Miranda Rules (Update)

• Author: Donald A. Dripps
• Pages: 1743-1744

Page 1743

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1966) held that a statement obtained from a criminal defendant through custodial interrogation is inadmissible against that defendant unless the police obtained a waiver of the RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION after warning the suspect of both the right to remain silent and the RIGHT TO COUNSEL. Recently, the Supreme Court has issued decisions favorable to the government concerning several Miranda issues: the definition of custodial interrogation, in Arizona v. Mauro (1989); the adequacy of warnings provided to persons in custody, in Duckworth v. Eagan (1989); and the standard that governs the validity of waiver, in Colorado v. Spring (1987) and Colorado v. Connelly (1986). Although in Arizona v. Robertson (1988) the Court reaffirmed the proscription of questioning until counsel appears, once the suspect requests counsel, the police need not advise the suspect of a lawyer's efforts to consult with him or her, as the Court held in Moran v. Burbine (1986).

The most significant of these developments is the holding in Connelly and Spring that a Miranda waiver is valid so long as the police did not obtain the waiver through conduct that would render a confession "involuntary" as a matter of PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. The Miranda opinion stated that "a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to ? counsel." Connelly, a lunatic, confessed at the behest of "the voice of God." Spring waived Miranda rights after government agents led him to believe that the questioning would concern an illegal firearms transaction, but the interrogation eventually included questions about a homicide. Spring's waiver was not knowing, and Connelly's was not intelligent. The Court nonetheless approved admission of both CONFESSIONS, stating in Connelly that "there is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a "voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT confession context."

The Justices would not likely approve waiver of the right to counsel at trial by a person in Connelly's condition or by a person like Spring, who misunderstood the seriousness of the charge. Yet in Patterson v. Illinois (1988), the Court held that in the interrogation context the claimed waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right initiated by a formal charge with the...