Mutually Assured Distrust: Ideology and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars

• Author: Krista Wiegand,Eric Keels
• Date: 01 November 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002720928414
• Published date: 01 November 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Mutually Assured

Distrust: Ideology

and Commitment

Problems in Civil Wars

Eric Keels

1

and Krista Wiegand

2

Abstract

Within the study of intrastate armed conflicts, many scholars rely on a bar-

gaining model when explaining why some civil wars are intractable. Primarily,

scholars posit that commitment problems represent a key barrier to settling

conflicts through negotiations. Yet, some civil wars are more easily resolved

than others. If commitment problems are a universal feature of civil wars, what

explains why commitment problems are more salient in some conflicts as

compared to others? We argue that ideological differences between combatants

enhance commitment problems in civil wars. Assuming that ideology is used by

combatants to generate support, concessions that violate the ideological goals of

each side may alienate supporters. With extreme ideological polarization, con-

cessions may be viewed as relative as opposed to absolute, making it difficult for

either side to credibly commit to offer concessions. To test these claims, we

quantitativel y examine the dura tion and outcome of all intrastat e conflicts from

1975 to 2011.

Keywords

ideology, indivisibility, commitment problems, civil war

1

One Earth Future Foundation, Broomfield, CO, USA

2

Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA

Corresponding Author:

Eric Keels, One Earth Future Foundation, 525 Zang Street, Broomfield, CO 80021, USA.

Email: erickeels@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(10) 2022-2048

ªThe Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720928414

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

The war in Afghanistan has now become the longest running military campaign in

the history of the United States. In addition to the thousands killed in the conflict,

sixteen years of fighting has led to a de facto stalemate in the conflict, where neither

side perceives any clear path to outright victory. Still, a settlement has been difficult

to achieve in the conflict between the Afghan Government, the US military, and the

various Taliban factions fighting for control of this war-torn state. Similarly, the

Colombian Government’s war with the National Liberation Army rebels has entered

its fifty-fourth year. While the Government of Colombia was able to end the pro-

tracted conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army

rebels, there is no guarantee that such a similar success will be achieved in their

dispute with this other Marxist rebel group.

The last twenty years have produced many studies that attempt to explain why

some conflicts remain intractable. By far, the dominant approach to this topic

remains the bargaining approach to civil war dynamics (Mason and Fett 1996;

Walter 2002, 2009a; Fearon 2004). In particular, scholars often posit that civil wars

are difficult to resolve through a negotiated settlement, given commitment problems

between combatants. Given the mutual incentive to defect from any agreement

reached, neither side may credibl y commit to a settlement (Fearon 1995 , 2004;

Walter 2002). Absent institutional mechanisms or international assistance, commit-

ment problems present a common barrier to resolving conflicts. What remains puz-

zling, though, is that some conflicts may be resolved relatively quickly while others

persist. For instance, the Chadian Government negotiated a peace agreement with

the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic rebels after only seven months of fighting.

This occurred without significant international assistance. Equally, what can explain

why the Museveni Government in Uganda was able to negotiate a peace agreement

with the Ugandan Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) after only a year of fighting

but has been unable to resolve the thirty-year conflict with the Lord’s Resistance

Army (LRA)? As noted by Kaufman (2015), if commitment problems are a uni-

versal aspect of civil wars, why do they play a larger role in some disputes and not in

others?

One explanation for the varying effects of commitment problems may be the

specific issues under contention (Walter 2006; Goddard 2006; Svensson 2007).

Certain contentious issues, such as the right to self-determination or the promotion

of religious practices, often complicate the bargaining environment as the stakes

under dispute are perceived to be indivisible (Goddard 2006). While the role of

intangible, and increasingly indivisible, issues has be en discussed widely in the

literature on interstate conflict (Huth 1996; Mitchell and Hensel 2005; Hensel

et al. 2008; Wiegand 2011), there has been relatively little wo rk on the role of

indivisible issues within the quantitative literature on intrastate conflict (Goddard

2006; Svensson 2007). Rather, much of the bargaining literature tends to downplay

the role of indivisible stakes in complicating negotiat ions (Fearon 1995; Powell

2006). It is difficult to believe, though, that bargaining is only affected by these

indivisible claims in interstate disputes but not in intrastate conflicts.

Keels and Wiegand 2023