Miranda v. Arizona - The Law Today

• Author: Captain Frederic I. Lederer
• Pages: 03

1. INTRODUCTION

   You have the nght to remnin szlent: onmay be used against you at inal, gou hat,sult icith n lauyer arid to hnie a iai~yerthis tntewogation nrid if you cannot affwd n iaioyer onewill be appointed for you.

   Thus speaks the Supreme Court in Mirnnda L'. Arizona,' surely one of the Court's must controversial decisions in criminal l a y and one almost certain to be modified by the Court in the near future. The decision is complex and ail1 be discussed at leng-th later. How ever, it ie important to note at this point that the decision in Miranda supplied an affirmative duty on the part of police desiring to conduct eustodiai interrogations to warn an accused of his nght to remain silent and of a right to counsel at interrogations far broader

   the stnetners nith which it had to be applied to be of value.

   The history of the Supreme Court's dealings with the confession problem is a story of partially futile attempts ta find a tool with which to control improper palice conduct. In the development of the contemporary law of confearions, the tool the Court ultimately seized \%-as the right to counsel. This right waz considered, If not the perfect tool, at least far better than its nearest competitors. The first decision of nationwide scope was Massink c. Cnited States.l finding a sixth amendment right to counsel at post-indictment inter- 'The opmmns and eanaludanr presented in this article are those of the author and da not neeesssnly represent the vie,%s of The Judpe Advocate General 5 School or any other g~reinmenialagency.

   JAGC U S Army Incfructar. C~iminal Laa Division, The Judge Advocate General's School. on extended leave to stud)

   Fulbright-Hsyi Fellaiihip at the Max Planck Internaiiunaleb Srrafreehr. at Freihurg, Germanyof Yea York, d D , 1971. Columbia Cnwerrify.dsfe Umverrlty of Virgmh. MernbeCaurc of llilifary Appeala. and the Uz 384 U S 436 (18661 The ~lrninesi

   general w e and do not include rhe required waiver quemme

   ' 377 C.5. 201 (19641. The Court had previously been dmfvrbed by police Interfer- 107

   MILITARY L.4W REVIEW [VOL. 78

   rogations ohen the defendant hdd rrtaine follaned in a few months by EWJ,POO t . I1

   Within the milltar? service. a recpmment fm counsel nsriiingi has been in effect smee at least the 1967 decii~on of the Court of Xlitar? .+peals in the case of l'iiitrd Stntrr t' T r ~ n p i o . ~

   11. ESCOBEDO V.ILLIA-01s

   Danny Escobedo'z brother-in-Ian aas fa-ia? arrested, intarogated and releared the 30th an accomplice turned itare's evidence. sted snd taken to the police station. During the ride to the station house Ercobedo refused to an.~wr question?

   stating that he wanted a d i m from his laaser.'

   Kotifierl b! the mother of a friend, Escabedo's lawyer arrived at the station house soon after Eacobedo. Despite his best efforts. in which he spoke to rirtually every policeman in the area including the chief of police. the lanyer was refused permission to speak with his client until questioning was completed Ercobeda repeatedly re-

   19iS1 .NIRA.TDA V. ARIZ0,VA

   the Court reasoned that when Escobedo was refused the right to see his lawyer he had become an accused and the purpose of the interrogation was to "get him." According to Mr. Justice Goldberg, "it would exalt form over substance to make right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment. Petitioner had. for ail practical purposes. already been charged with murder." Thus. the Court's prior decision in Masstah was extended to the Eseobedo fact pattern.

   The decision iras otherwise buttressed by stating that for the right to counsel at trial to have any meaning counsel would be neces~arv at oretriai interrocation. for otherwise the conviction

   " .

   would already have been assurds Interrogation was thus a "cnti-cal ?tage." The holding of the case w . 3 stated thusly:

   requeired and been denied an oppor'ruer and rhe polire haw not effectively

   accused har been denied "the Assistance of Coun~eYin ,idation of

   the Snth Amendment , .B

   Surely a mox limited decision could scarcely hare been imagined. Yet Mr. Justice dissenting, viewed the decision more ex-pansively, stating that "[alt the wry least the Court holds that once the accused became8 a suspect and, presumably. 1s arrested, any admission made to the police thereafter iB inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has ivaived his light to counsel." As time proved, Justice White's prediction was remarkably accurate. Taken at his word. hoverer. Justice Goldberg's deemion uas limited to cases in which a defendant war made aware of his right to remain silent and requested and was refused access to his counael. A warning of the right to counsel wa.? not required. Further, for Eseobedo to apply, the investigation had to have "focused" on the accused who had also to hare been taken into eurtody. The definition of focus was left open.

