Naval maneuvering.

• Position: Letters

As a Navy engineer, I'm pleased to hear that the Navy is doing something correctly ("Studs and Duds," by Eric Umansky, December 2001). Most of us in the Navy civil service work tirelessly to provide the war fighter the best possible product. Ben R. Rich, the one-time head of Lockheed's aircraft developer in Burbank, Calif., wrote a book called Skunk Works in which he described the famous site where the U-2, SR-7, F-117 and the B-2 discussed in your article were all developed. In the book, Rich described the "10 Commandments" of a contractor, one of which was never to work with the Navy since "they will break your back, your balls, and your spirit? It is good to hear that that hard-nosed approach is paying off.

DR. WILLIAM J. SCHARPF NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY Washington, D.C. "Studs and Duds" is based on a fundamentally flawed thesis that the Navy's rigorous testing of its systems results in better weapons on the battlefield. The Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), which the author, without any evidence, holds up as a model weapons program, was originally conceived as a "joint" weapon with the Air Force. It has suffered a host of serious technological setbacks in recent months. The program is not "fully operational." In fact, until significant software problems are corrected, final production JSOWs cannot be used by Navy F-18 or Air Force F-16 aircraft. The JSOWs used in Iraq, Kosovo, and--in very limited numbers--Afghanistan, are early-production models. The story also grossly misrepresents the development of remotely piloted vehicles like Predator and Global Hawk. Both were developed by defense agencies (not the Air Force), without the cumbersome framework of regulations that burden traditional acquisition programs. To suggest that either would be in better shape had it gone through the Navy's testing program is ridiculous. How many remotely piloted vehicles has the Navy developed in the past 10 years? Zero.

JOHN ROBINSON MANAGING EDITOR Defense Daily via email As a defense reporter who followed the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk programs, I'd like to point out a couple of inconsistencies in Umansky's article. Predator didn't follow the Pentagon's typical acquisition and testing process because it began as an "advanced concept technology demonstration"--an effort to swiftly field useful technologies. In fact, the Predator has been a victim of its own success. The program began in the early...