Mill and Green On the Modern Welfare State

DOI10.1177/106591296001300207
Published date01 June 1960
Date01 June 1960
AuthorHarry Holloway
Subject MatterArticles
389
MILL
AND
GREEN
ON
THE
MODERN
WELFARE
STATE
HARRY HOLLOWAY
University
of
Texas
N
A
COMPARISON
of
the
ideas
of
J.
S.
Mill
and
T.
H.
Green
there
is
a
t
curious
paradox
that
invites
examination:
why
can
Green
be
said
to
lay
the
&dquo;intellectual
foundations
of
the
modern
social
welfare
state,&dquo; ~
while
it
was
Mill
who
actually
called
himself
a
socialist?
Granted
that
the
terms
&dquo;social-
ist&dquo;
and
&dquo;social
welfare
state&dquo;
are
not
identical,
it
would
seem
a
fair
presumption
that
a
socialist
might
claim
kinship
with
modern
social
welfare
movements
that
non-socialists
could
not.
Certainly
Green
did
not
think
of
himself
as
a
socialist
and
he
might,
with
some
justice,
be
described
as
thoroughly
Victorian
and
of
conservative
inclination.
On
the
face
of
it
he
would
hardly
appear
to
be
the
modern
thinker
who
provided
the
principles
applicable
to
the
modem
welfare
state.
An
explanation
of
this
seeming
paradox
must
be
sought
in
a
review
of
their
principles
set
in
the
context
of
the
chief
problem
that
liberals
then
-
and
later
- had
to
face.
According
to
G.
H.
Sabine,
the
great
issue
English
liberalism
faced
in
the
latter
part
of
the
nineteenth
century
was
the
serious
middle-class
bias
given
it
by
Benthamite
utilitarianism.
For
the
period
of
&dquo;roughly
the
first
two-thirds
or
three-quarters
of
the
nineteenth
century ...
liberalism
was
largely
a
movement
to
make
the
political
power
of
the
industrial
and
commercial
middle
class
correspond
to
its
economic
and
social
importance,
and
its
theory
conceived
the
functions
of
government
from
the
point
of
view
of
persons
whose
freedom
of
action
was
more
likely
to
be
hampered
than
helped
by
legislation.&dquo;
2
Granted
this
initial
identity
of
class
interest
and
doctrine,
the
problem
in-
creasingly
faced
by
liberals
as
the
century
wore
on
was
how
to
make
the
defense
of
freedom
a
cause
representative
of
all
classes.
The
defense
of
liberty
had
to
become
a
creed
embracing
the
needs
and
aspirations
of
all
men,
high
and
low.
The
chief
difficulties
arose
over
liberal
reluctance
to
recognize
the
needs
peculiar
to
the
working
classes
and
to
accept
an
enlargement
of
the
area
of
state
inter-
vention.
Laissez
faire
had
to
give
way
to
the
positive
state
and
new
forms
of
free-
dom.
Otherwise
liberalism
was
likely
to
end
on
the
dust
heap
as
a
philosophy
discarded
by
the
great
mass
of
the
population.
A
comparison
of
Green
with
Mill
shows
that
he
made
this
transition
-
on
the
whole
-
successfully.
Mill,
for
all
his
sympathies
with
the
plight
of
the
working
classes
and
his
seemingly
radical
reform
proposals,
did
not.
For
Mill
can
be
shown
to
be
a
fundamentally
consistent
advocate
of
a
&dquo;sovereign&dquo;
indi-
viduality
at
odds
with
the
advancing
currents
of
collectivism.
His
was
an
ideal-
ized
individualism
of
the
man
who
had
need
of
and
could
use
the
liberty
to
be
independent
and
self-sufficient.
His
attitude
towards
the
state
and,
particularly,
towards
majority
rule
was
one
of
antipathy.
His
socialism
and
his
concern
to
improve
the
conditions
of
the
working
classes
did
not
entail
any
substantial
1
John
Hallowell,
Main
Currents in
Modern
Political
Thought
(New
York:
Holt,
1953),
p.
286.
2
G.
H.
Sabine,
A
History
of
Political
Theory
(rev.
ed.;
New
York:
Holt,
1955),
p.
741.
390
changes
in
the
status
quo.
