Neither free nor fair: the 1996 Bosnian elections and the failure of the U.N. election-monitoring mission.

AuthorRiley, Christopher A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

  1. INTRODUCTION II. THE HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA III. ACTIVITIES OF THE U.N., THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

    AND THE UNITED STATES IN YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA

    1. Early Attempts at Peace

    2. The Vance-Owen Plan

    3. The Invincible Plan

    4. U.S. Intervention

    5. The Contact Group

    6. The Dayton Peace Accords IV. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE

      IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

    7. Article I: Conditions for Democratic Elections

    8. Article II: The OSCE Role

    9. Article III: The Provisional Election Commission

    10. Article IV: Eligibility

    11. Article V: Permanent Election Commission V. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF MULTINATIONAL

      ELECTION MONITORING

    12. Acceptance of the Election-Monitoring Concept

    13. Recent Developments Concerning Election

      Monitoring

    14. Goals and Purposes of Election Monitoring

    15. OSCE and Election Monitoring VI. DO THE U.N. AND THE OSCE/ODIHR BELONG IN

      BOSNIA?

    16. The U.N. Debate

    17. The OSCE View

    18. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter VII. THE ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA VIII. ELECTION ANALYSIS IX. CONCLUSION

  2. INTRODUCTION

    Since the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia has been a region in turmoil. The break-up of the country in 1991 left the resulting republics unstable. Nowhere was this more evident than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ensuing civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina reintroduced the world to a concept rarely seen since Nazi Germany: ethnic cleansing.

    After many failed attempts, the international community succeeded in securing peace in Bosnia through the Dayton Peace Accords. Specifically, this treaty gave the United Nations (hereinafter U.N.) an opportunity to take the first steps toward democracy in Bosnia: free and fair elections.(1) Due to the intense hatred between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, this was a difficult, but not impossible, task. Unfortunately for those in Bosnia and around the world, the U.N. failed to take full advantage of this opportunity. Through an unsuccessful election-monitoring mission, the U.N. and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE) failed to instill in the Bosnian people the confidence in the democratic process which is essential to establishing a long-lasting democracy.

    Part II of this Note outlines the history of Yugoslavia. Part III discusses the activities of the U.N., the European Community (hereinafter EC), and the United States and their attempts to secure peace in Bosnia. Part IV reviews Annex 3 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provides for free and fair elections in Bosnia. Part V explains the history and purposes of multinational election-monitoring missions. Part VI addresses whether the U.N. and the OSCE had the authority to intervene in the Bosnian conflict and monitor its elections. Part VII examines the actual elections that took place on September 14, 1996. Finally, Part VIII analyzes and evaluates the elections to determine whether the election-monitoring mission was successful and considers the impact of the elections and the monitoring mission.

  3. THE HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA

    Yugoslavia was first created as a single nation after World War One(2) On December 1, 1918, Prince Regent Alexander proclaimed the creation of the Yugoslav state.(3) This first unified Yugoslavia was named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.(4) Bosnia, while part of this unified Yugoslavia, had actually become an independent state in 1878.(5) Even after its independence, however, Bosnia's religious and political factions rendered it unstable.(6)

    At the end of World War Two, Yugoslavia came under the socialist leadership of Josip Broz Tito.(7) Following the war, confusion surrounded the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia because it had no majority nationality or national name.(8) Nonetheless, Tito established six republics, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, with boundaries closely corresponding to those of the former Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.(9) Therefore, to an extent, the distinctiveness of Bosnia and Herzegovina was preserved in tile Yugoslav political system.(10) Tito continued to rule Yugoslavia, including the ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina, until his death in 1980.(11)

    After Tito's death, the ethnic tensions began to swell and destabilize the country.(12) Serbia, the dominant military and political republic, fought to maintain the federal system of government in Yugoslavia.(13) President Slobodan Milosevic led this Serbian movement after he ascended to power in 1987.(14) Ironically, Serbia's failure to recognize Croatia's right to the rotating federal Presidency in 1991 played a key role in the subsequent independence movements by some of the republics.(15) Slovenia and Croatia soon declared their independence, and Macedonia became autonomous.(16) Again, Bosnia's future Was uncertain because of its lack of a clear ethnic majority.(17) At that time, the population of Bosnia consisted of approximately forty-four percent Muslims, thirty-three percent Serbs, nineteen percent Croats, and four percent others.(18)

