Methodological stare decisis and intersystemic statutory interpretation in the choice-of-law context.

AuthorHart, Grace E.

When a state court determines that it must apply the statute of a sister state, what statutory interpretation methodology should the court use to interpret that statute? Is the forum court free to apply its own rules of statutory construction, or should it apply those of the sister state?

This question of interpretive methodology is particularly significant because many states give law-like status to methodology through legislated rules of interpretation (1) and judicial interpretive frameworks (2)--a practice that scholars have termed "methodological stare decisis." (3) Commentators have focused on courts' interpretations of their own state's statutes, but an emerging area of scholarship analyzes statutory interpretation methodology from an "intersystemic" perspective. Abbe Gluck has examined how state and federal courts apply one another's interpretive methodologies when interpreting one another's statutes, (4) and Nicholas McLean has recently considered the status of foreign interpretive methodologies in federal court cases construing foreign statutes. (5) Intersystemic statutory interpretation in the interstate choice-of-law context, however, remains unexplored. The choice-of-law literature has also neglected this issue, focusing almost exclusively on the question of what substantive law to apply rather than the question of how to apply it. (6)

This Comment introduces an intersystemic analysis of statutory interpretation in multistate cases and offers the first examination of current practices among state courts. Part I provides background on choice-of-law principles and demonstrates that they do not provide guidance to courts on how to construe sister state statutes. Part II examines cases in which state courts interpret sister state statutes and argues that current practices are inconsistent and doctrinally unmoored. Part III argues that current ad hoc practices undermine the policies underlying choice-of-law doctrines and that courts should instead apply the interpretive methodology of the sister state whose statute is being construed.

  1. THE LACK OF INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE IN CHOICE-OF-LAW

    PRINCIPLES

    State courts routinely apply the statutes of other states. (7) While the forum court generally applies its own procedural rules-such as those concerning the admissibility of evidence (8) and competency of witnesses (9)--choice-of-law principles determine what substantive law governs the case: that of the forum state or a sister state. (10)

    As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that statutory interpretation methodology defies categorization as simply a procedural device to be governed by forum law. Unlike procedural rules that regulate the method of presenting facts to the court (11) and facilitate adjudication, (12) interpretive methodology is deeply tied to statutory meaning. Because statutes are merely "strings of words," statutory meaning is not inherent in the text but instead is derived from the interaction of the text and the interpretive process. (13) A state's underlying interpretive framework therefore has an inherently substantive foundation as it is "intimately bound up with" the legal right created by a statute. (14) Accordingly, a closer examination of choice-of-law doctrines concerning substantive law is necessary to understand how statutory interpretation methodology functions in multistate cases.

    States have adopted a wide variety of choice-of-law methodologies to select the applicable substantive law in multistate cases. Despite this multiplicity of approaches, however, they all derive from two fundamental types of choice-of-law analysis--the traditional approach and modern interest analysis. (15) The key differences between these two theories arise from their normative grounding; while the traditional approach provides principles for deciding among competing laws that are external to either state's substantive law, the modern interest analysis resolves choice-of-law problems by analyzing the competing laws themselves. (16) The traditional approach aims to provide a set of independent jurisdiction-selecting rules to determine the applicable law for specific categories of legal issues. (17) For example, the "internal affairs doctrine" instructs courts to apply the law of the state of incorporation in lawsuits involving corporate governance, regardless of the content of the potentially applicable laws. (18) In contrast, modern interest analysis determines the applicable law by examining the content of and policies motivating each potentially applicable law. (19) Under interest analysis, a court should ascertain the policies underlying the competing laws through the "familiar" process of statutory construction and decide whether each state has a legitimate interest in asserting its policy given the facts of the case at hand. (20) Some states have adopted either the traditional or modern approach in its entirety. (21) Most states, however, have developed choice-of-law methodologies that incorporate some of the traditional jurisdiction-selecting principles while also considering the policies of the competing rules of decision. (22)

    The traditional and modern choice-of-law approaches offer courts guidance in selecting the applicable substantive law, but both are silent on how courts should apply that statute and decipher its meaning. Choice-of-law theory stipulates that the forum's lawmaking power is limited, because it cannot overrule a sister state court's determination of its own law; (23) a puzzle emerges, however, when the forum confronts a statutory interpretation question that the sister state courts have not yet addressed. There is no traditional jurisdiction-selecting rule for statutory interpretation methodology, perhaps due to an assumption that there is not much of a choice to be made at all. (24) Similarly, even though interest analysis refers to statutory construction, it describes the process as inherently "ad hoc," (25) leaving courts without meaningful direction in how to select an interpretive methodology.

    This lack of interpretive guidance is particularly significant as many states have varying approaches to statutory interpretation methodology. While some cases are clear, such that the statute will yield the same result regardless of rules of construction, methodological choice can alter the outcomes in other cases. (26) For example, Ohio construes remedial statutes liberally, (27) but Michigan uses this canon only as a last resort, even where a statute is ambiguous. (28) Therefore, in a torts case involving parties and events in Michigan and Ohio, the forum court's choice of rules of statutory construction could significantly impact the way in which the court interprets the statute. As a result, although Michigan and Ohio choice-of-law principles could select the same torts statute, the result of the case may be different depending on whether the court adopts Michigan or Ohio rules of construction.

  2. CURRENT PRACTICES IN INTERPRETING SISTER STATE LAW

    Without guidance from choice-of-law principles, state courts applying sister-state statutes use inconsistent interpretive practices. Many courts consciously adopt the interpretive methodology of the state whose statute is being applied. (29) For example, in Magee v...

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