Mobilizing the White: White Nationalism and Congressional Politics in the American South

• Author: Amanda Weiner,Ariel Zellman
• Published date: 01 September 2022
• Date: 01 September 2022
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221088844
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X221088844

American Politics Research

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X221088844

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Article

The past decade has seen a dramatic rise in the public profile

of white nationalism in the United States. Invigorated by the

2008 election of President Barack Obama and coalescing

with the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, this

period was marked by a substantial uptick in far-right hate

crimes (Bergengruen & Hennigan, 2019; Feinberg, 2020;

Jendryke & McClure, 2019), white nationalist rallies,

marches, protests, and online activities (Medina et al., 2018;

Miller & Graves, 2020; Scrivens et al., 2021), and increasing

polarization of the voting public, marked particularly by

white resentment regarding perceived status decline

(Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Fording & Schram, 2020;

Mutz, 2018; Updegrove et al., 2020; Valentino et al., 2017).

While these phenomena are closely correlated, white nation-

alist groups (WNGs) are typically regarded as symptoms of

such resentments rather than social movements that may

contribute to tangible political outcomes (see Blee, 2017;

Kincaid, 2017). Such distinctions are highly problematic at a

time when white nationalists are increasingly and openly

attempting to enter the American political mainstream

(Atkinson, 2018; Hartzell, 2018; Tanner & Burghart, 2020).

This paper represents an initial effort to rectify this over-

sight by analyzing how WNGs at the Congressional district

level can influence the ideological policy alignments of elected

representatives. To this end, it examines how these groups’

activities contribute to the radicalization of conservative

American politics (Blee, 2017; Kincaid, 2017; Klandermans

& Mayer, 2006). It bridges recent scholarship emphasizing

conditions conducive to hate group mobilization and hate

crimes to the exclusion of political outcomes (yet see Fording

& Cotter, 2014; Fording & Schram, 2020; McVeigh et al.,

2014) and established literature on the influence of ethnocen-

trism, out-group prejudice, and racial threats on political atti-

tudes and voter behavior (Hutchings & Valentino, 2004;

Jardina & Piston, 2019; Schaffner, 2020; Schaffner et al.,

2018). Formally, it tests the proposition that WNGs signifi-

cantly contribute to the radicalization of mainstream conserva-

tive politics in America, in a manner not reducible to

background demographics, socioeconomic conditions, nor

out-group hostilities theorized to explain their rise.

We do so quantitatively by regressing data on the distribu-

tion of WNGs in the American South, drawn from the Southern

Poverty Law Center’s annual Hate Map (SPLC, 2020a) and

subsequently geocoded to Congressional districts, against

John Birch Society ratings of Congressional representatives

1088844APRXXX10.1177/1532673X221088844American Politics ResearchWeiner and Zellman

research-article2022

1

Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Social

Sciences, Ramat Gan, Israel

2

Department of Political Studies, Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University

Faculty of Social Sciences, Ramat Gan, Israel

Corresponding Author:

Ariel Zellman, Department of Political Studies, Political Studies, Bar-Ilan

University Faculty of Social Sciences, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel.

Email: ariel.zellman@biu.ac.il

Mobilizing the White: White Nationalism

and Congressional Politics in the

American South

Amanda Weiner1 and Ariel Zellman2

Abstract

To what extent do white nationalists influence Congressional representative conservatism? Although ethnocentrism, out-

group prejudice, and racial threats strongly predict American political attitudes and voter behavior, how social movements

predicated on these beliefs shape political outcomes is rarely considered. We argue that white nationalist activities significantly

contribute to the radicalization of Congressional representatives’ policy agendas in a manner non-reducible to demographic

or socioeconomic conditions. By mobilizing white voters against racial status threats, they indirectly compel politicians to

adopt more radically conservative agendas. We quantitatively test these propositions by examining distributions of white

nationalist groups in the American South against Congressional representative conservatism from 2010–2017. Analyses

reveal that white nationalists indeed appear to significantly impact representative radical conservatism, even controlling for

numerous factors commonly theorized to explain their rise. In doing so, we contribute to emerging insights on the political

influence of the radical right on the contemporary American conservative “mainstream.”

Keywords

congressional representation, racial status threats, radical conservatism, white nationalism

2022, Vol. 50(5) 707–722

708 American Politics Research 50(5)

from 2010–2017. Taking into account well-established demo-

graphic and socioeconomic explanations for increased white

voter ethnocentrism and racial threat perceptions, we find that

Southern Congressional districts with growing numbers of

active WNGs are significantly more likely to elect more radi-

cally conservative representatives than those lacking such

groups.