    The Bosnian Serbs wished to join their occupied regions of Bosnia to Serbia.(19) Similarly, the Bosnian Croats wanted to join their occupied regions to Croatia.(20) Alternatively, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats sought complete ethnic autonomy within Bosnia.(21) The problem with this final alternative was that no clear ethnic lines could be drawn in Bosnia because the three ethnic groups were intermingled throughout the republic.(22)

    Soon after the conflict surrounding the federal presidency, actions by Yugoslav and international bodies resulted in Bosnian independence. On October 15, 1991, the Bosnian Assembly, under President Alija Izetbegovic, declared its independence.(23) On December 15, 1991, the EC made an offer of recognition to Bosnia.(24) On January 3, 1992, the four republics remaining under control of the federal presidency declared themselves the Third Republic of Yugoslavia.(25)

    On January 25, 1992, the Bosnian Assembly followed its independence declaration with the approval of a formal referendum on Bosnia's independence.(26) The referendum, held February 29 through March 1, 1992, was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs.(27) Despite the boycott, sixty-three percent of Bosnia's population voted in favor of independence.(28)

    On March 3, 1992, President Izetbegovic proclaimed the independence of Bosnia.(29) Formal recognition by the EC followed on April 6, 1992.(30) The Bosnian Serbs responded to the independence of Bosnia when Radovan Karadzic: announced the formation of The Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina.(31) After this announcement, the Bosnian Serbs launched their offensive to reclaim Bosnia and unite the Serbs.(32) This resulted in one of the bloodiest civil wars in recent times.

  4. ACTIVITIES OF THE U.N., THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND THE UNITED STATES IN YUGOSLAVIA AND BOSNIA

    The peace process in Bosnia was slow and complicated; it involved several different international bodies and a few interested foreign countries. The five-year process consisted of various unsuccessful agreements among new emerging entities in the region such as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These early negotiations and agreements, while unsuccessful, provided the essential basis for the Dayton Peace Accords. The region's ethnic diversity and its bloody civil war left many important issues to be resolved. The peace process provided a forum through which the emerging entities could develop their own identities. Consequently, a slow peace process was necessary to build a consensus for the Dayton Peace Accords.

    1. Early Attempts at Peace

      Before Bosnian independence, the EC organized the Carrington Conference to discuss the conflict in Bosnia.(33) The original purpose of the conference was to discuss ways to keep Yugoslavia, known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter SFRY), together as a state.(34) The result of the complex negotiations was a text prepared by Lord Peter Carrington entitled Treaty Provisions for the Convention.(35) After President Milosevic of Serbia refused to accept it, this phase of the conference ended, and the text of the treaty was abandoned.(36) In the later stages of the conference, the Badinter Commission(37) released a series of advisory opinions pertaining to the conflicts.(38) Three of these opinions, recited below, applied to the emerging Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

      1) though the Bosnian Serbs had a right to self-determination, this did not imply the right to separate themselves from the future state;

      2) the internal boundaries of the Republics within the former SFRY had, on the dissolution of that state, become international boundaries due to the respect such borders are accorded under international law; and

      3) the future Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though it had by December 1991 not yet formally decided on independence, would be a state worthy of recognition by the EC and its members once that decision had been taken.(39)

      Because the Carrington Conference failed to achieve its original goal of keeping the SFRY together as a state, its purpose fundamentally changed.(40) First, it was to preside over an "orderly dissolution" of the SFRY.(41) Thereafter, it was to prevent the disintegration of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina once it obtained its independence.(42) As a result, the Conference organized the Round of Talks on Bosnian Constitutional Arrangements, headed by Portuguese Ambassador Jose Cutileiro.(43) On March 18, 1992, just two weeks after Bosnia declared its independence, the talks concluded with the Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina.(44) This solution would divide Bosnia into three autonomous and ethnically-defined areas, held together under a weak central government.(45) The principles were quickly denounced despite the informal agreement among the leaders of the Serbs...

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