The
values
for
which
he
spoke
were,
in
spite
of
some
modifications,
fundamentally
those
of
the
middle
classes
rather
than
the
workers.
Mill’s
individualism
and
elitism
spoke
more
for
the
minority
than
the
majority.
Green
bridged
the
gap
with
a
doctrine
that
was
incomplete
yet
a
large
step
in
the
right
direction.
He
conceived
of
freedom,
rights,
and
the
state
in
such
a
manner
as
to
further
the
idea
of
a
common
citizenship
in
which
all
could
claim
and
exercise
common
economic
and
political
rights.
Freedom
meant
a
positive
power
of
doing
something
worth
while
to
which
sheer
lack
of
interference
was
no
necessary
gain.
The
common
good
was
a
moral
standard
of
rights
all
should
share
by
law.
To
uphold
these
rights
state
action
might
be
essential.
For
Green
the
state
was
no
enemy
of
freedom
but
rather
an
ideal
of
the
co-operative
direc-
tion
of
authority
to
produce
benefits
for
all.
For
stating
these
views,
even
if
faultily,
Green
can
be
shown
to
be
the
modern
liberal
as
Mill
is
not.
In
Green’s
idealistic
and,
at
times,
vague
language
it is
possible
to
find
&dquo;principles
of
state
interference&dquo;
his
liberal
predecessor
never
expressed.
Mill
took
as
his
central
value
the
free
development
of
the
individual
per-
sonality
to
the
fullest
and
most
complete
realization
of
his
capacities.
For
him
this
was
both
the
end
product
and
the
prime
condition
of
civilization.
Granted
the
value,
what
were
the
conditions
of
its
realization?
Freedom
and
a
variety
of
sit-
uations
were
the
main
conditions.
Freedom
meant
a
man
should
be
able
to
pursue
his
own
goals
in
his
own
way.
&dquo;The
only
freedom
which
deserves
the
name
is
that
of
pursuing
our
own
good
in
our
own
way,
so
long
as
we
do
not
attempt
to
deprive
others
of
theirs....&dquo;
3 To
be
able
to
seek
his
own
goods
in
this
way
a
man
should
be
free
of
restraints.
A
man
was
most
free
when
he
could
do
what
he
chose.
He
should
be
sovereign
master
of
his
own
destiny
in
a
society
which
opened
to
him
a
multitude
of
possible
ways
of
thinking
and
acting.
Any
other
kind
of
social
milieu
would
tend
to
close
to
him
various
possibilities
in
the
development
of
his
individuality.
In
the
explanation
of
his
purpose
he
gave
in
the
Autobiography,
Mill
said
he
wanted
to
prove
&dquo;the
importance,
to
man
and
society,
of
a
large
variety
in
types
of
character,
and
of
giving
full
freedom
to
human
nature
to
expand
itself
in
innumerable
and
conflicting
directions.&dquo;
4
Socrates
was
the
ideal
of
personal
development
and
a
completely
open
and
plural-
istic
society
was
the
ideal
social
environment.
Coupled
with
this
central
value
and
its
realization
was
the
conception
of
the
main
threat
to
liberty.
The
background
to
this
struggle
in
his
own
day
Mill
thought
to
be
the
&dquo;tyranny
of
the
majority.&dquo;
The
growing
impact
of
egalitarian
pressures,
socially,
economically,
and
politically,
was
the
main
reason
liberty
was
in
jeopardy.
These
leveling
influences
were
everyday
diminishing
the
&dquo;variety
of
situations.&dquo;
He
explained,
&dquo;Formerly,
different
ranks,
different
neighborhoods,
different
trades
and
professions,
lived
in
what
might
be
called
different
worlds;
at
present
to
a
great
degree
in
the
same.
Comparatively
speaking,
they
now
read
3
J.
S.
Mill,
On
Liberty
(Everyman’s
ed.,
including
Utilitarianism
and
Representative
Govern-
ment,
with
Introduction
by
A.
D.
Lindsay;
London:
Dent,
1948),
p.
75.
4
J.
S.
Mill,
Autobiography
(Preface
by
H.
J.
Laski;
World’s
Classics;
London:
Oxford
University
Press,
1928),
p.
215.

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