Motions to Suppress Confessions, Admissions, and Other Statements of the Respondent

• Author: Anthony G. Amsterdam/Martin Guggenheim/Randy A. Hertz
• Profession: University Professor and Professor of Law at New York University/Fiorello LaGuardia Professor of Clinical Law at New York University School of Law/Professor of Clinical Law at NYU School of Law
• Pages: 561-620

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CHAPTER 24

MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

CONFESSIONS,

ADMISSIONS, AND

OTHER STATEMENTS OF

THE RESPONDENT

PART A . INT RODUCTION

§ 24.01 Strategic Reasons for Seeking Suppression

of the Respondent’s Statements, Whether

Inculpatory or Exculpatory

The doctrines desc ribed in this chapter supply grounds for suppressing not only confes-

sions but any statement by the respondent—“whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that

the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 44 6 U.S. 291, 301 n.5

(1980) (emphasis in original); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966).

Ordinarily, counsel will want to suppress all statements made by the respondent. In

the case of a confession or a damagi ng admission, this is self-ev ident; the confession or

admission is frequently the most damning thi ng the prosecutor has. In cases involving

ostensibly exculpatory statements, a suppression motion is also t he prudent course, since

the facts that emerge at trial may render the statement more damaging than cou nsel can

predict. For example, a statement asserting self-defense may prove to be detrimental

in a case in which the state has no other persuasive proof that the respondent was the

person who committed the assault. Moreover, counsel’s pursuit of a suppression motion

may serve the ancillary goals of discovery and creation of transcript material for use in

impeaching prosecution witnesses at trial. See § 22.02 supra.

562 | Trial M anual for Defense Attorne ys in Juvenile Delinquency C ases

§ 24.02 Applicability of Adult Court Suppression

Doctrines to Juvenile Court Proceedings

The discussion in t his chapter of the constitutional and stat utory grounds for suppressing

statements interweaves adult and juvenile court caselaw. Although the Supreme Court

has not expressly held the Miranda doctrine applicable to juvenile delinquency prosecu-

tions, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4 (1979), and has not explicitly addressed

the “procedures or constitutional rights” governing suppression of statements extracted

during the “pre-judicia l stages of the juvenile process” (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967);

compare Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (applying traditional due proces s requirements

to determine the validit y of a statement by a juvenile prosecuted in adult court)), the

Court has recognized the logic of extending the safeg uards provided in adult court to

juvenile confessional evidence (see In re Gault, 387 U.S . at 49–52; see also id. at 56 & n.97)

and has approvingly cited lower court caselaw applying adu lt court doctrines of statement

suppression in juvenile court proceed ings (see id. at 52–55). The lower courts uniformly

hold these doctrines applicable to juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler,

476 F.2d 1091, 1092 (7th Cir. 1973); In re Creek, 243 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1968); In the Interest

of Edwards, 227 Kan. 723, 725, 608 P.2d 1006, 1008–09 (1980); State ex rel. Coco, 363 So.

2d 207, 208 (La. 1978); In re Meyers, 25 N.C. App. 555, 558, 214 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1975).

PART B. INVOLUNTARY STATEMENTS

§ 24.03 General Standard for Assessing Voluntariness

As explained in § 22.03(d)(ii) supra, whenever the defense claims that a respondent’s

statement was “involuntary” and must be excluded from evidence under due process

principles, the prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-

dence (and, in some jurisdictions, by proof be yond a reasonable doubt) that the statement

was voluntary.

“The [due process] question in each case is whether a [respondent’s] . . . will was

overborne at the time he confessed,” Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961); cf. United

States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)—“whether the behavior of the State’s law

enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the respondent’s] . . . will to resist and

bring about confessions not freely self-determined,” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,

544 (1961), or whether the confession was “the product of an essential ly free and uncon-

strained choice by its maker,” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (plurality

opinion), approved in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973). This ques-

tion is said to be determined “on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in any particula r

case.” Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 480 (1969).

Despite the psychological f lavor of the “voluntariness” label, the Supreme Court’s

involuntary-statement caselaw has gradually evolved to focus as much upon police mis-

treatment of suspects for its own sake a s upon the effects of the mistreatment in weari ng

Motions to Suppress Confessions, Admissions, a nd Other Statements

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the suspect down. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959); Blackburn v.

Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1960); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385–86 (1964);

Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967)

(per curiam); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (per curiam); Crane v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 683, 687–88 (1986); but see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432–34 (1986).

This Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques either in isolation

or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive

to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Although these decisions

framed the legal inquiry in a variety of different ways, usually through the

“convenient shorthand” of asking whether the confession was “involuntary,” . . .

the Court’s analysis has consistently been animated by the view that “ours is an

accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system,” . . . and that, accordingly, tactics

for eliciting inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional

boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of fundamental

fairness.

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 10 4, 109–10 (1985).

Indeed, some coercive behavior on the part of government agents is an indispens-

able ingredient of an involuntary-statement claim; in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157

(1986), the Court rejected a defendant’s contention that his confession was involuntary

solely because his mental illness drove him to confess. But this does not mean that a

defendant’s mental, emotional, or physical vulnerabilit y is immaterial. To the contrary,

Connelly reaffirms the clear holding of Blackbur n v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), that

ment al ill ness i s “relev ant to a n indi vidua l’s susce ptibil ity to police coerci on.” 479 U.S. at

165. Subsequently, in Yar bor ou gh v. Alv arad o, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), the Court definitively

declared that “we do consider a suspect’s age and [extent of prior] experience [with the

criminal justice system]” when gauging, for purposes of assessing the “voluntariness of

a statement,” whether “‘the defendant’s will was overborne,’ . . . a question that logically

can depend on ‘the characterist ics of the accused.’” Id. at 667–68 (majority opinion); see

also id. at 6 68 (t he “ch ara cte rist ics of t he ac cus ed” re leva nt t o th is as ses smen t “ca n in clude

the suspect’s age, education, and intelligence, . . . as well as a suspect’s prior experience

with law enforcement”). See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948), discussed in

§ 24.05(a) infra. Other qualities relevant to the assessment of a suspect’s susceptibility to

coercion are mental retardation (Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. at 441–44; Culombe v. Connecticut,

367 U.S. at 620–21, 624–25, 635), educational privation (Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560

(1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957)), physical pain and d rug ingestion (Tow ns en d

v. Sain , 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Beecher v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 234 (1972)), and any “unique

characteristics of a particular suspect” (Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 109) that impair the

suspect’s “powers of resistance to overbearing police tactics” (Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. at

442). In addition, the propriety or impropriet y of police conduct is itself measured, to

a large extent, by its tendency to weaken the suspect’s will. See, e.g., Spano v. New York,