More than technology needed to defeat roadside bombs.

• Author: Sapolsky, Harvey M.
• Position: Viewpoint

No weapon has been more effective against U.S. forces in combat than improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, which have so far killed more 3,000 Americans and wounded many thousand more.

As the wars wind down, the U.S. military should assess the effort to counter IEDs because it is likely to have to meet the same or similar asymmetric challenges in the future. The focused effort to counter them began with an Army IED Task Force in 2004. With the attacks continuing to mount, Gen. John Abizaid, then U.S. Central Command commander, called for a Manhattan like project to deal with the IED threat. The Defense Department's response was the creation in February 2006 of the Joint Improvised Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which reports directly to the deputy secretary of defense and which has since spent more than $25 billion to counter the threat.

The Manhattan Project analogy, of course, is a poor one because that was a highly secret effort to develop the atomic bomb during World War II. In essence the bomb project was the search for a silver bullet, the single weapon to win the war. In contrast, the IED effort had to be a rapid analysis and acquisition counter measure fight in large part because IED technologies kept changing in response to U.S. fielding of counter measures. Some are radio commanded, others wired, and others are triggered by pressure plates.

JIEDDO and others recogni'/ed early that it had to go far to the "left of boom" to truly defeat IEIDs, that it had to prevent them from being emplaced because the discovery and dismantlement of IEDs, even if successful, greatly disrupt coalition operations, especially the movement of forces and supplies. Moreover, some would always avoid detection and kill their targets. The mantra became destroy the network, identify those who finance and recruit the bomb builders and planters and get to them. Thus a premium was placed on gaining the specific intelligence that would allow U.S. forces to roll up the bomb networks through raids and arrests.

The fact that the IED struggle would be won only by defeating the networks, which ultimately requires defeating the insurgency, is the source of much of the frustration that Congress has had with JIEDDO. Domestic political support eroded as the war in Iraq dragged on. Politicians wanted a reduction in casualties, but under the American command structure, JIEDDO has no control over operations. It develops new technology and helps train the force, but...