Mediating Violence in Jamaica Through a Gang Truce

• Author: Anthony Harriott,Charles M. Katz,E. C. Hedberg
• Date: 01 June 2022
• Published date: 01 June 2022
• DOI: 10.1177/1057567720975631
• Subject Matter: Original Articles

Original Article

Mediating Violence in Jamaica

Through a Gang Truce

Charles M. Katz

1

, Anthony Harriott

2

,

and E. C. Hedberg

3

Abstract

The article examines a gang-related peace initiative instituted in Greater August Town, Jamaica. Our

objective was to understand the negotiation processes and determine whether the gang truce

resulted in the desired outcome: a reduction in homicide. Bivariate analyses showed a significant

decline in homicides immediately following the truce. Upon closer examination, however, com-

paring change in the target area to the balance areas in Jamaica and accounting for temporal trends,

we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the

gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect was the possibility that

homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time.

Keywords

gang, truce, Jamaica, violence, homicide, intervention

Given the devastating individual, family, and community effects of gang violence, over the past

several decades, an increasing body of literature has focused on gangs, gang members, and gang

activity. A core theme running throughout this body of literature is that gang members are signif-

icantly more likely to be the offenders and victims of violent crime than nongang members (Esben-

sen et al., 2001) and disproportionately affect neighborhood levels of violence (Block, 2000). These

findings have been robust, in that they have been repeatedly found regardless of research methodol-

ogy or research setting (M. Klein & Maxson, 2006). As a consequence, it should not be surprising

that policymakers and academics have focused much of their attention on developing responses to

gang violence.

Suppression strategies have been the favored public policy response to gangs since the 1980s

(Spergel, 1995). Suppression strategies typically rely on focusing criminal justice resources on gang

1

Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State Uni-

versity, Phoenix, AZ, USA

2

Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, The University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica

3

NORC at the University of Chicago, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Charles M. Katz, Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona

State University, 411 N. Central Street, Suite 680, Phoenix, AZ 85004, USA.

Email: ckatz@asu.edu

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members through such practices as surveillance, targeted police patrols, vertical prosecution, and

enhanced sentences for those convicted (Katz & Webb, 2006). Suppression strategies are based on

deterrence theory and are founded on the principle that swift, certain, and severe penalties for gang

crime will necessarily result in fewer individuals joining gangs and will deter people from engaging

in gang violence (M. Klein, 1995). While in some communities, gang-based suppression strategies

have evolved with the incorporation of problem-solving (i.e., problem-oriented policing and pulling

levers; Braga et al., 2001), others have evolved with the incorporation of more exacting and punitive

policies (i.e., “Mano Dura” and “Super Mana Dura”; Hume, 2007; Rodgers, 2009).

By the early-to-mid 1990s, as gang problems continued to proliferate, policymakers sought

alternative gang control strategies such as gang prevention programming, which were aimed at the

general youth population or focused on at-risk youth or neighborhoods. These programs were based

on the premise that by reducing risk factors and increasing protective factors, prevention specialists

could inoculate youth from gangs (Esbensen, 2000). While a burgeoning body of literature has

emerged examining the assumptions, identifying the issues, and evaluating the effectiven ess of

suppression and prevention strategies, much less attention has been given to examining gang inter-

vention programming. This might largely be the consequence of the absence of such programming

over the past 30–40 years. Intervention programs often focused on diverting youth from gangs or

sought to minimize the consequences of gangs and gang activity (i.e., harm reduction). Gang

intervention strategies include crisis intervention, dispute resolution, street-level counseling, and

youth outreach (Spergel, 1995).

By the 1980s, policymakers no long er believed that social interven tion approaches were an

effective strategy to control gangs and gang violence. Although gang intervention strategies took

many forms, they were based on two assumptions: That gang membership is the by-product of a

socially deprived community and that the values and norms of gang youth can be influenced and

directed toward those of mainstream society (Spergel, 1995). Such approaches, it has been argued,

not only did not reduce gang activity but may also have led to increased group cohesiveness, which

in turn may have led to increased violence (M. Klein, 1995). More recent research has yielded

similar results. For example, a number of studies examining U.S.-based replications of Chicago

CeaseFire/Cure Violence, which relies heavily on crisis intervention, dispute resolution, street-level

counseling, and youth outreach, have found these strategies to either be ineffective, or worse,

increase levels of violence (A. Fox et al., 2015).

Regardless, as of late, social intervention programs have become increasingly popular in the

Caribbean and Central America. For example, the peacemaking programing by the Jamaica Peace

Management Initiative (PMI), which seeks to reduce retaliatory violence through dialog ue and

mediation, has been recognized by community leaders as having an impact on reducing violence

in several targeted communities (Hutchinson, 2015; Violence Prevention Alliance, 2011). In Belize,

the government established a conflict mediation program as part of its Restore Belize initiative. The

initiative trains Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) teams in mediation and conflict reso-

lution skills. CSO teams in turn train institutional leaders (e.g., school leaders, prison officials,

community leaders) who hand select cases to mediate (Hemmer, 2015). Mediation frequently

focuses on issues related to retaliatory gang violence. The program evolved into its involvement

in a gang truce, which orchestrated a truce with 200 gang members from 13 gangs (E. Fox, 2012).

While these programs have not been rigorously evaluated, some have. Maguire et al. (2018) eval-

uated the Cure Violence program in Trinidad and Tobago and found that it resulted in a substantial

reduction in violence as measured through police calls for service, official crime reports, and

emergency room admissions. Likewise, Guerra Williams et al. (2010) evaluated a YMCA-based

peacemaking program in Jamaica. They reported that at-risk low-income males who received

intensive skills programming reduced their aggressive behavior when compared to a control group.

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