Multilateralism, Major Powers, and Militarized Disputes

• Published date: 01 March 2004
• Author: William J. Dixon,Renato Corbetta
• Date: 01 March 2004
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700101
• Subject Matter: Articles

Public debate on American foreign policy is said to be

dominated by two contentious issues. One of these,

the longstanding struggle between isolationism and

internationalism, has for now largely subsided in favor of

the latter, particularly following the events of September 11,

2001. As a consequence of America’s prevailing internation-

alist spirit, the equally truculent debate between multilater-

alism and unilateralism has now moved center stage (e.g.,

Kagan 2003; Prestowitz 2003; Nye 2002; Patrick and

Forman 2002). Are American interests best served by coop-

erating with other countries or by “going it alone”?

The unprecedented degree of international cooperation

observed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War revitalized

interest in and hopes for multilateralism. Many analysts pre-

dicted that in the post-Cold War era, states’ foreign policy

will be characterized by a greater degree of multilateralism

(Ruggie 1992). The failure or limited success of successive

multilateral initiatives—such as, operation “Restore Hope”

in Somalia and the Bosnia peacekeeping mission—and a

renewed tendency on the part of the United States to prefer

bilateral negotiations in the economic and security arena

somewhat dampened early enthusiasms (Martin 1992; Stoll

1998). More recent choices by the United States—ranging

from withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and other multi-

lateral treaties to military action in Iraq—have led foreign

leaders to voice their resentment against the arrogance of

the country’s unilateralist stance (see, for instance, Nye

2002; Wallace 2002).

The United States’ apparent proclivity to privilege unilat-

eral action or limited bilateralism seems to reinforce the

widespread conviction that great powers are more likely to

act unilaterally on the international stage. This view is based

on the observation that, given their greater capabilities and

potential for action, great powers enjoy a wider range of

options and face fewer structural constraints (Waltz 1979;

Patrick 2002). The logic of this argument is that is that they

are more prone to act alone because they have the opportu-

nity to do so. However, the relationship between major

power status and international multilateral behavior has not

received adequate attention in international relations. The

issue of multilateralism has been treated, to a large extent,

as a question tangential to the larger problem of inter-state

cooperation. As a result, the discipline of international rela-

tions lacks any “off-the-shelf” theory for explaining multi-

lateralism (Caporaso 1992: 604). The absence of a theory of

multilateralism is accompanied by relative scarcity of sys-

tematic evidence concerning the relative propensity of

major power states to act in coordination with other states.

This article addresses the question of whether major

power status affects the tendency of states to act multilater-

ally by looking at instances of collective participation in mil-

itarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Because great powers

have a larger number of strategic and economic interests

and greater capacity for projection, they tend to become

involved in a larger number of international disputes than

less powerful states (Siverson and Starr 1990; Enterline

1999). Yet, the nature of this involvement remains unspeci-

fied. On the one hand, because of their capabilities and

status, major powers are largely independent of other actors’

support and enjoy greater chances to achieve a favorable

outcome in a dispute. Therefore, one can expect that major

powers are more likely to initiate or intervene in a dispute

unilaterally. On the other hand, the opposite hypothesis

stating that great powers prefer to participate multilaterally

in said disputes cannot be ruled out a priori. It is possible

for major power status to influence participation in conflicts

either directly or indirectly, as a result of a host of state-level

and structural factors.

Using conflict as a framework for analyzing multilateral-

ism represents an alternative approach to the more common

focus on international organizations (IOs), international

regimes, and international law. Membership in IOs and

adherence to the rules established by regimes and treaties

5

Multilateralism, Major Powers,

and Militarized Disputes

RENATO CORBETTA, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY

WILLIAM J. DIXON, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

American foreign policy has been animated by public debate between multilateralism and unilateralism in re c e n t

years. Some strains of traditional realist thinking suggest that major powers like the U.S. will naturally tend to

be less enamored of multilateral action precisely because they possess the capabilities to engage a wider range

of unilateral options and they face fewer structural limitations than other states. We empirically investigate this

intriguing potential connection between major power status and multilateralism through the lens of interstate

conflict. Using Keohane’s (1990) definition of multilateralism as coordination among three or more states, we

analyze states’ propensity to participate multilaterally in militarized disputes. Contrary to expectations, we find

that major powers are substantially more prone toward multilateral participation than other states. These re s u l t s

p rove to be highly robust in the face of a number of potentially confounding factors and over time.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 2004): pp. 5-14