Our results significantly contribute to burgeoning research

on ethnonationalism, racial threats, and right-wing social

movements in the United States and western democracies in

general. Previous scholarship has cautiously avoided identi-

fying white nationalist movements as contributing to the

increased mainstreaming of racism in contemporary

American politics. This study however offers preliminary yet

compelling evidence that even in Congressional districts

most historically, politically, and socioeconomically prone to

such attitudes, white nationalist activities significantly influ-

ence downstream political outcomes.

Literature Review

In the discussion that follows, we employ three key terms

requiring definition. First, “white nationalist groups”

(WNGs) refer to named organizations whose agendas are

“largely dictated by their concern with protecting what they

believe to be a threatened white racial identity” (Fording &

Schram, 2020, p. 50). “Racial threats” refer to changes in the

socioeconomic, demographic, and political status quo, which

members of dominant racial groups perceive as challenging

their privileged access to economic resources and political

and social power (Stults & Swagar, 2018, pp. 149–151).

Finally, “radical conservatism” here refers to a general body

of policy positions and political attitudes that are generally

accepting of popular sovereignty and majority rule, yet

oppose fundamental values of liberal democracy, especially

minority rights and pluralism, indicating a deep—perhaps

even overriding— concern for threats to white conservative

sociopolitical dominance (Blum & Parker, 2019; Craig &

Richeson, 2014; Kincaid, 2017; McVeigh, 2009, p. 32;

Mudde, 2018, p. 2; Toplin, 2006; Valentino & Sears, 2005).1

Our operationalizations of these terms are clarified further in

the methodology section.

White Nationalists as Violent Actors

Much recent scholarship on white nationalism in the United

States has explored the oft-assumed intimate relationship

between “hate groups,” hate crimes, and domestic terrorism,

particularly perpetrated by far-right extremists. This research

agenda is critical. Whereas an enormous volume of research

has examined threats posed by foreign, especially Islamic

terrorism, white supremacists and other far-right extremists

have been responsible for almost three times as many domes-

tic attacks since 9/11 (Bergengruen & Hennigan, 2019). The

Anti-Defamation League reports that far-right organizations

and individuals were responsible for 73% of domestic

extremist-related fatalities from 2009 to 2018, and 2019

saw more anti-Semitic incidents than any other year since

1979 (ADL, 2019; Cortellessa, 2020). The Department of

Homeland Security (2020, p. 18) also cited 2019 as the most

lethal year for “domestic violent extremism” in the United

States since the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, with white

supremacist extremists responsible for more attacks and

deaths than any other ideological group.

Multiple studies confirm that the presence of hate groups

in the United States is significantly related to the occurrence

of hate crimes, against persons or properties motivated at

least in part by targets’ “immutable characteristics”

(Adamczyk et al., 2014; Feinberg, 2020; Jendryke &

McClure, 2019; Sweeney & Perliger, 2018; Yahagi, 2019).

While the number of WNGs explicitly linked to violent and/

or criminal acts, particularly those perpetrated by radicalized

“lone wolves,” are quite small, their effect has often been

devastating (Asal et al., 2020). So too, WNGs that explicitly

advocate violence are more likely to act violently (Asal &

Vitek, 2018), although they are also more likely to attract law

enforcement or other legal interventions leading to their

demise (Suttmoeller et al., 2018).

Particularly extreme, deeply violent white nationalist

organizations like the Order and more recently Atomwaffen

Divison and Base have advanced ambitious plots aimed at

inciting race war and overthrowing the federal government

in order to establish a white American ethno-state (Barkun,

1989; Blazakis et al., 2020; Stabile, 2019; Ware, 2019).

Recent efforts by far-right militia groups to instigate vio-

lence and police reprisals against protesters at Black Lives

Matters rallies, not to mention their high-profile participation

in the January 2021 U.S. Capital riot, may be even more con-

cerning (Burghart, 2020; Staff, 2021; Olson, 2020; Thomas,

2020; Wilson & Evans, 2020). That these groups and associ-

ated individuals’ actions were often ignored, condoned, or

even encouraged by the Trump administration (e.g. “Stand

back and stand by” to the Proud Boys during the first presi-

dential candidates’ debate in September 2020) is alarming to

say the least (also ADL, 2020; Levy, 2020; Miller & Graves,

2020).2

Demand-Based Approaches to White

Nationalism

Yet examination of white nationalism through the dominant

lens of criminal and political violence potentially obfuscates

study of the very meaningful extent to which these groups’

ethnocentric and racist agendas have (re)entered the

American mainstream (Fording & Schram, 2020; Hartzell,

2018; Mondon & Winter, 2020). To be sure, out-group preju-

dices have never been far from the surface of American poli-

tics, consistently if latently shaping popular political attitudes

and voter behavior. Particularly relevant, are consistent find-

ings that “racial threats” motivate increased support by white