Nationalization of the Constitution and Executive Power

• Author: Jack Fruchtman
• Profession: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program in Law and American Civilization at Towson University, Maryland
• Pages: 45-51

American Constitutional History: A Brief Introduction, First Edition. Jack Fruchtman.

© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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Nationalization of the Constitution

and Executive Power

The president’s main domestic duty is to enforce the laws that

Congress makes after he and his predecessors sign them. Madison and

Hamilton differed over whether Congress or the president should be

the most powerful agent of government. Madison preferred the

legislature, whereas Hamilton the executive. In Federalist 51, Madison

argued that “in republican government, the legislative authority,

necessarily predominates.” Most of the Constitution’s framers agreed,

given the placement in Article I of the Congress and its length and

their fear of an executive who might resemble George III. Madison’s

statement had a both positive and negative meaning. It was positive,

because the legislature theoretically reflected the people’s will. It was

negative, because legislatures might oppress the minority. The check

on Congress was the president’s veto. But Congress could then mount

a two‐thirds vote in both houses to override it. Meantime, Hamilton’s

view was different. In Federalist 70, he promoted “a vigorous execu-

tive” and stated that “energy in the executive is a leading character in

the definition of good government.” Some commentators have con-

cluded that Hamilton expounded the theory of the unitary executive,

the principle that the president, as the chief executive and commander

in chief of the armed forces, may act alone in matters of military and

national security policy when he was not answerable to congressional

or judicial oversight.