE COMMERCE was involved the admiralty clause extended federal jurisdiction to inland rivers and lakes (New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 1848). He carefully rooted this expansion in an 1845 act that established admiralty jurisdiction in "certain cases, upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting with" the oceans. Nelson left to state courts responsibility for vessels that operated on lakes and rivers exclusively within the same state. This interpretation rested on two constitutional themes that pervaded his other opinions: congressional domination of matters of law as opposed to constitutional principles, and belief in a scheme of dual SOVEREIGNTY.

Even in this single instance of doctrinal leadership Nelson lost the initiative. New members of the Court and the quickening tempo of commercial life in the western United States rendered his emphasis on dual sovereignty obsolete. Almost always eager for accommodation, he acquiesced. In 1869 he spoke for the Court in holding that from the time of Genesee Chief federal admiralty jurisdiction on the lakes and rivers stemmed from the JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 rather than from the act of 1845 (The Eagle v. Frazer, 1869). Through this about-face, Nelson acknowledged that litigants could use federal district courts in admiralty cases arising in INTRASTATE COMMERCE.

The concept of dual sovereignty also informed his...