Miranda V. Arizona and Its Progeny

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

III. Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny

A. Background

In 1897, the Supreme Court announced the test for compliance with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. That test was, and still is, voluntariness under "totality of the circumstances."

In 1964, the Supreme Court held that the voluntariness test alone was insufficient to protect the defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court held that "voluntariness" would no longer be the sole criterion for admissibility. The Court held that, where "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'The Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him in a criminal trial." Id. at 490-91. In essence, Escobedo was the forerunner to—and a rough draft of—Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Questions left open in Escobedo were resolved in Miranda, which announced (1) mandatory procedures for all statements obtained during custodial interrogations; and (2) an exclusionary rule for the failure to comply with those mandatory procedures. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. Miranda did not abandon the voluntariness test, but rather it added an additional requirement for all statements obtained during custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684, 696 (1971) ("The seminal case of Miranda . . . did not supersede pre-existing law on voluntariness. It simply added an additional dimension to that law.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In Miranda, the Supreme Court announced a mandatory procedure designed to ensure that police comply with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court held:

[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the Defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

384 U.S. at 444-45. The purpose of Miranda is not to modify police conduct, but rather to protect the defendant's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984).

Miranda was controversial from the day it was decided, and questions arose. Would Miranda make it impossible for police officers to do their job? Was Miranda found in the Constitution or was it just an invention of the Supreme Court? In Bryant v. State, 49 Md. App. 272 (1981), the Court of Special Appeals stated:

Dire consequences were predicted by some law enforcement officers as a result of what they saw as the unwarranted shackles placed upon them by Miranda. Confessions, it was said, would be virtually eliminated. Nevertheless, we have found no statistics indicating that Miranda has reduced the number of confessions, nor do we perceive that it has unduly hampered the police.

The end of what has been styled "the Warren Court" and the beginning of what is now known as "the Burger Court" gave rise to widespread speculation that Miranda would be short-lived. Indeed, in holdings such as Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 [] (1971), the Court seemed to chip away at Miranda and to be fashioning a coffin for Miranda's ultimate demise as a viable constitutional force. Miranda critics, and they were numerous, thought that "the outlook was extremely rocky for the . . . (Miranda) nine." It was just a matter of time, they said, until the "right" case would be heard by the Supreme Court and Miranda would be unlamented past history.

Those prognosticators of Miranda's expiration must have sustained an intellectual jolt when the Court filed Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 [ ] (1981).

Id. at 275-76.

On the constitutional front, the debate was whether the requirements of Miranda are constitutionally mandated, as part of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, or whether Miranda warnings are merely a prophylactic device, of non-constitutional dimension, invented by the Supreme Court. In Schmidt v. State, 60 Md. App. 86 (1984), the Court of Special Appeals stated: "Miranda warnings are not constitutional dictates but merely prophylactic rules designed to protect an accused from self-accusation coerced by police conduct outside of judicial scrutiny. . . ." Id. at 101. However, in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme Court finally addressed whether Miranda is a constitutional mandate and held that it is. Id. at 438-40.

Because the only remedy for a Miranda violation is suppression of a non-Mirandized statement, Miranda applies only if the defendant is charged with a crime. Martinez, 538 U.S. at 772-73.

B. Applicability of Miranda warnings

Miranda warnings apply to all custodial interrogations. In Miranda, the Supreme Court stated: "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that "police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." Id. at 495.

In Cummings v. State, 27 Md. App. 361 (1975), the Court of Special Appeals stated: "Miranda, in precise terms, was aimed not at self-incrimination generally (even in response to police interrogation) but at compelled self-incrimination—the inherent coercion of the custodial, incommunicado, third-degree questioning process." Id. at 364.

There are four relevant questions to resolve a Miranda scenario. Id. at 367. First, was the defendant in custody? Id. Second, was the defendant's statement made in response to interrogation? Id. In Cummings, the Court stated: "The answer to both of the foregoing questions must be in the affirmative before Miranda is even applicable. Only in the event that Custody and Interrogation are found to have been present does a court move on to consider [the third and fourth questions]." Id. Thus, if the defendant was not in custody or if the defendant was not subject to interrogation, Miranda does not apply. See, e.g., Minehan v. State, 147 Md. App. 432, 440 (2002) (confession not the product of custodial interrogation and Miranda inapplicable).

If both the first question and the second question are answered in the affirmative, i.e., Miranda is applicable because the defendant was in custody and subject to interrogation, the third question is whether there were adequate Miranda warnings, and the fourth question is whether Miranda rights were asserted or knowingly and intelligently waived? Cummings, 27 Md. App. at 367.

C. Custody

1. Custody occurs when the defendant is under arrest or its functional equivalent, decided under an objective standard

Miranda applies when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way by a government actor, regardless of whether the custody is for a misdemeanor or felony. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428, 434 (1984). If a person is in custody, any interrogation (even if for a different crime) triggers Miranda requirements. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).

In Rosenberg v. State, 129 Md. App. 221 (1999), the Court of Special Appeals stated: "'Custody' ordinarily contemplates that a suspect will be under arrest, frequently in a jailhouse or station house setting. The concept of 'custody,' however, is not necessarily synonymous with an actual arrest; it also includes a reasonable perception that one is significantly deprived of freedom of action." Id. at 240 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also In re Joshua David C., 116 Md. App. 580, 593 (1997). Moreover, "Miranda warnings are not required 'simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.'" California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).

The test is whether a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was under arrest or its functional equivalent. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. In Bond v. State, 142 Md. App. 219 (2002), the Court of Special Appeals stated:

In

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