Metagoverning Aquaculture Standards: A Comparison of the GSSI, the ASEAN GAP, and the ISEAL

• Author: Phatra Samerwong,Simon R. Bush,Peter Oosterveer
• Published date: 01 December 2017
• Date: 01 December 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1070496517736872
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Metagoverning

Aquaculture Standards:

A Comparison of the

GSSI, the ASEAN GAP,

and the ISEAL

Phatra Samerwong

1

, Simon R. Bush

1

, and

Peter Oosterveer

1

Abstract

The presence of multiple eco-certification standards for sustainable aquaculture is

thought to create confusion and add cost for producers and consumers alike. To

ensure their quality and consistency, a range of so-called metagovernance arrange-

ments have emerged that seek to provide harmonized quality assurance over these

standards. This article aims to answer the question of how these metagovernance

arrangements differ and whether they actually reduce confusion, with a focus on

aquaculture in Southeast Asia. We compare three metagovernance arrangements,

the Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative, the International Social and Environmental

Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Good Aquaculture Practices, with respect to differences in their goals, their levels of

inclusiveness, and their internal governance arrangement. The findings indicate that

these metagovernance arrangements differ with respect to their goals and

approaches and do not seem to directly reduce confusion. More critically, they

represent a new arena for competition among market, state, and civil society

actors in controlling the means of regulation when aiming for more sustainable

aquaculture production.

Keywords

aquaculture standard, metagovernance, GSSI, ASEAN GAP, ISEAL, environmental

governance

Journal of Environment &

Development

2017, Vol. 26(4) 429–451

!The Author(s) 2017

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DOI: 10.1177/1070496517736872

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1

Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Phatra Samerwong, Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, Wageningen

6706 KN, The Netherlands.

Email: phatra.samerwong@wur.nl

There are currently more than 29 government, nongovernmental organization

(NGO), and corporate-led eco-certif‌ication standards available for assessing and

assuring the environmental and social performance of aquaculture production

and trade (Parkes et al., 2010). Common to all these standards is a process of

setting norms and rules, conf‌lict resolution, learning, and exerting authority

toward the improvement of aquaculture production and trade (Hatanaka,

2014; Hatanaka & Busch, 2008; Pattberg, 2005). However, these standards

also dif‌fer because they represent a diverse set of public and private actors,

have diverse internal procedures, and provide assurance against divergent

claims, including responsible, legal, organic, or sustainable aquaculture produc-

tion (Bingen & Busch, 2007; Ponte, Gibbon, & Vestergaard, 2011). The result is

a highly variated landscape of eco-certif‌ication standards and labels, with dif-

ferent levels of credibility in the market, accessibility for producers, and (ultim-

ately) ef‌fectiveness in steering the improvement of production.

There are dif‌fering ideas on what implications this multiplication of standards

holds for improved production. On one hand, having multiple standards is

thought to increase competition for achieving higher overall improvement

toward broadly def‌ined sustainability goals a so-called race-to-the-top scenario

(Cashore, Auld, Bernstein, & McDermott, 2007). The consequence of more strin-

gent ‘‘top’’ standards may then be the exclusion of some producers because of the

added costs of complying with their requirements (e.g., Lee, Geref‌f‌i, & Beauvais,

2012; Neilson & Pritchard, 2010). On the other hand, multiple standards might

lead to a ‘‘race-to-the-bottom’’ if standards put accessibility by producers above

measurably improved production practice (Ponte & Riisgaard, 2011). In this

scenario, the credibility of the standards may come into question as criteria for

producer compliance are relaxed. For consumers and producers alike, the con-

sequence of multiple standards is also thought to be confusion over multiple and

ambiguous claims by eco-labeled products (e.g., Harbaugh, Maxwell, &

Roussillon, 2011; Kolk, 2013). But despite these various claims, the actual

ef‌fect of multiple standards for producers and consumers remains unclear.

One response to the proliferation of standards in a number of industries has

been the emergence of so-called metagovernance arrangements that essentially

set standards for standards (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; Glasbergen, 2011).

Metagovernance arrangements provide a framework for standards to ensure

their performance and ultimately strengthen their legitimacy to producers,

buyers, and consumers alike (Washington & Ababouch, 2011). Multiple types

of metagovernance arrangements are observed, ranging from initiatives designed

to assess the equivalence of standards against a set of (normative) metastan-

dards, such as codes of conduct or principles (Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014;

Loconto & Fouilleux, 2014) to initiatives that seek harmonization of dif‌ferent

standards by creating a new ‘‘super-standard’’ (Mo

¨ckel, 2015; Mutersbaugh,

2005). As the number and type of these metagovernance arrangements prolifer-

ate each with dif‌ferent goals, methodologies, levels of accessibility, and

430 Journal of Environment & Development 26(4)