NATO: going, going ... but not yet gone.

• Author: Ullman, Harlan
• Position: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

IN ITS nearly sixty years of existence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has often found itself in jeopardy. That is the case today. And Afghanistan is not the only cause celebre.

NATO, of course, is one of history's great survivors. From Suez in 1956 to the Euromissile crisis 25 years later, and through the Vietnam and (so far) Iraq debacles, the alliance has persevered and often thrived. Following the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked--for the first time--Article 5, considering an attack on one an attack on all. NATO went to war against global terror, and in 2006 it assumed full responsibility for the UN International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Imagine what NATO's founding fathers would think if they awakened today. NATO's first prolonged ground-combat operations did not take place along the inner-German border against Soviet forees, but in faraway Afghanistan. So, much has changed for the better. However, NATO's future very much hangs in the balance over Afghanistan and other critical and unresolved issues that linger from the Cold War.

Some argue that all alliances ultimately erode and NATO's time may now have come. That is a profoundly mistaken view and, as I argue, NATO has never been more important to promoting stability and security. However, for NATO to remain vibrant and effective, each of the 26 members must be willing to agree to and act on a better defined, clearer and more convincing vision and set of purposes to handle the challenges, dangers and uncertainties of the coming decade. This in turn will demand major changes in forces, capabilities, command structures and rules of engagement--rather than empty promises and ill-defined commitments.

Several realities must inform NATO's thinking. First, NATO has never fully answered the central post-Cold War question of how to sustain a military alliance formed to counter a military threat that no longer exists. Nor has NATO learned how to deal with a Russia many fear is turning against the West, even though the NATO-Russia Council was one mechanism created to facilitate greater integration.

Second, the nature of the threats and dangers to NATO and the world at large has profoundly changed. Jihadi extremism--frequently dismissed as "terrorism" or limited to Al-Qaeda--is an amalgam of ideas and ideologies, wrapped in a perverted interpretation of Islam that seeks political power. It is focused in the Arab and Muslim worlds, where the recruiting base of desperate, humiliated and disenfranchised people numbers in the hundreds of millions. The United States and Europe, of course, are targets as well.

Third, energy, environment and infrastructure protection are now much higher priorities than they were during the Cold War.

Fourth, NATO members have questioned and challenged America's leadership over the Iraq War and its aftermath. A large majority of Europeans hold (to put it politely) an unflattering view of George W. Bush and of the interventionist neoconservative agenda they believe is being imposed either on target states in the Middle East or, de facto, on the alliance. Writing off America until January 2009 is an understandable reaction, albeit one that assumes two years isn't too long to wait.

Fifth, China and India are now important geo-economic players. Whether Asia will replace Europe as the center of geopolitics is a pregnant question but one with a long gestation period. Irrespective, Asia is surely a more dominant region than it was during the Cold War.

Sixth, the proliferation of multilateral institutions and non-governmental...