In the opinions1 and briefs2 that follow, the reader is invited to explore the issue of interrogation of criminal suspects and the question of when a suspect's confession to a crime should be admitted at trial. As you read this section, you may wish to consider the following questions:
Why does the Constitution protect a criminal suspect from being a witness against himself or herself?
Under what circumstances could a police officer ask an individual questions about a crime without having to give the person the Miranda warnings?
What is the purpose of the right to counsel?
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say may be used for or against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney now or at any time during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you, without cost, by the courts. [sample Miranda warning]
In the interest of space, only the opinions of the supreme courts of Arizona and California, which reached different results, and only the briefs in Miranda v. Arizona, are presented.
CITE AS 401 P.2D 721
STATE OF ARIZONA, APPELLEE,
ERNEST ARTHUR MIRANDA, APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
April 22, 1965.
Prosecution on count of kidnapping and rape. The Superior Court, Maricopa County, Yale McFate, J., entered judgment on guilty verdict, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, McFarland, J., held that confession of defendant, who from previous arrests was familiar with legal proceedings and personal rights in court and who was picked from police lineup by complaining witness as person who allegedly kidnapped and raped her, made after police had informed him of his rights but had not specifically informed him of right to assistance of council and he himself had not requested and been denied assistance of counsel, was not inadmissible by reason of defendant's lacking attorney at time it was made.
Reference to "rape" in kidnapping count of information against defendant was proper where rape was alleged to be purpose of kidnapping. A.R.S. § 13–492, subsecs. A-C.
Where allegation in kidnapping information against defendant that defendant had allegedly perpetrated kidnapping for purpose of raping complaining witness was necessary and proper element of information, subsequent reiterated reference to alleged rape by use of words "and did rape" were not objectionable as being inflammatory inasmuch as those words stated no more than the original necessary reference to matter. A.R.S. § 13–492, subsecs. A-C.
Use of word "rape" in first or kidnapping count of information against defendant, to define necessary element of defendant's alleged purpose for alleged kidnapping, was not, by itself, prejudicial to defendant where use of word was necessary in second or "rape" count of information. A.R.S. § 13–492, subsecs. A-C.
Descriptive phrase "not being related in any way to the defendant" in first or kidnapping count of information against defendant, which had mere object of indicating that defendant's alleged taking of 18-year-old girl did not fall within exception in statute providing for taking of minor by parent, could not have had any inflammatory contents which prejudiced defendant. A.R.S. § 13–492, subsecs. A-C.
Where word "fear" originally alleged in second or "rape" count of indictment against defendant had been stricken from information prior to trial and, therefore, was not included in information read to jury, original inclusion could not have prejudiced defendant. A.R.S. §§ 13–492, subsecs. B, C, 13–611, subsec. A, par. 2.
Allowing defendant charged with rape and kidnapping, on his own motion, to have sanity hearing that caused delay of trial, through late filing of medical report, past 60-day period that rule required trial to be brought in, except in case of appropriate showing of good cause by affidavit or defendant's consent or action, was "good cause," within section, for continuing trial for additional five days beyond 60-day period. 17 A.R.S. Rules of Criminal Procedure, rules 236, 250.
Where prosecuting attorney, who had wide latitude in his argument to jury, stated conclusion in argument, justified by evidence, that 18-year-old complaining witness had acquiesced in alleged act of rape due to her fear of defendant, and trial court's immediate instruction to jury to disregard statement and instruction at close of trial limiting jury's consideration to rape offense charged had effect of precluding prejudice from inflammatory aspect of statement, prejudicial error did not appear. A.R.S. § 13–611, subsec. A, par. 2.
Whether defendant charged with rape of complaining witness had actually penetrated 18–year-old complaining witness, as witness affirmatively testified and as defendant's confession indicated, and whether thereby rape was actually perpetrated were questions for jury. A.R.S. § 13–611, subsec. A, par. 2.
All inferences must be construed in light most favorable to sustaining verdict in criminal case.
Where there is evidence to support criminal verdict, Supreme Court will not disturb finding of jury.
A chief duty of both sheriff's office and county attorney's office is to make sure that people are not unjustly charged with crime; both have duty to protect innocent as well as to detect the guilty.
Confession may be admissible when made without an attorney if it is voluntary and does not violate constitutional rights of defendant. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6, 14.
Confession of defendant, who from previous arrests was familiar with legal proceedings and personal rights in court, made after police had informed him of his rights but had not specifically informed him of right to assistance of counsel and he himself had not requested and been denied assistance of counsel, was not inadmissible by reason of defendant's lacking attorney at time it was made.
Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Pickrell, former Atty. Gen., Stirley Newell, former Asst. Atty. Gen., Allen L. Feinstein, Phoenix, of counsel, for appellee.
Alvin Moore, Phoenix, for appellant.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of kidnapping, Count I; and Rape, Count II; and sentenced to serve from twenty to thirty years on each count, to run concurrently. From the judgement and sentence of the court he appeals. Appellant, hereinafter called defendant, was in another information charged with the crime of robbery. After arraignment in the instant case, on motion of the county attorney, the trial on the robbery case was consolidated with the instant case, but thereafter—one day prior to the trial of this case—separate trials were granted. Defendant was tried and convicted on the robbery charge, from which he is also appealing in the companion case of State v. Miranda, No. 1397, 98 Ariz. 11, 401 P.2d 716.
The facts, as they relate to the defense as charged under Counts I and II in the instant case are as follows: On March 3, 1963, the complaining witness—a girl eighteen years of age—had been working in the concession stand at the Paramount Theatre in downtown Phoenix, and had taken the bus to 7th Street and Marlette. After getting off the bus, she had started to walk toward her home. She observed a car, which afterwords proved to be defendant's, which had been parked behind the ballet school on Marlette. The car pulled out of the lot, and came so close to her that she had to jump back to prevent being hit. It then parked across from some apartments in the same block. Defendant then left his car, walked toward her, and grabbed her. He told her not to scream, that he would not hurt her. He held her hands behind her back, put a hand over her mouth, and pulled her toward the car. He put her in the back seat, tied her hands and feet, and put a...