Mens Rea in Alaska: from Bad Thoughts to No Thoughts?

• Citation: Vol. 23
• Publication year: 2006

§ 23 Alaska L. Rev. 139. MENS REA IN ALASKA: FROM BAD THOUGHTS TO NO THOUGHTS?

Alaska Law Review
Volume 23
Cited: 23 Alaska L. Rev. 139

MENS REA IN ALASKA: FROM BAD THOUGHTS TO NO THOUGHTS?

LEE PERLA ^[*]

I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERWAY WITH STATE V. HAZELWOOD

A. Civil Responsibility and Criminal Accountability

B. Course Charted Herein

II. BACKGROUND: EVENTS OF THE LOG

A. Captain Hazelwood's Voyage

B. Captain Hazelwood's Legal Trek

III. RULE OF LENITY: A STARE DECISIS TO STEER HER BY

A. Ambiguous Mens Rea Requirement in the Statute

B. The Rule of Lenity, Not Ambiguous at All

IV. VIOLENCE TO PRECEDENT: TURNING INTO THE WIND

A. Speidel Rejects the Civil Standard of Negligence

B. Guest's and Rice's Rejection of Strict Liability Are Not Equivalent to an Acceptance of Civil Negligence

C. Law of the Sea: Responsibility, Authority, and Accountability

V. UN-DUE PROCESS: AN AFFRONT TO LIBERTY

A. Alaska's Exceptions to the Mens Rea Requirement Were Limited

B. Civil Standards are Inadequate for Assigning Criminal Punishments

VI. SUGGESTED COURSE: STEER CLEAR OF THE STORM

A. Criminal Negligence for Ship Captains

B. The Legislature's Response

VII. CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES

This Note examines how the most recent Alaska Supreme Court decision affirming the criminal conviction of the captain of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker for negligent discharge of oil under the civil standard of negligence departed from Alaska's prior mens rea jurisprudence. Alaska had operated under a Model Penal Code-based mens rea regime that required a somewhat heightened showing of mens rea. Although the decision has not been widely applied, it has the potential to dramatically alter the scope of protections afforded criminal defendants in Alaska.

I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERWAY WITH STATE V. HAZELWOOD

A. Civil Responsibility and Criminal Accountability

In the American legal system, we hold each other responsible for wrongdoing with either civil remedies or criminal punishment. The former involves paying money for harms caused. The latter involves far more serious consequences -- the loss of life or liberty. [*pg 140] Counsel in the criminal system, unlike in a civil suit, are rarely equally matched. The prosecutor usually commands greater resources than the defendant on trial. Despite our best efforts, that advantage sometimes places a criminal defendant in the untenable position of defending against the vast resources of government prosecutors from a position of weakness.

To help alleviate those inequities, we adhere to a structural framework that safeguards the rights of individuals. This framework is rigorous enough to ensure that every criminal defendant is afforded a fair trial, one in which the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. That framework is built on statute and practice. Legislators have incorporated due process provisions in our state constitutions, in the rules of evidence and procedure, and in the criminal code itself. Yet we do not depend on the foresight of legislators alone. As the ultimate bulwark for fairness in the criminal justice system, our courts are empowered to intercede in ways both equitable and appropriate.

Courts frequently act towards that aim by reading a mens rea element into criminal codes. A criminal defendant must not only commit a bad act before punishment can be administered; the defendant must do so as the result of "bad thoughts." In other words, in most cases, the defendant must possess a "culpable" mental state to be blameworthy of the alleged crime. ^[1] Alaska's Revised Criminal Code establishes the default state of mind for criminal punishment to attach as either "knowingly" or "recklessly." ^[2] In fact, when the Code was first enacted, only three crimes used a lower "criminal negligence" standard. ^[3] Crimes of "inadvertence" come before Alaska's courts through various other regulatory statutes not contained in Title 11 of the Criminal Code.