   a Id at 486 - I d at 486lamed bi Warren, C J , and Douglar and Brennsn JJ , dissenting1

   Io id at 196

   Id at 487 ertinp In re Groban. 352 U 5 330. 344 (1957) (Black. J. ~n an opinmn

   Id at 490-91

   Id

   Uitimateiy, Eseobedo, a limited decision when taken at its word, proved of limited value.'a Far more important was the use of the decision as a stepping stone to what Justice White feared was likely. the case of Mzranda 0. A,rzonn

   111. MIRAMDA V. ARIZOXA l3

   The Supreme Court's decision in Eseobedo r. Illinois 14 left the lair. of confessions in uncertainty. While the decision itself had been narrow and rirtuaiig limited to the facts of the case, potential for broad expansion was clearly evident. Deeply concerned b> the need to predict the Supreme Court's ultimate interpretation of the fifth amendment. the organized bar struggled to delimit the Anal bound-arm of the Eseobedo deciaion.15 Foremast among the questions left by Eseohedo were:

   When did a suspect who desired to see retained counsel hare a right to see him?

   Did a suspect who desired counsel during or before Interrogation but who lacked the funds to retain one have a right to hare one appointed free of charge?

   Did government interrogators have to affirmatively narn suspects of their right to ~ounsel prior to interrogation?

   The questions left by Eseo%edo were almost saleig ones relating to a right to counseI. At stake vas the suspect's right to consult

   Taken literally the opinion UBS of lmir eonaequen rapidlgeame to be iieuedaspreseribinp aright to eounse fmn had focused' on a iuspecf subjected IO pollee interro "focus" defied ear! rerolution until II %ai subrurned info 'custody I' Eseobrdo as, I" one respect. a ciit~alde

   the right to COYOJL! to the inverfipatory process hlr found this parficulsrl) oblectmab!a ' ITlhe vital fact not inwlve the deliberate inieriopafion of 8 defendan eial oroceediner analnit him " 378 E 9 at 482. and

   with a lawyer pnor to or during a cuztadial interrogation. The right to couniel became the focal point of the problem because of the Court's belief that the poiice-dominated atmosphere surrounding most interrogations could be offset only by the presence of a lawyer whose sole responsibility was to the suspect. Ultimately of cou11se the past-Eseobedo imxs reached the Supreme Court.

   The rehicle which the Court chose to resolve the Escobedo prab]ems was Mzranda, consolidated with three other eases.18 all of which raised dated fifth amendment and eonfmnon problems. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the individual cases, it is important to point out that as a group they included moat of the factual variations important to an attempted definitive res-olution of the Eseobedo issues. Both State and federal eases %ere included; warnings of one type or another had been given in Some cases but not in others." Similarly, while the relief requested in each case was identical, the reversal of a conwtion, or the affir-mance of a reversal. the legal arguments raised by the various defendants varied from a limited reliance on the due process voluntar-mess doctrine to a claim that the Constitution required automatic aasignment of counsel before a custodial interrogation could yield admissible evidence. In airnost all the eases the defendants placed their primary reliance on the fifth amendment right against aelfincrimination, arguing that the right to counsel was essential to a realistic exercise of the privilege.

   Perhaps the best and most comprehensive argument !,as made b) the America1 Civil Liberties Union appearing as ( L ~ I I C U S

   that if the subject chaares IO teconieis his intended meaningthe mtterrogirian proceedmgrOhvlaui!i an effecrire xdrrlng of the pnnege 12 d keyztone of ~ t ; effeetiie enfoleeaent I' 13 eoua'l! clear that there I> a Teed IO pro- e n

   caniide and uho ~ 1 1 . ba!arer his confidence .

   I; a m r n e function oi ~ o l m custodial ineommunieada infemeatm :o

   ,de rt,e presence ai ,ameane ,t 1"Ierragarm"

   pooe, He I* :"rne"le

   et the aoearnpliihed police Intel-

   job to be a ihoie-heailed d o e a t e for the rubieei rith no conflicting interertb ~n this regard

   SIX neeesiar~

   to endure that If a

   ifralned close e\amlnatlon.

   Appeals to the sixth amendment right to counsel. though present. were rare. Just as the claims made by the convicted defendants were quite vaned in scope. -20 too did the positions taken bg the counsel for the state and federal prosecution varb- widely, ranging from an outright denial of any right to counsel or warnings to the comparatively mild position taken b?- then Solicitor General Mar-shall go in which he conceded the right to counsel at interrogations but denied the need to warn suspects of the existence of that right.?? Government counsel were united in their concern for the possible consequences to law enforcement that might flow from an absolute right to counsel at interrogations 22

   r. Justice Thurgaod Marihrll of the Supreme CourtIIEDALIE. 8upm note li...