Mises's Human Action and Its Place in Science and Intellectual Culture.

• Author: Boettke, Peter J.

I consider Ludwig von Mises's Human Action: A Treatise on Economics the greatest work in economics and political economy in the twentieth century, and it ranks in the top five books of all time in the discipline, alongside Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxations by David Ricardo, A Treatise on Political Economy by Jean-Baptiste Say, and Principles of Political Economy by John Stuart Mill. It is probably accurate to say that without the contributions of Alfred Marshall, Philip Wicksteed, and Knut Wicksell, and certainly without Carl Menger, Eugen Bohm-Bawerk, and Friedrich von Wieser, Mises could not have written his magisterial work. But his work was more in line with the approach of the great classical political economists than with the scientific texts of early neoclassical economics. But make no mistake, he synthesized the best learning in the classics and the neoclassical and forged that synthesis into a powerful work that countered the antieconomics arguments that emerged in the social sciences and the humanities from antiquity to modernity.

I consider it an honor and privilege to provide commentary on Mises's great work Human Action for The Independent Review's symposium "Reconsidering the Classics of Political Economy." Human Action is a monumental achievement of the human mind. It makes fundamental contributions to methodology of the social sciences, the analytical tools best developed to study the pure logic of choice, the situational logic of the marketplace, and the social philosophy of radical liberalism. It is also, unfortunately, a work that has been subject to severe misinterpretation by friend and foe alike because of its unique history in the context of twentieth-century scientific and intellectual culture. At the core of Mises's work is simply a claim about the nature of critical reasoning in the human sciences. He is navigating an intellectual terrain between the English-language discussions of the logical status of economics exemplified by Mill and the German-language continental philosophical context out of which he was writing. Those allergic to continental philosophy (as most analytical philosophers are) misunderstand his claims about the nuances of economic theory, and those allergic to analytical philosophy (as many continental philosophers, German historicists, and English empiricists often are) misunderstand his claims about the logical status of economic theory. Before we get started, I want to attempt a simple clarification.

Mises is not making a dogmatic and extreme claim to certainty. He is simply making a rather elementary claim in logical reasoning. He is attempting to make truth-preserving arguments in striving for logically sound economic theory. By this standard, if the premises by which one commences an argument are true, and the logical derivations are correct, then the conclusions are true. However, early-twentieth-century economists were intellectually exhausted by seemingly endless debates about theory and policy. The biggest confusion in scientific discourse results when discourse partners use the same words to mean different things and different words to mean the same thing. So economists' intellectual temperament during Mises's time veered toward substituting mathematical models for verbal chains of reasoning in an effort to clear up ambiguity and confusion. All theorizing entails abstraction, but the older theorists in the classical and early neoclassical period took great pains to ensure that they constrained their flights of fancy so that abstractions were limited only to adequate abstraction for the purpose at hand and so that they never lost sight of the real world. In Mill, for example, this method was one of successive approximations in the move from pure theory to applied theorizing and eventually to considering questions of public policy. (1) As Frank Knight put it in The Economic Organization, pure theory is analogous to providing the skeletal structure of the economic "body" ([1933] 1967, 35), but advances in theorizing require accounting for the muscular, circulatory, and nervous system to get a true understanding of the system in operation.

By 1930s, this type of thought experiment was being pushed aside in the scientific literature for the beautiful abstractions of mathematical theory both in Europe (where the main scientific discussion was taking place) and in the United States (where the economics profession was fast emerging). And mathematical theory, rather than seen as providing a skeletal framing, was applauded as being institutionally antiseptic and transcending time and place. The relationship between averages and marginals is true whether we are talking about student test scores or the costs faced by factory managers, and it is true whether those students and managers are located in China or in England and true whether we are discussing the decisions made in 1770 or those made in 1930. Math is math.

The only problem is that although mathematical reasoning can ensure syntactic clarity, it is incapable of ensuring semantic clarity. Our logic quest shifts from seeking to derive logically sound arguments to ensuring that our arguments are logically valid. The truth or falsehood of the original premise is no...