A Multisite Evaluation of Prosecutor-Led Pretrial Diversion: Effects on Conviction, Incarceration, and Recidivism

• DOI: 10.1177/08874034211000403
• Author: Warren A. Reich,Robert C. Davis,Melissa Labriola,Michael Rempel
• Date: 01 October 2021
• Published date: 01 October 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/08874034211000403

Criminal Justice Policy Review

2021, Vol. 32(8) 890 –909

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/08874034211000403

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Article

A Multisite Evaluation of

Prosecutor-Led Pretrial

Diversion: Effects on

Conviction, Incarceration,

and Recidivism

Robert C. Davis1, Warren A. Reich2,

Michael Rempel2, and Melissa Labriola2

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in prosecutor-led pretrial

diversion programs, yet up-to-date research on the effectiveness of these programs

is lacking. Participants in four prosecutor-led diversion programs, Cook County, IL

(separate analyses for misdemeanor and felony participants), Milwaukee County, WI

(two distinct programs varying in participant risk level and treatment intensity), and

Chittenden County, VT, were propensity-score matched to comparison defendants

(total n = 5,040). All programs yielded a significant decrease in instant case conviction

(mean odds ratio = .12) and use of jail sentences (mean odds ratio = .33). There was

also a trend toward reduced re-arrest at 2 years (mean odds ratio = .79). Three of four

diversion programs significantly delayed onset of first re-arrest. Taken together, results

support the effectiveness of a diverse set of prosecutor-led pretrial diversion programs

that varied in charge severity, participant risk level, and program duration and intensity.

Keywords

pretrial diversion, criminal court, program evaluation

Recent years have seen an increase in pretrial diversion programs across the country.

This trend can be discerned in Department of Justice requests for proposals and, indeed

1National Police Foundation, Washington, DC, USA

2Center for Court Innovation, New York, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Robert C. Davis, National Police Foundation, 2550 S Clark St Suite 1130, Arlington, VA 22202,

Washington, DC, USA.

Email: rdavis@policefoundation.org

1000403CJPXXX10.1177/08874034211000403Criminal Justice Policy ReviewDavis et al.

research-article2021

Davis et al. 891

the Bureau of Justice Assistance has provided funding to many incipient diversion

initiatives across the country, primarily in prosecutor offices. The current interest in

diversion programs may be viewed as part of the national interest in reducing large jail

populations and the belief that many individuals are better served by programs and

services rather than the traditional criminal justice system (California Proposition 47

2014).

Pretrial diversion typically occurs early in case processing, either before a case is

filed in court or following an arraignment on criminal charges. In addition to poten-

tially saving criminal justice system resources (especially if diversion takes place very

early in case processing), successful completion of a diversion program allows defen-

dants to avoid the collateral consequences of a conviction or incarceration, including

the loss of housing or employment, risk of deportation for non-citizens, or a myriad of

other long-term deleterious effects on income, employment, or psychological

well-being.

Early Diversion Programs

Formal diversion dates back at least as far back as the President’s Commission on Law

Enforcement’s report (1967). Recognizing that courts were overcrowded, the

Commission recommended that first-time defendants who suffered from unemploy-

ment, alcoholism, or mental illness might benefit more from an early service interven-

tion than from traditional prosecution to disposition.

Based on recommendations of the 1967 President’s Commission, the Department

of Labor funded two large experiments, one in New York City and one in Washington,

D.C. Other federally funded experiments soon followed in the early 1970s, and by

1977 there were in excess of 200 diversion programs nationwide (Feeley, 1983). Yet

contrary to expectation, as evaluation studies became more sophisticated, they

tended to reveal null or negative effects on conviction rates, recidivism, and cost

savings (Zimring, 1973). For example, a large randomized controlled trial found no

differences in case outcomes, vocational outcomes, re-arrests, or days in jail (Baker

& Sadd, 1979). The researchers pointed to the possibility that these null effects

resulted from a stringent prosecutor selection process which screened out all but

weak and low-level cases and allowed in only cases that would not have otherwise

experienced adverse legal outcomes even in the absence of diversion. Furthermore,

a federally funded program in New Haven (CT) did not fare well in rigorous research

that found it was more expensive than post-conviction probation (Freed et al., 1973).

In a study of a deferred prosecution program for DWI offenders in the state of

Washington, Salzberg and Klingberg (1983) found little to no reduction of post-

deferral alcohol-related traffic violations for those who participated in a diversion-

ary deferred prosecution program.

Researchers and other court system experts began cautioning that diversion pro-

grams simply expanded social control over defendants who would not otherwise be

subjected to complete court-mandated requirements (Freed, 1974). With little robust

evidence that diversion programs improved court outcomes for participants, reduced