Montesquieu’s Paradoxical Spirit of Moderation: On the Making of Asian Despotism in De l’esprit des lois1

• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Author: Alex Haskins
• DOI: 10.1177/0090591718780215
• Date: 01 December 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

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Political Theory
2018, Vol. 46(6) 915 –937
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of Moderation: On
the Making of Asian
Despotism in De l’esprit
des lois1
Alex Haskins1
Abstract
In recent years, scholars have paid considerable attention to moderation in
Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois. Still, little scholarship has considered how
Montesquieu develops moderation as a concept and practice. In this article,
I argue Montesquieu’s complementary defense of moderation and critique
of despotism rely on immoderate argumentative practices of omission that
enable him to reshape extant laudatory narratives of China and Japan. Through
an analysis of Montesquieu’s primary texts on climate and commerce, I
demonstrate that, absent these practices, Montesquieu’s “Asian despotism”
collapses, revealing the moderate natures of both countries. This conclusion is
paradoxical insofar as we take seriously Montesquieu’s claim that De l’esprit des
lois upholds the spirit of moderation as of paramount importance. Moreover, I
argue that this analysis of Montesquieu’s paradoxical spirit brings to light under-
examined dimensions of Montesquieu’s work and alerts political theorists to
how different reading practices can recast his “moderate” reputation.
Keywords
Montesquieu, moderation, Asian despotism, omission, paradox
1The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Corresponding Author:
Alex Haskins, The University of Chicago, 5828 S. University Avenue, Suite 401, Chicago,
IL 60637, USA.
Email: ahaskins@uchicago.edu

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Political Theory 46(6)
I say it, and it seems to me that I have written this work only to prove it: the
spirit of moderation should be that of the legislator; the political good, like the
moral good, is always found between two limits.
(De l’esprit des lois, 6.29.1.602)
Introduction
Several scholars over the last decade have cited the epigraph above claiming
that, for Montesquieu, moderation is “in a sense, [his] cause,”2 “a seminal
theme” in his works,3 “the central principle of his philosophy,”4 and a first
virtue for legislators that indicates that Montesquieu himself “practices what
he preaches.”5 And they are far from alone.6 Indeed, the resurgence within
political theory around moderation has found many lauding Montesquieu’s
approach and temperament as well suited not only to his own time but per-
haps to ours as well.7
Despite this wealth of literature, few scholars have considered how
Montesquieu’s argumentative practices influence his development of mod-
eration as a substantive concept. Certainly, some have challenged narra-
tives of Montesquieu’s orientalism and selective citation practices by
highlighting his nuanced empirical and theoretical project.8 Still others
have explored the motives behind his narratives about East Asia, conclud-
ing that his analysis was meant to warn against absolutist politics in France.9
Nevertheless, no account has offered a theory of Montesquieu’s argumenta-
tive practices.
In this article, I argue that Montesquieu’s substantive defenses of modera-
tion and critiques of despotism rely on immoderate argumentative practices
of omission that enable him to invert the laudatory narratives of China and
Japan circulating in his day.10 His argumentative inversions span climate,
commerce, religion, mores, law, and governance, demonstrating that his
approach considers multiple facets of these societies. In this piece, I focus on
commerce and climate in Montesquieu’s thought and demonstrate that, absent
his argumentative practices of omission, Montesquieu’s “Asian despotism”
collapses, revealing the tempered natures of China and Japan, as depicted in
his sources. This conclusion is paradoxical insofar as we take seriously
Montesquieu’s claim to have written De l’esprit des lois to foreground the
importance of a spirit of moderation. Moreover, I argue that this analysis of
Montesquieu’s paradoxical spirit brings to light under-examined dimensions
of Montesquieu’s work and alerts political theorists to how different reading
practices can recast his “moderate” reputation.

