Merger Efficiencies in Canada

AuthorRalph A. Winter,Roger Ware
Published date01 September 2016
Date01 September 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X16657216
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Merger Efficiencies in Canada:
Lessons for the Integration of
Economics into Antitrust Law
Roger Ware* and Ralph A. Winter**
Abstract
In terms of solidifying the economic foundations of competition policy, Canadian merger law is much
further advanced than merger law in any other jurisdiction. This article evaluates the developments in
the Canadian law and draws both positive and negative lessons for integrating economic principles into
merger law generally. The balancing weights test adopted in Canadian law for incorporating efficiencies
into merger assessment has firm support in economics. But the implementation of this test has run into
problems. A sharp wedge remains in Canada between the law and the economics of merger evaluation.
Keywords
merger law, competition policy, efficiencies, economic foundations
Introduction
Roger Blair’s extraordinary record of contributions to antitrust economics includes a recent article on
welfare standards in U.S. and E.U. antitrust enforcement.
1
As Roger and his frequent coauthor Daniel
Sokol document in this article, merger law in both U.S. and E.U. has changed substantially since the
1960s. Economic theory traditionally had little influence on merger decisions in either jurisdiction
because of political considerations or simply the idea that big was bad. Merger law now rests more
firmly on economic foundations. Yet in Europe, Blair and Sokol conclude, political goals still influ-
ence merger decisions. And in both jurisdictions, as Blai r, Sokol, and other scholars have noted,
merger decisions appear to depend o n the impact of mergers on consumers, rat her than on total
welfare. Economists generally favor a total welfare standard, which includes profits as well as con-
sumer surplus.
*Professor of Economics, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
**Canada Research Chair in Business Economics and Public Policy, Sauder School of Business, UBC, Vancouver, Canada
Corresponding Author:
Roger Ware, Professor of Economics, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada.
Email: ware@econ.queensu.ca
1. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E. U. Antitrust Enforcement, 102 FORDHAM L. REV.81
(2013).
The Antitrust Bulletin
2016, Vol. 61(3) 365-375
ªThe Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0003603X16657216
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