Middle East nuclear stability: the state of the region and the state of the debate.

• Author: Feldman, Shai
• Position: Continuity and Transformation: The Modern Middle East - Interview

How likely are nuclear weapons to spread in the Middle East? How fast might they proliferate? How would the proliferation of nuclear weapons affect the stability of the Middle East, and what situational factors might affect the region's prospects for nuclear stability? These are some of the central issues addressed in this article.

A Nuclear Middle East?

It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the odds of a nuclear Middle East emerging any time soon. Indeed, assessments of the time it might take one or more of the region's states to obtain nuclear weapons rarely expose the difficulties entailed in making such evaluations.(1) An operational nuclear capability might be pursued today through one of two primary avenues. First, there is the "quick fix" approach, namely, the purchase of fissile material or nuclear warheads from a state that already possesses nuclear weapons. The most likely such scenario would involve the possibility of warheads or fissile material being smuggled from the former Soviet Union and sold to a Middle Eastern state.

The second avenue is the gradual development of a technical infrastructure that allows the indigenous manufacture of nuclear weapons. This could be pursued either through the production of highly enriched uranium or through the separation of plutonium from the by-pro ducts of nuclear-reactor fuel. While the former requires the construction of a uranium-enrichment facility, the latter requires the existence of a plutonium-producing nuclear reactor as well as the acquisition of a large-scale separation plant. Once fissile material is obtained through either smuggling or indigenous production, an added capability to design and produce nuclear bombs is required. If these bombs are to be fitted on the tips of ballistic or cruise missiles, which have a better chance than bombers of penetrating an adversary's air defense, the technology for reducing the size of warheads must also be mastered.

In the past few years, Iraq and Iran have emerged as the primary foci of concern about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Iraq's nuclear infrastructure was largely destroyed by U.S. bombings during the 1990-91 Gulf War and by the post-war activities of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).(2) Yet there is every reason to believe that Saddam Hussein continues to harbor hopes of reviving Iraq's nuclear program once the sanctions applied against Iraq, in the framework of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 687 and 715, are lifted. Subsequently, Hussein may also feel confident enough to terminate the intrusive monitoring and verification regime currently applied to Iraq by the U.N.

Iraq's motivation to rebuild its atomic program may be further propelled by Iran's current efforts to reconstruct and further expand its nuclear infrastructure. Furthermore, Iraq's sense of humiliation, resulting from the contrast between the approach adopted by the UNSC toward its nuclear efforts and the willingness of the majority of states to tolerate Israel's nuclear potential, may also fuel Saddam Hussein's determination to rebuild his nuclear infrastructure.

Iraq's reconstruction of its atomic program would be based on three key assets: first, the financial resources that would be available once UNSC sanctions were lifted and Iraq had recaptured its share of the international oil market; second, the hundreds of scientists and engineers who comprised the human infrastructure of Iraq's nuclear activities until the Gulf War, and who remain largely (if not entirely) in place; and finally, the impressive talents of Saddam Hussein, demonstrated by his administration and management of the scientific and engineering dimensions of Iraq's nuclear program in the late 1980s, as well as by the successful concealment and deception exercised by Iraq in this realm. By the eve of the Gulf War, Hussein's efforts had brought Iraq quite close to the production of nuclear weapons - probably just a few years away - while deceiving all major Western intelligence agencies regarding the thrust of its nuclear program.

In contrast, Iran has already embarked upon a major effort to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure. Currently, its activities are centered on reviving the ambitious nuclear power program launched by the Shah of Iran in the early 1970s - a program suspended by the Ayatollah Khomeini following the 1979 revolution. In this framework, Iran recently contracted Russia to complete the construction of the first of two 1,300-megawatt power reactors at Bushehr.(3) When Khomeini took power, these reactors were about 80 percent and 65 percent complete, respectively.(4) The Russian-Iranian agreement calls for the completion of both reactors, as well as for the construction of two 440-megawatt Russian reactors.(5) In addition, Iran has signed an agreement with China for the supply of a 300-megawatt nuclear power reactor to be located at Darkhovin, near the Iraqi border. 6 The contract is part of a framework agreement calling for the eventual construction of two Chinese power reactors in Iran.(7) Earlier attempts by Iran to obtain nuclear research reactors from China and India were aborted after successful U.S. diplomatic interventions with the two govemments.(8) At the same time, there are reports that Iran is attempting to recruit nuclear scientists and engineers, and to establish networks for purchasing smuggled fissile material, from the former Soviet Union. Other reports point to Iranian efforts to buy sensitive materials needed for the construction of clandestine uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing facilities from Western Europe.

