Misuse of the 'Reasonably Anticipated Use' Standard in Louisiana Products Liability Act Jurisprudence

• Author: Steven E. Spires
• Position: J.D. candidate 2020, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University
• Pages: 575-624

Louisiana Law Review Louisiana Law Review

Volume 80

Number 2

Winter 2020

Article 15

4-22-2020

Misuse of the "Reasonably Anticipated Use" Standard in Louisiana Misuse of the "Reasonably Anticipated Use" Standard in Louisiana

Products Liability Act Jurisprudence Products Liability Act Jurisprudence

Steven E. Spires

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev

Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Repository Citation Repository Citation

Steven E. Spires,

Misuse of the "Reasonably Anticipated Use" Standard in Louisiana Products Liability Act

Jurisprudence

, 80 La. L. Rev. (2020)

Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol80/iss2/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital

Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital

Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 295341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 295 4/15/20 8:48 AM4/15/20 8:48 AM

Misuse of the “Reasonably Anticipated Use”

Standard in Louisiana Products Liability Act

Jurisprudence

Steven E. Spires

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .................................................................................. 574

I. Background .................................................................................. 577

II. The Meaning of “Reasonably Anticipated Use” .......................... 581

A. Definition of “Reasonably Anticipated Use”

Is Fact-Specific ...................................................................... 582

B. No Difference Between “Normal” and

“Reasonably Anticipated” Use .............................................. 585

III. Theoretical Approaches To Applying “Reasonably

Anticipated Use” in the LPLA Context........................................ 588

A. Duty….. ................................................................................. 589

B. Breach.. .................................................................................. 590

C. Cause-in-Fact ......................................................................... 594

D. “Proximate Cause”................................................................. 594

E. Comparative Fault ................................................................. 597

IV. Applying “Reasonably Anticipated Use”

in State and Federal Court................................ ............................ 598

A. Early No-Duty Cases: Daigle and Lockart ............................ 599

B. Plaintiff Negligence Muddies the Waters:

Myers, Delphen, and Hunter.................................................. 603

Copyright 2020, by STEVEN E. SPIRES.

 J.D. candidate 2020, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State

University. I want to thank my entire family, especially my parents and siblings,

for sharing a love of books, music, and learning; my wife Kelly for her

partnership; Dean Thomas Galligan, a great torts teacher, law review advisor,

mentor, and all-around example of how to be; Prof. Anna Scardulla for her

invaluable editing skills and suggestions; Prof. Lee Ann Lockridge for her

guidance and encouragement; and my fellow Louisiana Law Review members for

their help with the writing process (Mary Grace and Brooke) and for their

solidarity (Missy and Sam). Special thanks to Ray Dawson and Troy McCullen.

Errors are my own.

341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 296341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd 296 4/15/20 8:48 AM4/15/20 8:48 AM

574 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80

C. Who Decides Policy Questions?

The “Huffing” Cases.............................................................. 611

D. An Analytical Mess: Kampen and Matthews......................... 614

V. Toward Clarity ............................................................................. 617

Conclusion.................................................................................... 621

INTRODUCTION

Ralph Kampen was just trying to be a good father. His daughter

complained of a strange noise coming from underneath her 1989 Isuzu

Impulse, so Kampen jacked up the car with the manufacturer-provided tire

jack and slid his body under the car to inspect the undercarriage.1 The jack

failed, and the falling car crushed Kampen, breaking both of his

collarbones.2 Kampen brought suit against Isuzu under the Louisiana

Products Liability Act (LPLA), alleging that the jack was defective in

construction.3

To recover under the LPLA, Kampen first had to prove the threshold

element that his damages “arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the

product.”4 The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor

of Isuzu, but a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that a jury

could find Kampen’s use of the jack was “reasonably anticipated” because

the jack was being used to elevate the car—the exact use Isuzu surely

intended when it made the jack.5 The Fifth Circuit en banc reheard the case

and redefined Kampen’s “use” to include the placing of his body under the

car.6 The court then held that although a reasonably anticipated use of the

jack was to change a tire, it was not a reasonably anticipated use to jack

up the car to inspect the undercarriage.7 The court dismissed Kampen’s

claim.8

1. Kampen v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 308 (5th Cir.

1998).

2. Id. at 309.

3. Id. at 308.

4. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54 (2018).

5. Kampen, 157 F.3d at 308–10.

6. Id. at 310–11.

7. Id. at 317–18.

8. Id. at 318.