Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi's Kuzari.

• Author: Abrahamov, Binyamin
• Position: Book Review

By DIANA LOBEL. SUNY Series in Jewish Philosophy. Albany: STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, 2000. Pp. x + 277. $23.95.

The Kuzari by the Jewish poet and thinker Judah Ha-Levi (d. shortly after 1141), presents a fictional dialogue between a Khazar king and a philosopher, a Christian, a Muslim, and a Jew (Haver). The work aimed at defending Judaism against Aristotelian philosophy, Christianity, and Islam, while upholding Judaism as the most exalted religion. Written in Judeo-Arabic, the Kuzari incorporates terms rooted in Islamic philosophy, mysticism, theology, and law. Lobel focuses on the ways Ha-Levi adapts these terms to his purposes. Her discussion of these terms comprises five sections--relationship between man and God, striving for the Divine, perception of God, prophecy, and love for God--and is accompanied by an analysis of the concepts and contexts in each. Lobel briefly reviews previous scholarship on the Kuzari and the ideas Ha-Levi presents. The author's impressive lucidity and erudition enable even the non-specialist reader to comprehend fully Ha-Levi's arguments and rhetorical strategies.

Lobel attempts to sketch the borders and the overlapping lines between mysticism and philosophy. However, this reviewer is not convinced that her statement (p. 23) declaring the Sufi "a background figure in the dialogue" of I: 1 is corroborated by solid proof. It is a commonplace that Muslim philosophers, having been influenced by Neoplatonism, used mystical ideas and terms that include ascetic concepts. See, for example, the term khushu', which occurs in the philosopher's speech (Kuzari I: 1). P. Morewedge regards Ibn Sina as an example of Islamic mysticism; see his "The Neoplatonic Structure of Some Islamic Mystical Doctrines;" in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. P. Morewedge (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 51-75. But it seems to me that Ha-Levi polemicizes against a philosophy that uses mystical terms and concepts. The attack against isolation, for example, may have been directed at Ibn Bajja's (d. 1138) tadbir al-mutawwahid (the Conduct of the Solitary). Even if we were to accept Lobel's insistence on the use of Sufi terms by Ha-Levi, we should point out that contrary to Lobel's assertion on p. 23, "the Sufis never used the term ittihad to describe the mystical union ... it is non-Sufis--such as the Shi'i Ibn al-Da'i (ft. late fifth/ eleventh century), the philosopher Ibn Sina, and the theologian al-Ghazali--who ascribe the use of...