Municipal Contracting With County Sheriffs for Police Services in California: Comparison of Cost and Effectiveness

• Date: 01 March 2011
• Published date: 01 March 2011
• DOI: 10.1177/1098611110393133
• Author: Peter J. Nelligan,William Bourns
• Subject Matter: Articles

Police Quarterly

14(1) 70 –95

© 2011 SAGE Publications

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DOI: 10.1177/1098611110393133

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14110.1177/1098611110393133Nelligan and BournsPolice Quarterly

1California State University, Stanislaus, Turlock

Corresponding Author:

Peter J. Nelligan, Department of Criminal Justice, California State University, Stanislaus,

One University Circle, Turlock, CA 95382

Email: pnelligan@csustan.edu

Municipal Contracting

With County Sheriffs

for Police Services

in California:

Comparison of Cost

and Effectiveness

Peter J. Nelligan, PhD1 and William Bourns, PhD1

Abstract

Rather than having a traditional, municipal police department nearly 30%of the

478 cities in California contract with their county sheriff for police services. The

usual rationale is that contracting with the sheriff costs less than establishing and

operating a city police department. This research investigates this issue by analyzing

expenditure, crime, and other relevant data covering the 5-year period 2001-2005. It

poses and answers the following questions: (1) Are the cities that contract (contract

cities) similar to the cities that have their own police departments (department cities)

on a range of characteristics that may affect the cost of policing? (2) Do statewide

data show the claimed cost differential? (3) Are there differences in comparative

costs between or within regions and counties in the state? and (4) Does contracting

cost less because of less effective policing as measured by percentages of violent

and property crimes cleared? Contract cities are newer, less populous, less dense,

wealthier, have less business activity, have lower numbers and rates of reported

crime, and have fewer arrests. It is suggested that there is less police work in the

contract cities, and that may affect cost. Mean annual per capita police expenditures

are much lower in the contract cities statewide, in both the northern and southern

regions, and in three of the four southern California counties where contracting is

most prevalent. Finally, contract cities have on average significantly higher clearance

rates for violent crimes than department cities (especially in Los Angeles County)

and the same clearance rates for property crimes. It does not appear that contract

Nelligan and Bourns 71

cities are paying less because they are getting lower quality police service, at least

as measured by crime clearances. Suggestions are made for further research on the

contracting phenomenon.

Keywords

police, sheriffs, contracting, police consolidation

Introduction

The most common model for the delivery of local police services across the nation is

the city police department. Ever since the founding of the first police departments in

Boston, New York, and Philadelphia in the mid- to late 1800s, police chiefs and offi-

cers traditionally have been employees of city governments and have been directly

responsible to them.1 However, the municipal police department as an element of city

government is not the only model for the delivery of police services to municipalities.

In several states across the country, newly incorporating communities have chosen to

contract with their county sheriff for police services or, in some cases, existing

municipalities have chosen to disband their police departments in favor of contracting.

Substantial contracting has been identified in Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,

Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.2

Cities contracting with sheriffs is a post–World War II phenomenon, the best

known, and probably first, instance being the city of Lakewood in 1954 in Los Angeles

County. Contracting in Ohio began with authorizing legislation in 1961. Many con-

tracting cities are quite small. For example, of the seven contracting cities in Maricopa

County, Arizona, six have less than 6,000 residents, and only one, Fountain Hills, has

a population approaching 25,000. Wisconsin’s Wright County Sheriff contracts with

14 cities and townships with a median population of 2,275 and only three cities

between 10,000 and 15,000. The township of South Haven with 208 residents con-

tracts for 4 hr of sheriff’s service per week at a rate of US$56.00 per hour. However,

Broward County’s Pompano Beach has just more than 100,000 residents, and Los

Angeles County’s Santa Clarita has 175,000.

Interest in contracting with sheriffs appears to be increasing. A decade ago, Johnson

(2000) suggested that contracting has become more attractive as policing has become

more expensive and complex, making operation of a small city police department a

financial and organizational burden. As the usual rationale for contracting is reduced

costs, it is not surprising that the extreme revenue crisis currently being experienced by

state and local governments across the nation has instigated more consideration of con-

tracting. According to a survey by the National League of Cities, the National Association

of Counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (2010), local governments are expecting

major job losses across the United States through 2012. There has been more interest in

law enforcement contracting in Ohio as the economy has declined (R. T. Cornwell,

personal communication, May 10, 2010). The National Sheriff’s Association devotes a