Mobilizing From Scratch: Large-Scale Collective Action Without Preexisting Organization in the Syrian Uprising

• Date: 01 September 2021
• Author: Wendy Pearlman
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912281
• Published date: 01 September 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

2021, Vol. 54(10) 1786 –1817

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020912281

Comparative Political Studies

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414020912281

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Article

Mobilizing From Scratch:

Large-Scale Collective

Action Without

Preexisting Organization

in the Syrian Uprising

Wendy Pearlman1

Abstract

Core social movement research argues that large-scale challenges to authority

build upon preexisting organization and civil society resources. How do dissenters

mobilize masses in repressive settings where, given curtailment of civil society,

autonomous associations scarcely exist and norms discourage trust more

than encourage it? Testimonials from the Syrian uprising illustrate how protest

can become widespread under such conditions, yet occurs through processes

different from what dominant theory expects. Activists get demonstrations off

the ground by planning around awareness of their organizational deficits. Once

in motion, contention propels both organization and increasing organizational

sophistication. To be effective, mobilization sometimes evades or obscures

established social relationships, even as it produces new forms of sociability.

Bridging literatures on mass and clandestine mobilization, this research

reconsiders the assumed sequential logic of movement development from

organization to protest, rather than vice versa. It also shifts attention from

movement antecedents toward the resourcefulness and strategy that enable

mobilizing both from scratch and at grave risk.

Keywords

social movements, conflict processes, Middle East, nondemocratic regimes,

networks

1Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Wendy Pearlman, Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University,

Scott Hall, 601 University Place, #204, Evanston, IL 60208, USA.

Email: pearlman@northwestern.edu

912281

CPSXXX10.1177/0010414020912281Comparative Political StudiesPearlman

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Since the 1960s, a large body of social movement theory has argued that

sustained, mass challenges to authority grow from preexisting civil society

groups and other sources of organizational strength. How does protest mobi-

lize in settings of overwhelming repression and state violence, where civil

society is severely curtailed and autonomous associations scarcely exist?

I posit the term “mobilization from scratch” to describe large-scale collec-

tive action in the absence of preexisting organization. I develop this metaphor

from baking. Someone who prepares a cake from scratch puts distinct ingre-

dients together for the first time and makes them congeal into something new.

This is more difficult than using a prepackaged mix, which has already com-

bined those ingredients, such that the addition of water or an egg finishes the

batter. Similarly, “mobilization from scratch” builds from foundational ele-

ments such as individuals, a political cause, and everyday social relation-

ships. This pathway to protest is not facilitated by “preorganized” elements,

like civic groups, political parties, histories of activism, opposition leaders,

free media, and labor unions.1 That is in part why uprisings in such settings

take observers, and even protesters themselves, by surprise.

This article theorizes this undertheorized type of mobilization by delineat-

ing five processes that underlie and distinguish it. First, activists in such set-

tings are aware of their structural limits as well as pervasive risk, and thus

extract all the mobilizational leverage they can from elements other than pre-

existing organization. Second, mobilization from scratch itself generates

mobilizing structures, rather than vice versa. Third, sustained contention pro-

duces new problems and needs that drive more, and increasingly sophisti-

cated, kinds of organization. Fourth, in addition to developing from established

social relationships, vehicles of organization might actively evade or obscure

such relationships. Fifth, under these circumstances, mobilization creates not

only new social ties, but also new forms of sociability.

I explore these processes in the initial stages of the 2011 Syrian uprising.

For more than four decades, Syria’s security state prohibited political parties,

independent associations, or other spaces in which citizens could speak

freely, no less act collectively. Pervasive surveillance sowed fear and distrust.

According to conventional theory and many Syrians themselves, revolution

under these conditions was simply “impossible” (Saleh, 2017). When activ-

ists nonetheless launched protests in 2011, they were aided by factors unre-

lated to preexisting organization, such as emotions (Wood, 2003), information

and media technology (Lynch, 2012), spontaneous assembly around focal

points (Schelling, 1978), and the capacity of early risers to trigger a cascade

(Kuran, 1991). In addition, protest transpired in a particular temporal context,

as demonstration effects from elsewhere in the Arab spring (Patel et al., 2014)

were critical in motivating Syrians to the streets. Nonetheless, an uprising

1788 Comparative Political Studies 54(10)

Pearlman 3

could not have spread over space and time, especially against a repressive

onslaught, had protestors not also developed means of organization unpre-

dicted by preuprising circumstances.

No society is completely bereft of resources for collective action.

Analyzing Syria, Leenders (2012, 2013) and Leenders and Heydemann

(2012) argue that social networks, especially those centered on clans, tribes,

migration, and smuggling, crucially facilitated early protests. I do not deny

that these or other social ties aided Syria’s uprising. Rather, I caution that

excessive searching for organizational antecedents can lead us to exaggerate

the importance of existent structures vis-à-vis those generated in the course

of contention. Doing so risks missing opportunities to conceptualize mobili-

zational trajectories where agency plays an especially important role, and

thus to learn from the creativity, resourcefulness, and strategic smarts that go

into making those trajectories. Investigating these dynamics contributes to

contentious politics scholarship by reconsidering the sequential logic of

movement development, bridging the literatures on mass protest and on clan-

destine action, and probing how repressive contexts shape social relation-

ships that both influence, and are influenced by, protest in particular ways.

This article proceeds in five sections. The first three sections review rele-

vant scholarship, present a theory of large-scale collective action without pre-

existing organization, discuss my research methodology, and offer historical

background on Syria. The fourth section pulls upon hundreds of original

interviews to illustrate five processes underlying mobilization from scratch in

the Syrian case. The conclusion discusses the implications of this research

and possible directions for future research.

Beyond Preexisting Organization

Early 20th century theories of collective behavior attributed protest to impas-

sioned mobs driven by alienation, relative deprivation, or crowd dynamics.

Contesting such views, subsequent research conceptualized social move-

ments as rational collective action requiring resources and organization (Zald

& McCarthy, 1987). The American civil rights movement became a paradig-

matic case, with scholars showing how large-scale dissent grew from “indig-

enous organizational strength” and preexisting networks of activist groups

(McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984). Innumerable cases affirmed these arguments

with further evidence of how existent organizations, even when ostensibly

nonpolitical, serve as mobilizing structures by aiding communication, recruit-

ment, sanctioning, solidarity, and other resources.

Although much of this research studied democratic countries, others applied

their insights to authoritarian regimes and explored how organizational