Moral Logics of Support for Nonviolent Resistance: Evidence From a Cross-National Survey Experiment

• Author: Sirianne Dahlum,Jonathan Pinckney,Tore Wig
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221100198
• Published date: 01 March 2023
• Date: 01 March 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(3) 326–362

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221100198

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Moral Logics of Support

for Nonviolent

Resistance: Evidence

From a Cross-National

Survey Experiment

Sirianne Dahlum

1

, Jonathan Pinckney

2

, and

Tore Wig

3



Abstract

An emerging consensus holds that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more

successful than violent campaigns, partly because they attract more partici-

pants. Yet, we lack an understanding of whether and why nonviolent tactics

attracts support. We propose two motivational logics that can explain

support for nonviolence: An instrumentalist logic, whereby nonviolent re-

sistance is preferred based on cost-benef‌it considerations, and an intrinsic

logic where nonviolent resistance is preferred because of perceived inherent

moral worth. To investigate the motivational pull of these two logics, we

conduct a pre-registered survey experiment among more than 5000 re-

spondents across 33 countries in fall 2019. We f‌ind that nonviolent tactics

strongly increase movement support relative to violent tactics, and that the

preference for nonviolence is primarily driven by intrinsic commitments

to the moral worth of nonviolent resistance, rather than instrumental

considerations.

1

Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway

2

United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, USA

3

University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Corresponding Author:

Sirianne Dahlum, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. P.O box 1097 Blindern,

OSLO 0317, Norway.

Email: sirdah@prio.org

Keywords

social movements, democratization and regime change, political psychology,

conf‌lict processes

Introduction

Nonviolent civil resistance can be a powerful driver of change. History offers

many compelling examples of successful nonviolent movements, from the

anti-apartheid movement and the anti-Communist movements in Eastern

Europe at end of the Cold War to the “Jasmine revolution”in Tunisia. More

recently, in 2019, the world was swept by one of the largest protest waves

since WWII, with mass protests across all continents, challenging both

democratic and autocratic regimes (Chenoweth, 2020). Comparative work

indicates that nonviolent resistance movements are more likely than violent

movements to achieve their desired ends—including promoting policy change

or overthrowing corrupt and authoritarian regimes (Chenoweth & Stephan,

2011;Bayer et al., 2016). One suggested explanation for this highly cited and

inf‌luential f‌inding that “nonviolent resistance works”is that nonviolent

movements have greater success in recruiting large numbers of participants.

Cross-national data collection on resistance campaigns strongly supports this

explanation, f‌inding that nonviolent movements are, on average, four times

larger than violent movements (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, 33).

However, it remains unclear whether it is nonviolent (rather than violent)

resistance in itself that attracts participants, resulting in larger, more effective

movements, or whether there are other correlated features of these campaigns

that increase their appeal. Since existing research on the link between non-

violent resistance and success is supported primarily by correlational evi-

dence, we cannot rule out, for instance, that primarily nonviolent movements

attract more participants because they (potentially) cluster in specif‌ic areas

(e.g., cities) or tend to focus on different demands than violent movements.

Furthermore, if nonviolent resistance methods really do increase individual

support, we lack a systematic understanding of the cognitive appeal of

nonviolent resistance when contrasted with violent uprisings that have similar

goals. For instance, do individuals only prefer nonviolent resistance because

and when they expect it to be less risky and more effective than violent

resistance? If so, this has important implications for when we can expect

nonviolent resistance to succeed and attract mass popular support.

To address these questions, we conduct a pre-registered survey experiment

exploring whether individual support for a movement is affected by reported

use of violent or nonviolent tactics, and if so, why.

2

We focus on two potential

explanations for nonviolent resistance’s appeal. First, nonviolent resistance

may be preferred because of its expected advantage over violent resistance

Dahlum et al. 327

when it comes to eff‌iciency, potential for success, and/or the level of risk

incurred by individual participants. We label this an “instrumentalist”logic,

since its driving forces are expected costs and benef‌its. Second, individuals

may choose nonviolent resistance because they consider it to be intrinsically

desirable. We label this an “intrinsic logic”since it values nonviolent re-

sistance as inherently valuable irrespective of contextual factors.

As it is both unfeasible and ethically problematic to experimentally induce

participation in a real-world anti-regime protest, particularly when such par-

ticipation might leadto violent government repression, we presentrespondents

with a hypothetical scenario of an ongoing anti-regime protest movement. To

gauge different levels of support for the movement, respondents are asked

whether they would support as a bystander, participate in or contribute f‌i-

nanciallyto the movement. Although a measureof willingness to participatein a

hypothetical protest will never perfectly capture willingness to participate in an

actual protest, we f‌ind that respondents are much more hesitant to report

willingess to participate in than (merely) support a movement, suggesting that

potential costs of protest participation are calculated in to a certain extent. We

randomly vary the movement’s use of nonviolent versus violent protest

strategies. To identify intrinsic and instrumentalist logics, we also randomly

vary the conditions that the hypothetical protest movement is facing—

specif‌ically whether it is violently repressed (thereby posing a physical

threat to participants) and whether it is reported to be making progress and

expectedto succeed. This allows us toanalyze, for instance, whetherthe support

for nonviolent protest is moderated or mediated by expected success.

Our sample consists of more than 5000 respondents in a convenience

sample from 33 countries, across a wide range of locations and background

characteristics, which allows us to explore the sensitivity of the results to

various conditions. While our theoretical argument should apply to many

different forms of protests, both concerning democratization and other goals,

we focus on a pro-democracy movement in our experiment to hold motivation

and valence of movement goals constant (since we expect that our survey

respondents will be generally supportive of a pro-democracy movement) and

explore the role of movement tactics. While many of our respondents from

western democracies may have few chances to join a pro-democracy

movement themselves, such movements inevitably take place on a global

stage and the opinions and reactions they spark from citizens of democracies

will have important consequences for their ability to foster international

support and ultimately achieve their goals.

We conducted the study in the fall of 2019, in the middle of a global protest

wave, with major protests happening in diverse countries in all world regions.

This wave included protests that were quite difference from our context

of democracy-protests, for example, climate protests, but also a number of

pro-democracy protests, happening in places like Sudan, Bolivia, Hong Kong,

328 Comparative Political Studies 56(3)