The Code distinguishes criminal from civil negligence by requiring a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed under like circumstances for criminal negligence, whereas civil negligence merely requires any [*pg 141] deviation from a reasonable standard of care. ^[4] Alaska's Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction defines criminal negligence as "something more than the slight degree of negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages and is negligence of a degree so gross as to be deserving of punishment." ^[5] In practical terms, this distinction affords the criminal defendant the right to emphasize to the jury the seriousness of criminal punishment. ^[6] It also serves the broad policy goal of reserving criminal sanctions for criminals, and civil punishments for accidental offenders. Alaska's courts have been recognized as being among the vanguard that support this axiom of fairness. Indeed, criminal law casebooks use Alaska examples to illustrate the role mens rea plays in the criminal justice system. ^[7] A recent decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, however, may signal a change. In State v. Hazelwood, ^[8] the court let stand a criminal conviction and jail sentence under the negligence standard previously applicable only to civil matters.

B. Course Charted Herein

This Note evaluates State v. Hazelwood, and explores whether the conviction of the captain of the Exxon Valdez for negligent discharge of oil changed the criminal standard of negligence in Alaska. Part II begins with a brief overview of the events giving rise to the criminal case against Captain Hazelwood. Part III suggests that Chief Justice Compton's dissent correctly outlined the binding nature of the Rule of Lenity ^[9] and determines that the Rule should have applied in this case. Part IV discusses what Chief Jus-[*pg 142] tice Compton called the majority's "violence to precedent"; and Part V highlights the majority opinion's troubling substitution of the due process protections afforded criminal defendants with those of civil litigants. The Note argues that this substitution was unnecessary and unwarranted. The facts of the case demonstrate Hazelwood's guilt under the previous criminal standard of negligence. Thus, the Hazelwood court could and should have preserved the requirement for criminal intent that Alaska law had earlier evidenced. Part VI suggests that industry standards can provide a reliable means for the courts to determine when a ship's captain merits criminal punishment.

II. BACKGROUND: EVENTS OF THE LOG

A. Captain Hazelwood's Voyage

Just after midnight on March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker, operated by the Exxon Shipping Company, ran aground on Bligh Reef, approximately one and a half miles outside the designated tanker lane. ^[10] The vessel's captain, Joseph J. Hazelwood, began the outbound trek on the bridge, and stayed there while a local pilot helped steer the vessel out of Valdez Harbor and through the narrows. ^[11] But at the time of the grounding, Captain Hazelwood was in his cabin after having turned over the watch to Third Mate Gregory Cousins. ^[12] Captain Hazelwood returned to the bridge when the navigation error became apparent, i.e., when the ship ran aground. ^[13]

The grounding was not due to natural causes; seas were calm and visibility was good. ^[14] Moreover, mechanical errors played no [*pg 143] part. ^[15] Both the vessel and the navigation aids in the channel were in perfect working order, and the bridge team had at its disposal some of the most sophisticated commercial navigation equipment available. ^[16] The channel was relatively easy to navigate, and the reef had been "charted and named" since 1794. ^[17] Nevertheless, Valdez ran aground -- and the consequences were catastrophic. Valdez eventually spilled eleven million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound, directly causing enormous economic and environmental damage. ^[18]

Though his outbound journey had ended, Captain Hazelwood's legal trek had just begun with his now-infamous radio call. Captain Hazelwood reported the incident by radio to the Coast Guard Traffic Center in Valdez, approximately twenty minutes after the grounding (likely after the vessel's inability to free herself became apparent). ^[19] The federal and state investigations that followed provided evidence of errors in seamanship. ^[20] These findings [*pg 144] became the basis for Hazelwood's subsequent indictment and prosecution for reckless endangerment, operating a watercraft while intoxicated, and negligent discharge of oil. ^[21] The last charge is the focus of this Note, which argues that Hazelwood's conviction changed Alaska's requirement that the prosecutor show the defendant possessed mens rea sufficiently culpable to be "deserving of [criminal] punishment." ^[22]

B. Captain Hazelwood's Legal Trek

At the outset, Captain Hazelwood moved to dismiss all of the charges against him. ^[23] He argued that he was immune from prosecution because he had immediately reported the Exxon Valdez's grounding and its discharge of oil to the Coast Guard in compliance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. ^[24] Hazelwood's claim rested on a paragraph that conferred immunity on any person who complies with the requirement to make an immediate report. ^[25] The trial court found both the independent source rule ^[26] and [*pg 145] the inevitable discovery doctrine ^[2...