The Mumbai massacre and its implications for America and South Asia.

• Author: Riedel, Bruce

The attack on multiple targets in Mumbai, India in November 2008 by ten terrorists of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) organization ranks among the most significant acts of international terrorism since 9/11. Not only did the terrorists put a city of twelve million people under siege, they captured the attention of the global media for sixty hours. This fulfilled the first objective of any terrorist attack--terrorize your target audience. The attack is certain to be a model for terrorists around the world to copy.

The events in Mumbai were meticulously planned, and the terrorists were well-trained and equipped. During the attack, communication with the operation's masterminds in Pakistan was maintained via cell phone. The attack severely disrupted a budding rapprochement between India and Pakistan--likely one of its major goals--and highlighted the emergence of LeT as a major player in the global Islamic jihadist movement. Indeed, the killers' targets--Indians, Europeans, Americans, Israelis, and Jews--are the targets of the global Islamic jihad and Al Qaeda, of which LeT has long been a close ally and confederate.

Since the attack, LeT, which has had a longstanding and intimate relationship with Pakistan's army and intelligence service, has not been dismantled. While a few leaders have been arrested, the organization's infrastructure in Pakistan and elsewhere remains intact. Thus another LeT mass casualty attack on India could come at any time.

India displayed remarkable restraint after the Mumbai attacks, primarily because it lacks good military options for retaliation against Pakistani targets. But such restraint is unlikely to survive many more such horrific attacks. With this in mind, New Delhi is working on options to respond to the next Pakistan-based terror attack on its interests.

American interests in South Asia, including the NATO war in Afghanistan, would be set back considerably by another attack similar to Mumbai, especially if it results in a major Indian military response. The United States should make shutting down the operational capability of LeT a major diplomatic objective. To do so, it will have to subtly address the underlying issues that shape Pakistani behavior toward terror in order to ease Indian-Pakistani tensions. This will involve encouraging a continuation of the Indian-Pakistani dialogue that the Mumbai attacks sought to stop.

THE ATTACK, ITS PERPETRATORS AND OBJECTIVES

In July 2009 the lone survivor of the terrorist team, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Qasab, surprised the attendants of his Mumbai trial by confessing in open court that he and his nine comrades had been recruited by LeT; trained in commando tactics at LeT camps in Pakistan; equipped by LeT with AK-56 automatic assault rifles (the Chinese version of the Russian AK-47), hand grenades, GPS sets, cell phones and other equipment; and dispatched by senior members of LeT from Karachi, Pakistan with orders to hijack an Indian boat at sea and take it into Mumbai. In Mumbai, the group split into four teams and attacked their predetermined targets: the central train station of the city, a hospital, two famous five-star hotels known for hosting Western visitors and the Indian elite, a Jewish residential complex and a famous restaurant frequented by foreigners. After they had fired indiscriminately into crowds at the various target sites, the terrorists left small bombs behind to add to the confusion and terror. (1)

Throughout the siege of the city, the terror-stayed in touch with their LeT masters back in Pakistan by phone. Indian authorities have released the chilling transcripts of their calls, showing the masterminds providing guidance and encouragement to the killers, even ordering them to kill specific hostages when asked.

Qasab identified the leader of the operation as LeT senior official Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, who oversaw his training and was present when the team left Karachi. The training included three months of intense exercises with small arms as well as more specialized training for the attack itself, including watching videos and photos of the targets on a laptop computer. The team then waited another three months while LeT leadership determined the best timing for the attack.

Qasab's account is generally consistent with other evidence India has presented about the operation since November 2008. LeT, which is formally banned in Pakistan but operates relatively freely, has denied any role in the attack, and senior officials of the movement claim no knowledge of the attackers. Thus, LeT motives in attacking Mumbai must be gleaned from the circumstances surrounding the attack rather than from the masterminds directly. While it is not known who ordered the attack, it can be contended that whoever did had significant political leverage in Pakistan and powerful protectors.

What is clear is that the attack's targets--India's major financial capital, Westerners on vacation, Israelis and Jews and local bystanders--are the same targets of the global Islamic jihadist movement led symbolically by Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, have long urged the Islamic community to wage jihad against the Crusader-Zionist-Hindu alliance that, in their narrative, seeks to oppress the Muslim world.

The timing of the attacks is also significant. In the fall of 2008, India and Pakistan were moving toward improving their tense bilateral relationship, albeit slowly and haltingly. Since the partition of the subcontinent, the two have fought three major wars and several smaller campaigns. A peace process began in 1999, though ironically so as it took place after the two had tested nuclear weapons a year earlier. In February 1999, former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee met with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in Lahore to look for ways to defuse tensions. They set up a back channel designed specifically for quiet negotiations on the most difficult issues dividing the two, especially Kashmir. As Sharif has described it, the goal was to end the arms race between the two nations and resolve their underlying differences. (2)

While the process that began in Lahore moved forward in bits and pieces, it incurred several major setbacks. The Kargil War in the summer of 1999, initiated by the Pakistani army leader and future dictator Pervez Musharraf, even halted it altogether for some time. Musharraf had opposed the Lahore process, snubbing the Indian prime minister's visit by deliberately skipping events set up for the unprecedented trip by Vajpayee. Instead of engaging in the process, he ordered the Pakistani army to take positions inside Indian-controlled territory across the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, near the town of Kargil, the next spring. This move sparked a limited war between India and Pakistan in mid-1999. LeT became an enthusiastic supporter of the Kargil adventure and criticized Sharif's orders to withdraw the army back behind the LOC.

The process was further damaged by the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, Which led to the mobilization of over a million soldiers along the border and a renewed threat of war. Though the terror attack came after Musharraf had taken power in a coup, he would soon become the principal agent of the India-Pakistan peace process. After limited attempts at military options, nuclear blackmail and terror, Musharraf finally settled on pursuing the back channel. Through it, he and the new Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, achieved significant progress by 2008. The back channel discussions even survived other major acts of terror including the attack on Mumbai's subway and train system in July 2006 that killed over two hundred, more than the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The details of the back channel talks have been reported by Steve Coil, and none of the parties have denied that Coil's report is indeed accurate. (3) Musharraf himself has confirmed the story. (4)

The back channel did not facilitate the resolution to all issues dividing the two, but it did serve to produce an understanding that any potential peace would involve two key ideas. First, the LOC would become an international border with only minor, mutually-agreed adjustments. Second, the border would be a soft one; that is, a border permitting maximum movement of Kashmiris between the two states. Local issues such as tourism and the environment would be handled by the local governments of Pakistan Azad Kashmir and India Jammu and Kashmir. India would claim victory in the LOC's final status, Pakistan in its...