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Before proceeding with my analysis, it seems apt to consider what “mod-
erate” and “despotic” mean for Montesquieu. As suggested above, I distin-
guish between two forms—substantive (i.e., political, commercial,
climatological, etc.) and argumentative—and highlight their distinctive, but
interrelated, aspects. On the substantive front, Aurelian Craiutu offers an
insightful definition: “Montesquieu drew a seminal relationship between
moderation, limited power, the separation of powers, and the rule of law, and
he made the concept of political moderation the keystone of his liberal politi-
cal philosophy.”11 Whether we consider the model of the three branches of
American government Montesquieu later influenced, his push for constitu-
tional monarchy in his native France, or his definition of “despotic” govern-
ment as “one alone, without law and without rule, draw[ing] everything along
by his will and his caprices,”12 it seems apparent that a defining trait of des-
potic societies is the absence of tempering checks on arbitrary power.13 By
contrast, moderate regimes eschew excessive, arbitrary, and un-tempered dis-
plays of force in favor of tempered ones. Substantive corollaries in commerce
and climate include excessive quantities of a given item or descriptor (e.g.,
luxury, extreme temperatures) and Montesquieu notes that such excesses are
distinguishing traits of at least some despotic regimes.
Curiously, though, Montesquieu does not apply his substantive insights to
his argumentative strategies of analysis of China and Japan in De l’esprit des
lois. And yet, much of the aforementioned literature implies that Montesquieu
was both substantively and argumentatively moderate insofar as he embodied
a spirit that eschewed excessive or un-tempered displays of uniformity in
both respects.14 However, I challenge this harmonization by exploring
Montesquieu’s omissions in De l’esprit des lois. Montesquieu influences his
audience by construing China and Japan as substantively (i.e., politically,
commercially, or climatologically) despotic when his sources suggest other-
wise. Montesquieu’s moves are understandable given his anti-absolutist
stance, but they have the effect of rendering his overall spirit—which com-
bines the substantive and the argumentative—as a paradoxical, if not contra-
dictory, matter.
Still, one could maintain that such critiques deserve qualification. As two
scholars have argued recently, Montesquieu “renounces his usual reticence
only in cases of the most extreme abuses, which is to say in order to deliver
his most important lessons about the dangers of the abandonment of mod-
eration in political life.”15 My response to this qualification is threefold:
first, as I will show, this claim is demonstrably false, given Montesquieu’s
omissive practices on a range of non-extreme topics throughout De l’esprit
des lois. Second, even if it were the case that Montesquieu limited his
immoderation to extreme cases, his very use of such argumentation is

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Political Theory 46(6)
potentially counterproductive to his stated aim of upholding the importance
of a broader spirit of moderation. If “extreme abuses” can be shown to be a
product of Montesquieu’s omissive reading practices, then one might rea-
sonably respond that Montesquieu is inconsistent at best; his reliance on
such means to disabuse his audience of extreme cases of despotism poten-
tially betrays a lack of faith in tempered analysis itself. Third, justifying
Montesquieu’s selective analysis poses problems for scholars who argue that
he does not reduce complicated political regimes to Manichean dichotomies
of good and evil.16 Yet, if one takes his analysis of “despotic” regimes seri-
ously, Montesquieu appears quite Manichean. He finds little, if anything,
redeemable in that with which he disagrees (i.e., Chinese- and Japanese-
inspired absolutist politics) and sets out to undermine such laudatory
accounts. Thus, I argue scholars should acknowledge Montesquieu’s para-
doxical spirit—his circumspect analysis, his (mostly) charitable citations,
and his selective omissions—and resist attempts to recover him simply as a
“moderate” figure.
Indeed, Montesquieu’s own self-conscious identity as an artist potentially
unsettles such approaches.17 In his preface, Montesquieu fears his audience
will dismiss his twenty-year work, pleading with them to consider the design
of the whole work and how it reflects his broader role as an author.18
Montesquieu’s artistic motif seems deliberate both here and at the preface’s
conclusion when he considers earlier French, English, and German writers
and asserts that, like Correggio before him, “[he] too, [is] a painter.”19
Montesquieu’s self-conscious role as artist and author extends to his acknowl-
edgement that he has not provided all of the information he could have
because it would be “tedious,”20 his articulations of his own normative stakes
in the project,21 and his admission that his writing process involved many
drafts, several iterations of what he had thought was truth, and a slow process
of recognizing his principles and their place in his work.22 Paired...