The U.N. and humanitarian assistance: Ambassador Jan Eliasson.

• Author: Loehr, Robert C.
• Position: Transcending National Boundaries - Interview

Journal: In recent years, the international community has increasingly been called upon to intervene in situations of intrastate conflict, often without the consent of the parties involved. To what extent do you feel that this intervention threatens the traditional concept of sovereignty?

Eliasson: I think we are going through a change in international relations that goes back to two main factors: The first is the end of the Cold War, and the second is the fact that conflicts (perhaps also as a result of the end of the Cold War) are now concentrated in the realm of civil wars and internal conflicts. This change is increasingly recognized within the international community. The process of adapting to this changing international environment has made it possible for the Security Council to make decisions to enter these internal conflicts to a degree that was not the case in the past.

It started with a very important resolution, U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, which came about after the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and the subsequent dramatic events in the north and south of Iraq. The flow of refugees across the borders to Turkey and Iran was in a way seen as a threat to international peace and security, and the resolution was passed to deal with conditions which basically prevailed inside a country. There were some abstentions (an important one from China), but there were no vetoes of this resolution.

Since 1992, the United Nations Security Council has been more involved with internal conflicts than with international conflicts. So there has already been some type of conceptual breakthrough for the international community, enabling the United Nations to deal with civil wars. This is reflected in the fact that there have been no vetoes in the Security Council concerning such situations. This, in turn, reflects the diminishing tensions between the major powers in the Security Council.

It is not clear to what extent this development is welcomed by all the members of the General Assembly. There may be some nations, especially developing countries, who fear its potential consequences. It may infringe upon their sovereignty, and young nations' independence may be put into question. Finally, there is a fear that humanitarian intervention will be used as a political Trojan Horse. These concerns have to be taken seriously, because it is very important that this trend, as well as the changing responsibility for internal conflicts, be accepted not only within the Security Council, but within the international community as a whole.

Journal: Do you feel, then, that the intervention in Iraq was perhaps a watershed event?

Eliasson: Yes, and not only because the U.N. later had to deal with the internal situation in the Kurdish area, where, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, I led an operation of humanitarian support. There is also the fact that the Iraq-Kuwait war opened up a new, innovative solution for the implementation of Security Council resolutions in this type of conflict - the setting up of a coalition which received the blessing of the United Nations. But this part of the Iraq-Kuwait situation was truly international. It was a case of aggression which was dealt with in a relatively normal way, i.e., in the context of an international conflict. The other part, which engendered Resolution 688 and the humanitarian programs, dealt with the subject that we are talking about here: activity in internal conflicts.

Journal: If we can, for a moment, narrow it down a bit to humanitarian areas, do you feel that there is a moral obligation for the international community to respond to humanitarian crises that cannot be addressed by a host government alone? Specifically, in the case of what have become known as failed states," such as Somalia, how do you think the international community should respond?

Eliasson: Certainly there is a moral obligation, and now also an obligation that is accepted by the member states. In the resolution that created the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which I was proud to be the first to head (General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991), there is a recognition by the member states of the necessity to provide the international community with access to people in humanitarian need, and also of an obligation for the welfare of their own people in such a humanitarian crisis. I personally used this resolution as a diplomatic, formal basis for various negotiations. For example, in negotiations over humanitarian corridors in the case of Sudan and later Angola, I made reference to this resolution and to the commitments of the member states to provide assistance. So yes, the concept that solidarity does not end automatically at a border but rather with a human being in need has broken through in the humanitarian area.

We have not yet reached this stage when it comes to human rights or to other internal developments, and I think movement in this direction is seen by some developing countries as reason for concern. But in terms of humanitarian situations there has been acceptance.

I do not use the phrase "failed states," as I do not think we should give up on nations. There is a tremendous vitality - sometimes only potential - in every nation. But in the case of Somalia, where there was an obvious lack of central authority, it was easy for the Security Council to come to a unified view that the United Nations had to act. As a matter of fact, the African countries were the ones pushing most strongly for action by the Security Council, because of the dangers posed by the chaos and anarchy that existed inside Somalia. We would probably have run into more serious problems for such action if there had been a government that had resented the entry of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. But in the case of Somalia, where it was so obvious that things were falling completely apart and that we were facing an absolutely horrendous humanitarian nightmare (one that I saw with my own eyes in the fall of 1992), it was clear that something had to be done. In the case of such situations of complete anarchy, it is obvious that the United Nations has a responsibility, and I think that this is now recognized by practically all member states.

Journal: Given that the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is largely over now, and that there has been a general failure to achieve a consensus on building a Transitional National Council as envisioned in the March 1993 Addis Ababa accords, do you think the UN. should remain in Somalia or limit its role?

Eliasson: I am not as informed about the details of the situation in Somalia now as I was when I was Under-Secretary-General, but my basic view is that the United Nations should not completely abandon any situation. More broadly, the United Nations should try to achieve a balanced presence from the very beginning. I was very strongly of the view (even when I was inside the United Nations) that we should have had a humanitarian strategy, complementing the peacekeeping and political strategies, and that the humanitarian strategy should have been underpinned by a massive humanitarian, economic and developmental effort. My view was, and is still, that such a massive international humanitarian effort would have had not only enormously positive effects on the population, but also on security in the country. If we had built bridges, repaired roads, taken away mines and given jobs to the young boys who otherwise sat on their vans brandishing their weapons, we would indeed have made a contribution to security.

The right strategy for the United Nations, in my view, is to adopt the correct mix of operational elements to begin with, and then to "hang in there" until the situation is such that there is a process that is self-sustaining inside the country. I do not know to what extent we have reached that stage. I am concerned by reports that I am receiving from the field that things are falling apart. For the United Nations to...