Mill on Deference and Democratic Character

• Published date: 01 December 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920970277
• Date: 01 December 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

2021, Vol. 74(4) 1125 –1136

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920970277

Political Research Quarterly

© 2020 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920970277

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Introduction

The citizenry of many liberal democracies today increas-

ingly exhibit a distrust of perceived elites. This is espe-

cially true with respect to experts and those of advanced

educational attainment more generally. People’s unwill-

ingness to defer to the consensus of putative experts can

be seen in a variety of policy areas, from vaccines and

climate change to COVID-19 safety measures. Moreover,

a recent Gallup poll found that Americans’ confidence in

higher education dropped from 57 percent in 2015 to 48

percent in 2019 (Jones 2018). Some treatments of this

phenomenon regard it as one of recent genesis. In Twilight

of the Elites, Hayes (2012) draws on sociology and social

theory to argue that America’s meritocratic system has

produced a self-perpetuating elite class disconnected

from the rest of society, emphasizing in particular how

this manifests in an unwillingness to defer to claims of

specialized knowledge. In The Death of Expertise,

Nichols (2017) bemoans what he sees as the infantilizing

effects of the modern university, as well as the Internet’s

tendency to assail us with an overwhelming mix of seri-

ous analysis and crackpot speculation. By contrast,

Hofstadter (2012) argues in that distrust of intellectuals

has been a part of the United States since its inception.

Potential responses to this phenomenon, as well as an

account of its origins, can be found in the work of John

Stuart Mill, a theorist who reflected on the nature of mass

democracy as it was first emerging. Mill regards defer-

ence to superior expertise and wisdom as an essential part

of a well-developed character while also esteeming inde-

pendent thought. While the latter may be a more familiar

aspect of Mill’s philosophy, the former is noteworthy as

well. Specifically, it is an important component of his

focus on character formation.1 Although scholars have

noted Mill’s concern with deference,2 his strategies for

cultivating a salutary form of it, as well as his sense of

democracy’s Janus-faced potential with respect to this

disposition’s development,3 have been underexplored.

Analyzing this component of how Mill tries to combine a

defense of representative government, individual free-

dom, and equality under the law with the development of

character yields resources for contemporary theorists

occupied with this task.4 I show how Mill’s approaches to

cultivating deference among citizens include redesigning

the political process to amplify the voice of the highly

educated, promoting more widespread opportunities for

970277PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920970277Political Research QuarterlyArellano

research-article2020

1Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Alec Arellano, Occidental College, M-22, 1600 Campus Road, Los

Angeles, CA 90041, USA.

Email: alec.arellano88@gmail.com

Mill on Deference and Democratic

Character

Alec Arellano1

Abstract

Citizens of liberal democracies today increasingly exhibit a distrust of perceived elites, especially experts and those

of advanced educational attainment more generally. John Stuart Mill’s work offers potential responses to this

phenomenon. Mill regards deference to superior wisdom as an essential part of a well-developed character while

esteeming independent thought. Although his emphasis on the importance of character formation is well known, his

concern for inculcating a salutary form of deference has been underexplored. I show how Mill’s approaches to this

task include redesigning the political process to amplify the voice of the highly educated, promoting more widespread

opportunities for learning, and consistently emphasizing the partiality of human understanding. I also compare Mill’s

treatment of the place of deference in democratic politics with that of Alexis de Tocqueville’s, and consider how

Tocqueville might critique Mill’s strategies for cultivating deference. In so doing, I demonstrate how these authors

provide us with resources for navigating the tensions between popular sovereignty and expertise, and between

independent thought and intellectual authority.

Keywords

John Stuart Mill, character, virtue, deference, democracy

Article