Men of the Spear and Men of God: Islamism's Contributions to the New Somali State

• Citation: Vol. 28 No. 1
• Publication year: 2014
• topic: Civil Rights,Constitutional Law

Men of the Spear and Men of God: Islamism's Contributions to the New Somali State

Matthew Cavedon

MEN OF THE SPEAR AND MEN OF GOD: ISLAMISM'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEW SOMALI STATE

Introduction

In September 2012, Somalia's new government held a presidential election for the first time-Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, an Islamist, won.¹ Twenty years after a coalition of clans overthrew military dictator Mohamed Siyaad Barre and the country fell into anarchy,² a new state is beginning to take shape. Though the government has yet to pass very many laws, Somalia's new Constitution establishes parliamentary democracy,³ declares Islam the official religion,⁴ considers human rights a guiding principle,⁵ and guarantees private freedom of religion while restricting the public propagation of religions other than Islam.⁶ The state is still far from secure, and the government has yet to

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extend its authority everywhere,⁷ but Somalia is taking its first steps toward stable government.

Acceptance of Islamists is one significant advantage of the new state compared to earlier transitional governments. Islamists seek to identify and promote "Islamic values" in law, politics, and society through peaceful political participation, armed revolution, and community development.⁸ Islamists are important in Somalia, and they are controversial. The electoral vindication of their efforts to enter democracy is encouraging. After several years of antagonism between Islamists on one side and transitional politicians and their supporters on the other, it is time to recognize that Somali Islamism is more than just extremism. Islamism can offer the state much-needed legitimacy, is likely to reconcile itself to democracy, and has a valuable focus on community development. Islamists can be a positive force for Somalia's future.

Islamists have been highly active in Somalia for the past four decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, they rose to prominence by opposing the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre.⁹ Barre took power in a 1969 coup and unsuccessfully tried to co-opt religion into his brand of "Islamic socialism" while opposing independent-minded religious leaders.¹⁰ Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, after Barre's fall, Islamists created courts and militias in an effort to restore order. The most prominent of these court-militia organizations banded together as the Union of Islamic Courts ("UIC"),¹¹ which earned popular respect by restoring order to much of the country before being driven out by a 2006 American-backed Ethiopian invasion.¹²

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After the invasion, some former UIC members joined groups that were much more radical than the UIC had been.¹³ These groups are considered menaces by many Somalis and foreign observers.¹⁴ The most notorious of these groups, al-Shabaab, continues its war to establish regional theocracy.¹⁵ But many Somali Islamists do not embrace al-Shabaab's extremism. Instead, they have earned respect for their resistance to Barre, efforts at making life better during anarchy, and prominence in community organizing and development.

Many Islamists are willing to take their place in a new regime that respects the rule of law and allows for free political deliberation. The state is right to give Islamists the opportunity to participate, an opportunity that earlier transitional politicians refused them. Islamists have many contributions to offer the state, many benefits to gain from political participation, and many reasons to continue to work peacefully for community development.

This Comment analyzes benefits that can arise from mutual cooperation between the new state and Islamists to rebut anti-Islamist attitudes on the part of transitional politicians and their foreign supporters. This Comment also argues that Islamists who have not committed their support to democracy ought to do so, for pragmatic and principled reasons. Finally, this Comment identifies issues related to political participation that Islamists still need to address. Each of these arguments is meant to expand consideration of Somali Islamism beyond extremism. Part I of this Comment introduces Somali Islamism's tendencies, history, and attitudes toward democracy. Part II describes the most disturbing tendency in Somali Islamism-extremism-and the hostility it has inspired in recent years. Part Ill considers what benefits Islamists can offer the state as political participants. Part IV discusses the incentives that Islamists who have yet to commit to democracy have for doing so. Part V highlights areas in which Islamist political agendas need further development.

