Sea-mine threat can no longer be ignored: Navy must ensure that organic mine warfare systems are deployed fleet-wide.

• Author: Goure, Daniel
• Position: Viewpoint

To borrow an old saying, mine warfare is like the weather: everybody talks about it but nobody does anything. Like all old sayings it is not entirely accurate, but there is more than a grain of truth in it. Mine warfare has been and continues to be an issue much discussed in the U.S. Navy and in Congress. Attention to this subject has waxed and waned depending on circumstances, budgets and threats.

Now, attention is again being focused on mine warfare. One of the most serious threats to U.S. naval power projection is sea mines. Mines, which are cheap to make and easy to deploy, are perhaps the most effective weapons available to a littoral adversary seeking to prevent U.S. naval forces accessing littoral territories and projecting power ashore.

Of the 18 Navy ships seriously damaged in operations since the Korean War, mines were responsible for 14 of these incidents. Between 1988 and 1991, three warships to hit mines were the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), the cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) and a countermine task force flagship, the USS Tripoli (LPH-10). Aggregate damage to the ships exceeded $121.5 million, while combined cost for the three mines was estimated at $13,000.

Mines have twice complicated U.S. amphibious landings, first at Wonsan in 1950, and then off Kuwait in the 1990s. In addition to the physical harm caused in these and other incidents, mine warfare caused significant operational delay.

U.S. adversaries have learned from these low-budget successes, and as a result the current mine threat is growing rapidly in scope and technological sophistication. As of 1996, 48 navies were capable of laying mines, 31 nations manufactured mines and more than 20 nations exported mines. Between 1989 and 1998, there was a 40 percent increase in the number of countries with mining capabilities, a 75 percent increase in the types of mines available, a 60 percent increase in countries producing mines and a 60 percent increase in countries exporting mines.

Today, in addition to traditional, low-technology contact mines, the Navy can expect to encounter far more advanced systems that incorporate magnetic, acoustic, seismic, underwater electric potential, pressure, delayed arming mechanisms, propulsion systems, coatings and camouflage techniques that make mines more difficult to detect. Many of these features can be added to obsolescent mines at a fraction for the cost of new ones.

To address the significant threats posed by sea mines, the Navy has...