Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force: Emerging Recruiting Models

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X211048216
• Published date: 01 January 2023
• Date: 01 January 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20917183

Armed Forces & Society

2023, Vol. 49(1) 138 –159

© The Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X20917183

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Article

1134644AFSXXX10.1177/0095327X20917183Armed Forces & SocietyLevy

research-article2022

Neither a Conscript Army

nor an All-Volunteer Force:

Emerging Recruiting Models

Eyal Ben-Ari, Elisheva Rosman, and Eitan Shamir 

Abstract

This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the

advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a

hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has un-

dergone changes centered on f‌ive key organizing principles: selective conscription,

early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing

pay-scales, and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These

principles are “grafted”onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized”model.

The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate

mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military ex-

pertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic

social, economic, and political expectations about its composition and the use of

personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and f‌lexible, as shown through the

comparisons throughout the paper.

Keywords

recruiting models, grafting, conscription, Israel, Baltic states, Scandinavia, all-volunteer

forces

1

The Center for Society, Security and Peace at Kinneret Academic College, Mevasseret-Zion, Israel

2

Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

Corresponding Author:

Eyal Ben-Ari, The Center for Society, Security and Peace at Kinneret Academic College.

Email: eyal1953@gmail.com

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20917183

Armed Forces & Society

2023, Vol. 49(1) 138 –159

© The Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211048216

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

Ben-Ari et al. 139

Introduction

Most academic and military debates about the advantages and disadvantages of force

composition (and hence recruitment and retention) posit a dichotomy between the

ideal-types of conscription and all-volunteer models. We argue that a new model

maximizing the benef‌its of the two systems—providing a necessary mass of force and

specialized military professionals—has emerged in Israel. Moreover, a close scrutiny of

other small- and medium-sized countries reveals similar, if limited, developments in the

same direction. While some countries like Finland or South Korea have maintained

conscription along classic lines, others as Denmark or Lithuania maintain parallel

systems by decreasing the numbers of conscripts and strengthening their volunteer

systems. In contrast, Israel has experimented with and adapted its model by “grafting”

onto conscription a set of arrangements allowing it to enjoy many benef‌its of a fully-

f‌ledged voluntary force centered on military professionalism. While Israel’s con-

scription has never been truly universal (and is becoming less so), for many groups, the

Israel Defence Forces (IDF) still embodies the ethos of a “People’s Army.”Moreover,

the country preserves conscription (32 months for men, 24 months for women) despite

evidence that volunteer forces are more cost-effective in terms of training and personnel

(Arad, 2010).

Why, then, does Israel maintain conscription despite its inbuilt inequalities and

costs? We contend that to meet its security challenges and corresponding personnel

needs, a form of selective conscription has evolved that is centered on a multiplicity of

organizational routes and roles involving different lengths of service, pecuniary and

non-material rewards, professional development, promotion ladders, and prospects for

civilian employment. Further, the design of this model represents an attempt to meet

domestic social, economic, and political demands that have developed during the past

four decades. This is an adaptive system since it allows the military to maintain its

image of embodying the national ethos, adhering to economic constraints and ad-

dressing the multiple motivations of potential recruits while meeting the military

demands of today’s conf‌licts (see Krebs, 2005).

The IDF’s force structure comprises conscripts, regulars, and reserves. Recent

decades have witnessed considerable downsizing of the reserves (along with increasing

material rewards for those remaining) (Levy, 2011;Catignani et al., 2021) coupled with

a reform of the component of regulars (creating different contracts) (Safrai, 2019). No

less signif‌icant are organizational transformations that have occurred in conscription,

changes that are important since in Israel virtually all regulars and reservists (including

off‌icers), members of Israel’s Internal Security Agency, the Mossad, and the police have

served as conscripts.

Today’smodel of conscription is very different from the form it took unti l the 1980s

since it is a hybrid structure combining elements of the ideal-types of professional and

militia models (Cohen, 2010). Yet this form is neither an all-volunteer force nor a

universal mandatory conscription one, nor is it one in which one segment of volunteers

is juxtaposed next to a conscript-based one. Clearly there always were and still are

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