More Is Not Always Better: The Case of Counterterrorism Security

• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Date: 01 September 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718823924
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

More Is Not Always

Better: The Case

of Counterterrorism

Security

Pritha Dev

1

, and Konrad Grabiszewski

2

Abstract

Can counterterrorism security be counterproductive? We argue that it can be when

the at-risk population acts strategically. We model a two-stage game where the

government first chooses the defensive security level for a public place. The second

stage is a simultaneous-move game with terrorist choosing terror effort and

members of the population deciding whether or not to attend the public place. Our

key measure of the efficiency of the counterterrorism security is the expected

number of casualties. Under very standard and general assumptions, we show that it

is possible that more security leads to an increase in that number. This is because

increasing security both discourages and encourages the terrorist. On the one hand,

more security makes a successful terror attack less likely (discouragement). On the

other hand, more security motivates more people to attend the public place which

makes the attack more valuable to the terrorist (encouragement).

Keywords

terrorism, counterterrorism security

1

Economics Area, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India

2

Prince Mohammad bin Salman College, Saudi Arabia

Corresponding Author:

Konrad Grabiszewski, Prince Mohammad bin Salman College, King Abdullah Economic City 23964, Saudi

Arabia.

Email: konrad.grabiszewski@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2019, Vol. 63(8) 1923-1938

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002718823924

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According to the Oxford Engli sh Dictionar y, terrorism i s “the unlawful u se of

violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political

aims.”

1

Because of its violent nature and targeting civilian population, the fear of

terrorism is among the top worries of the modern world. In June 2017, 42 percent

of Americans were worried about being a victim of terrorism and 66 percent of

them consider the possibility of future terror attacks in the United States as a great

or fair concern (source: Gallup poll, http://news.gallup.com/poll/4909/terrorism-

united-states.aspx. Retrieved on January 12, 2018). In 2016, 79 perce nt of Amer-

ican respondents pointed at international terrorism as a critical threat to the United

States making it number one concern in the nation (development on nuclear weap-

ons by Iran was the second highest with 75 percent) (source: Gallup poll, http://

news.gallup.com/poll/189161/americans-cite-cyberterrorismamong-top-three-

threats.aspx. Retrieved on January 12, 2018).

Given that the fear of terrorism is widespread and significantly affects people’s

behavior, it is of utmost importance to incorporate it into the studies of terrorism.

The impact on behavior can be seen in a June 2017 poll, which shows that “as a

result of the events relatin g to terrorism in recent years,” 32 p ercent American

indicated that they are less willing to fly airplanes, 26 percent were less willing to

go to skyscrapers, 38 percent less willing to attend an event with thousands of

people, and 46 percent less willing to travel abroad (see Note 2).

Activities like going to a public place (e.g., 2008 Mumbai attacks), attending a

public event (e.g., 2017 Ariana Grande con cert in Manchester), or using public

transportation (e.g., 2004 Madrid train bombing) are associated with the ris k of

being targeted by terrorists. Whatever is “public” is a potential target of a terror

attack whose objective is to inflict a maximal loss of life. When deciding whether or

not to be part of a public event and go where expected crowd is to be, people take the

risk of terror attack into account and might opt out.

Our focus on “public places” is motivated by Brandt andSandler (2011) who show

that terroristsare now concentrating onattacking public places. Thereis also empirical

evidence which supports the fact that people change behavior as a response to terror.

Enders and Sandler(1991), Enders, Sandler, andParise (1992), and Drakos and Kutan

(2003) find evidenceof tourists not favoring destinations with higherrisk of terrorism.

Elias, Albert, andShiftan (2013) show that commutersin Israel choose private means

of transport over public transport as their risk perception of terror activities increase.

Kalist (2010) documents that in the United States, as the terror alert levels initially

went up after the September 2001 attacks, there was a dip in attendance for Major

League Baseball events. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) show how investors strate-

gically move away from countries and regions with higher terrorist risk. Sandler and

Enders (2008) provide an excellent review of economic consequences of terrorism.

In order to address the fear of terrorism and prevent terror attacks, governments

around the world spend large amounts of taxpayer money on defensive counter-

terrorism security.

2

For example, in the United States, that amount is around

1924 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(8)