Multilateral Institutions and Conflict Resolution

Published date01 March 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21176
Date01 March 2017
C R Q, vol. 34, no. 3, Spring 2017 301
© 2016 Association for Confl ict Resolution and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) • DOI: 10.1002/crq.21176
Multilateral Institutions and Con ict Resolution
Alexandru Grigorescu
Molly M. Melin
States have a multitude of tools for territorial dispute resolution at
their disposal ranging from direct bilateral negotiations to third-party
states to international organizations ( IOs ). While the literature explores
when states are more likely to accept a third party in their negotiations
and when they are more likely to seek a resolution to their disputes
bilaterally, we have little understanding of why states are more likely to
seek IOs for such tasks. We examine the disputants that prefer certain
confl ict managers, with a focus on the distinguishing characteristics of
IO -led confl ict management. We derive a set of hypotheses based on our
expectations that, due to the institutional and multilateral character-
istics of IOs , certain states will turn to them to resolve their disputes
while others will avoid them. Using the Issue Correlates of War data, we
nd support for our hypotheses. We conclude that the institutional and
multilateral characteristics of negotiations indeed aff ect states’ confl ict
resolution choices.
W hen seeking to resolve their territorial disputes over Jammu and
Kashmir, India and Pakistan accepted Soviet third-party media-
tion after their 1965 war but opted for bilateral negotiations after their
1972 war (Indian Foreign Ministry 1972 ). In 1973, after Iraq invaded
a Kuwaiti border station, the two countries preferred the involvement of
Saudi Arabia in resolving their dispute rather than Arab League or United
Nations (UN) mediation (Wynbrandt 2004 ). After their 1974 war over the
Agacher Strip, Burkina Faso and Mali sought mediation of their dispute
through the Organization of African Unity (Nhema and Zeleza 2008 ).
What explains some countries’ preferences to address their territorial dis-
putes through an international organization (as Burkina Faso and Mali
302 GRIGORESCU, MELIN
C R Q • DOI: 10.1002/crq
through the Arab League) rather than bilaterally (as India and Pakistan
did in 1972) or through other third-party confl ict managers (as India and
Pakistan did with the USSR in 1965 and Iraq and Kuwait did with Saudi
Arabia in 1973)?
States have a multitude of tools for dispute resolution at their disposal.
Some states prefer resolving their disputes through direct bilateral negotia-
tions with their adversary. Others turn to third-party states to mediate such
negotiations, and yet others seek the assistance of international organiza-
tions (IOs).
1 Recent trends show states are increasingly turning to IOs as
a forum for confl ict management. For instance, while between 1961 and
1970 there were nine instances of IOs acting as third-party mediators in
disputes between states, between 1991 and 2000 they were involved in
twenty-two instances of dispute resolution. We are at a point where the
role of IOs in confl ict resolution deserves closer attention.
While the literature has off ered numerous arguments explaining when
states are more likely to negotiate through a third-party mediator and when
they are more likely to seek a resolution to their disputes bilaterally, we still
need to better explain why states are more likely to seek IOs for such tasks.
e present study complements existing works by seeking to understand
which disputants are more likely to turn to IOs for resolving their disputes.
By identifying the types of disputants that prefer certain types of confl ict
management mechanisms, we can then better design such mechanisms to
fulfi ll the needs of the states that use them.
e following section reviews the existing literature addressing IO
involvement in confl ict resolution. We then proceed to discuss what we
consider to be the most important diff erences between IOs and other
types of actors as third-party mediators: their multilateral and institu-
tional character.  e institutional character of IOs refers to their role in
reducing uncertainty through conveying information, and their multilat-
eral character refers to the multiple actors involved in IOs. We derive a
set of hypotheses based on our expectations that, due to the institutional
and multilateral characteristics of IOs, certain states will turn to them to
resolve their disputes while others will avoid them. We argue that states
that do not highly value private information, such as those with member-
ship in highly institutionalized IOs and those without additional ongo-
ing disputes, are more likely to employ IO confl ict managers. In addition,
certain states may develop institutionally oriented preferences. We argue
that states with a history of IO-led confl ict management are more likely
to choose this forum once again, as the process creates changes in a state s

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