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I. SOMALI ISLAMISM IS IMPORTANT, AND MANY ISLAMISTS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT DEMOCRACY

"Islamism" is a contested term with three primary persuasions.¹⁶ First, the term can refer to a religious revivalist effort that views a return to authentic Islamic values and practices as the answer to modern social problems, including poverty and the failures of nationalism.¹⁷ Second, "Islamism" can mean militancy aiming to consolidate political power and impose Islamic law on a country.¹⁸ Third, and most broadly, the term can signify a variety of political ideologies professing Islam as their source of inspiration in principles and policy prescriptions.¹⁹

This Comment incorporates all three of these meanings by using "Islamism" to refer broadly to those movements and actors that believe in infusing law, politics, and society with Islamic values. Somali Islamists, in particular, have a long history of taking multiple approaches to political systems, including democracy. Their experiences and beliefs that make them potent partners of the new state.

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A. Somali Islamism Has a Long History and Is Highly Active

Islamism emerged as a major force in Somali politics in the 1970s and 1980s by challenging the Barre regime's hypocrisy and violence. Once the government fell, Islamists worked to restore order to the country. In addition to their formal political activities, Islamists have undertaken various "community commitments," providing essential services and social organization. These activities all helped Islamists gain legitimacy and firsthand knowledge that they can contribute to the new state.

1. Muslims Organized in the Colonial Era and Islamists Resisted the Barre Regime

Somali Islamism first rose out of indigenous Sufism,²⁰ a variety of Islam that focuses on spiritual perfection through the observance of traditional practices. Sufi Muslims have been politically active in Somalia for over a century. During the colonial era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, religious leaders worked to forge nationalist movements.²¹ They sought to unite Somali Muslims in an independent nation.²² Sufis continue this legacy of political activity: They recently organized a militia to resist al-Shabaab and bolster the new state.²³ Modern Somali Islamism, though, is not monolithically Sufi.²⁴ An influx of Islamist fundamentalism inspired by Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, and Afghan Islamism has supplemented indigenous Sufi Islamism.²⁵

Due to Barre's hostility to all Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s, Sufi and non-Sufi Islamists came to share a common struggle. Barre used Islamic

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rhetoric and touted the religious values of his regime in the early years following his takeover in 1969.²⁶ But this rhetoric masked the brutality Barre used against Muslims who dissented from his vision of Islamic socialism. For instance, he made "us[ing] religion to create division or to cripple or weaken the authority of the leaders" a capital offense.²⁷ Barre insisted on Islam's centrality in Somali society, but forced independent religious leaders to stay clear of politics.²⁸

They refused. Religious leaders protested a law Barre proposed that would have granted women more rights in divorce and inheritance.²⁹ The regime argued that Shari a family law condoned women's oppression.³⁰ Clerics responded by accusing Barre of interfering with Somali religious life, and by condemning secularism and bureaucracy.³¹ This charged opposition both the Barre regime and secular-style women's rights-it was not a watershed moment in the relationship between Islamists and human rights theory.³² But Barre's response was swift and bloody: He executed ten theologians for "seditious and counter-revolutionary activities."³³

In the wake of the crackdown, Somalis increasingly attended mosques, worshipped communally at shrines, and joined cooperative Islamic agricultural communities.³⁴ Underground Islamist groups recruited new members and organized at the grassroots level, supporting women expelled from universities for wearing Islamic garb and hosting Qur'anic study circles for students.³⁵ Some took up arms, while others opted for peaceful protest.³⁶ The Barre

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regime spent the 1980s and 1990 trying to maintain control by suppressing Islamism.³⁷ Islamists protested and Barre again employed violence, this time killing more than a thousand people.³⁸ In 1991, a coalition of clan leaders-whose role has long been important in Somali society-overthrew the Barre regime.³⁹ No government consolidated power in the years that followed.⁴⁰

After decades of struggle, Islamists had earned the respect of many Somalis. They proved an alternative to the hypocritical, tyrannical government and resisted Barre without becoming corrupt. This reputation will prove a valuable resource for the new state.

2. Islamists Tried to Restore Order After Barre's Fall

When the Barre regime was overthrown, Islamism emerged as an important political identity in Somalia. Different Islamist groups set out to bring order to chaos, turning their institutions and networks into forces for stability.

The first post-Barre effort by Islamists failed. After the government fell in the spring of 1991, a band of Islamists led by a local hotel owner organized a militia in Mogadishu, the nation's capital.⁴¹ They tried to enforce strict sexual mores, but this proved too difficult...