Iran's decision to revive its nuclear program is clearly tied to post-Gulf War revelations regarding Iraq's pre-war nuclear efforts. Like others in the region, Iran seems to have been completely surprised to discover how close Iraq had come to obtaining nuclear weapons. The construction of the power reactors at Bushehr contributes to Iran's science and engineering infrastructure, and thus could later ease its efforts to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, at a propitious time, Iran may terminate its membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), thus ending the safeguards currently applied to its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would allow Iran to extract whatever amounts of plutonium accumulate at Bushehr for separation into weapons-grade material.

While Iraq and Iran currently comprise the focus of Middle East nuclear non-proliferation concerns, other states in the region have recently accelerated their nuclear efforts as well. For instance, Algeria has made impressive efforts to build a nuclear program, purchasing a 15-megawatt research reactor from China and a smaller, one-megawatt reactor from Argentina.(9) This is quite worrisome in light of the deteriorating internal conditions in Algeria and the corresponding prospects that this capability might be inherited by an extremist Islamist regime. At the same time, Syria has also taken initial steps toward establishing a nuclear infrastructure by purchasing a 30-kilowatt neutron-source mini-reactor from China.(10)

In the past five years, Egypt has undertaken a renovation of its aging two-megawatt nuclear research reactor at Inshass and has supplemented it with the construction of a 22-megawatt research reactor purchased from Argentina.(11) Meanwhile, Libya continues to maintain its 10-megawatt reactor (imported from the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s) and has not abandoned its efforts to purchase a 440- to 600-megawatt nuclear power reactor.(12)

By all foreign accounts, Israel already possesses both a robust nuclear capability and the means to deliver such weapons. In a global survey of nuclear capabilities, the New York Times defined Israel in 1993 as possessing the world's fifth-largest nuclear arsenal. It estimated that Israel had acquired some 50 to 200 nuclear warheads, as well as sophisticated delivery means, including the 1,400-km range Jericho-2 missile.(13) Indeed, U.S. and Russian intelligence estimates of Israel's nuclear capability seem to converge. A 1993 report issued by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service - the KGB's successor - estimated that Israel might have produced as many as 200 nuclear weapons and had uranium stocks to last it 200 years.(14)

Yet, with the exception of Israel (which is already commonly referred to as a nuclear state), it is far from clear whether any of the emerging nuclear programs in the Middle East could yield deliverable nuclear weapons within the next 15 years. All states in the region that are currently attempting to develop a nuclear infrastructure are NPT signatories, and their nuclear facilities are subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, lessons learned from the experience with Iraq's pre-Gulf War nuclear program have resulted in considerable efforts to close previous loopholes in IAEA monitoring and verification procedures, complicating the task of any country that might attempt to circumvent these safeguards.

Similarly, the lessons drawn from Iraq's nuclear efforts have resulted in a tightening of the export controls exercised by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), as well as in closer cooperation among their intelligence agencies in intercepting illegal nuclear exports. Consequently, it has become much more difficult to obtain sensitive materials similar to those purchased by Iraq from advanced industrial states in the late 1980s.

It is also likely that the major powers will continue to hold Iraq strictly accountable to the current IAEA monitoring and verification regime even after UNSC sanctions are lifted and Iraq is allowed to resume its oil exports. At the same time, considerable intelligence assets are likely to be devoted to following Iran's efforts in order to avert a second nuclear surprise. This may make Teheran's efforts to obtain a nuclear capability exceedingly difficult. Finally, due to...