Chapter III. Selected decisions, recommendations and reports of a legal      character by the United Nations and related inter-governmental      organizations

Chapter HI

SELECTED DECISIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF A LEGAL CHARACTER BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

  1. Decisions, recommendations and reports of a legal character by the United Nations

    1. EXTRACT FROM A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCEl

      [Original text: English]

      [26 June 1967]

      INTRODUCTION

    2. This report on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) is submitted because, as indicated in my statement on 20 June 1967 to the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly [1527th plenary meeting], important questions have been raised concerning the actions taken on the withdrawal of UNEF. These questions merit careful consideration and comment. It is in the interest of the United Nations, I believe, that this report should be full and frank, in view of the questions involved and the numerous statements that have been made, both public and private, which continue to be very damaging to the United Nations and to its peace-keeping role in particular. Despite the explanations already given in the several reports on the subject which have been submitted to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, misunderstandings and what, I fear, are misrepresentations, persist, in official as well as unofficial circles, publicly and behind the scenes.

    3. A report of this kind is not the place to try to explain why there has been so much and such persistent and grossly mistaken judgement about the withdrawal of UNEF. It suffices to say here that the shattering crisis in the Near East inevitably caused intense shock in many capitals and countries of the world, together with deep frustration over the inability to cope with it. It is, of course, not unusual in such situations to seek easy explanations and excuses. When, however, this tactic involves imputing responsibility for the unleashing of major hostilities, it is, and must be, a cause for sober concern. The objective of this report is to establish an authentic, factual record of actions and their causes.

    4. The emphasis here, therefore, will be upon facts. The report is intended to be neither a polemic nor an apologia. Its sole purpose is to present a factually accurate picture of what happened and why. It will serve well the interests of the United Nations, as well as of historical integrity, if this presentation of facts can help to dissipate some of the distortions of the record which, in some places, apparently have emanated from panic, emotion and political bias.

      1 Document A/6730/Add. 3, reproduced from Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 5.

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      CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT ACTIONS

    5. Not only events but dates, and even the time of day, have an important bearing on this exposition. The significant events and actions and their dates and times are therefore set forth below.

      16 May 1967

    6. 2000 hours GMT (2200 hours, Gaza local time). A message from General Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, was received by the Commander of UNEF, Major-General Rikhye, requesting withdrawal of "all UN troops which install observation posts along our borders" (A/6730, para. 6, sub-para. 3 (a)). Brigadier Mokhtar, who handed General Fawzy's letter to the Commander of UNEF, told General Rikhye at the time that he must order the immediate withdrawal of United Nations troops from El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh on the night of 16 May since United Arab Republic armed forces must gain control of these two places that very night. The UNEF Commander correctly replied that he did not have authority to withdraw his troops from these positions on such an order and could do so only on instructions from the Secretary-General; therefore, he must continue with UNEF operations in Sinai as hitherto. Brigadier Mokhtar told the Commander of UNEF that this might lead to conflict on that night (16 May) between United Arab Republic and UNEF troops, and insisted that the Commander issue orders to UNEF troops to remain confined to their camps at El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh. General Rikhye replied that he could not comply with this request. He did, of course, inform the contingent commanders concerned of these developments. He also informed United Nations Headquarters that he proposed to continue with UNEF activities as established until he received fresh instructions from the Secretary-General.

    7. 2130 hours GMT (1730 hours, New York time). The Secretary-General received at this time the UNEF Commander's cable informing him of the above-mentioned message from General Fawzy. The UNEF Commander was immediately instructed to await further instructions from the Secretary-General and, pending this later word from him, to "be firm in maintaining UNEF position while being as understanding and as diplomatic as possible in your relations with local United Arab Republic officials".

    8. 2245 hours GMT (1845 hours, New York time). The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic visited the Secretary-General at this time at the latter's urgent request. The Secretary-General requested the Permanent Representative to communicate with his Government with the utmost urgency and to transmit to it his views (A/6730, para. 6, sub-para. 3 (c)). In particular, the Secretary-General requested the Permanent Representative to obtain his Government's clarification of the situation, pointing out that any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must come directly to the Secretary-General from the Government of the United Arab Republic.

    9. 2344 hours GMT. The UNEF Commander further reported at this time that considerable military activity had been observed in the El Arish area since the afternoon of 16 May 1967.

      17 May 1967

    10. 0800 hours GMT (0400 hours New York time). The Commander of UNEF reported then that on the morning of 17 May, thirty soldiers of the Army of the United Arab Republic had occupied El Sabha in Sinai and that United Arab Republic troops were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the UNEF observation post there. Three armoured

      cars of the United Arab Republic were located near the Yugoslav UNEF camp at El Sabha and detachments of fifteen soldiers each had taken up positions north and south of the Yugoslav contingent's camp at El Amr. All UNEF observation posts along the armistice demarcation line and the international frontier were manned as usual, but in some places United Arab Republic troops were also at the Line.

    11. 1030 hours GMT (0630 hours, New York time). The Commander of UNEF reported then that troops of the United Arab Republic had occupied the UNEF observation post at El Sabha and that the Yugoslav UNEF camps at El Qusaima and El Sabha were now behind the positions of the army of the United Arab Republic. The Commander of UNEF informed the Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff of these developments, expressing his serious concern at them. The Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff agreed to request the immediate evacuation of the observation post at El Sabha by United Arab Republic troops and shortly thereafter reported that orders to this effect had been given by the United Arab Republic military authorities. He requested, however, that to avoid any future misunderstandings, the Yugoslav observation post at El Sabha should be withdrawn immediately to El Qusaima camp. The Commander replied that any such withdrawal would require the authorization of the Secretary-General.

    12. 1200 hours GMT (0800 hours, New York time). The Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff at this time conveyed to the Commander of UNEF a request from General Mohamed Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav detachments of UNEF in the Sinai within twenty-four hours. He added that the UNEF Commander might take "forty-eight hours or so" to withdraw the UNEF detachment from Sharm el Sheikh. The Commander of UNEF replied that any such move required instructions from the Secretary-General.

    13. 1330 hours GMT. The Commander of UNEF then reported that a sizable detachment of troops of the United Arab Republic was moving into the UNEF area at El Kuntilla.

    14. 2000 hours GMT (1600 hours, New York time). The Secretary-General at this date held an informal meeting in his office with the representatives of countries providing contingents to UNEF to inform them of the situation as then known. There was an exchange of views. The Secretary-General gave his opinion on how he should and how he intended to proceed, observing that if a formal request for the withdrawal of UNEF were to be made by the Government of the United Arab Republic, the Secretary-General, in his view, would have to comply with it, since the Force was on United Arab Republic territory only with the consent of the Government and could not remain there without it. Two representatives expressed serious doubts about the consequences of agreeing to a peremptory request for the withdrawal of UNEF and raised the questions of consideration of such a request by the General Assembly and an appeal to the United Arab Republic not to request the withdrawal of UNEF. Two other representatives stated the view that the United Arab Republic was entitled to request the removal of UNEF at any moment and that that request would have to be respected regardless of what the General Assembly might have to say in the matter, since the agreement for UNEF's presence had been concluded between the then Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt. A clarification of the situation from the United Arab Republic should therefore be awaited.

    15. 2150 hours GMT (1750 hours, New York time). The Secretary-General at this time saw the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic and handed to him an aide-memoire, the text of which is contained in paragraph 6 of document A/6730. The Secretary-General also gave to the...

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