Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters.

• Author: Niehoff, Leonard M.
• Position: Book review

MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS. By C. Edwin Baker. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 256. Cloth, $68; paper, $23.99.

INTRODUCTION

While in the course of reading the book reviewed here, I wandered into a local coffee shop to supplement my morning dose of caffeine. I put the book down so I could fish some money from my pocket. The young man behind the counter tapped the cover with his finger and said, "Hey, great book." This sort of remark captures a reviewer's attention, and so I asked, "Why do you think so?" His initial deer-in-the-headlights expression gradually gave way to something like self-confidence; he furrowed his brow and tightened his lips and then responded, "The guy has lots of ideas."

And so he does. Over the past two decades, C. Edwin Baker (1) has closely considered the various forces that threaten the independence of the press and its unique contribution to a free and democratic society. In Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, (2) he discussed how abuses and excesses of governmental power threaten freedom of expression and of the press. In Advertising and a Democratic Press, (3) he explored how the press's dependence on advertising weakens the performance of the institution and distorts the content of its publications. In Media, Markets, and Democracy, (4) he investigated the relationship between media economics and democratic theory. Now, in his most recent book, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters, Baker considers how media ownership--particularly the concentration of ownership--affects the ability of the press to fulfill its charge under the First Amendment.

Media Concentration and Democracy is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, Baker sets forth three arguments for the proposition that the increasing concentration of media ownership compromises the role of a free press within a democratic society and, therefore, requires a regulatory response. Part I of this Review describes those three arguments and contends that, although they offer some inventive reconceptualizations of the relationship between media and democracy, they ultimately lack the theoretical rigor and empirical substantiation necessary to justify significant changes in media-ownership policy. In short, Part I maintains that Baker bears a burden of proof and does not carry it.

In the next three chapters, Baker considers objections that might be raised to his arguments. Part II of this Review questions whether Baker fairly frames those rebuttal arguments and whether he offers sufficient support for his rejection of them. In particular, Part II challenges Baker's fairly dismissive view of the impact that new media, especially as conveyed through the internet, may have on the very issue his book seeks to address.

In his final chapter, Baker proposes possible policy responses to the problems created by media concentration. Part III of this Review explores the various shortcomings of these proposals. Part III focuses on some apparent inconsistencies within Baker's arguments and highlights the absence of the practical details needed to effect--or even evaluate--the changes he proposes.

As this summary suggests, this Review raises a number of objections to Baker's arguments and proposals. Furthermore, this Review raises the fundamental question of whether Baker's central operating assumption--that media is a scarce resource that should be fairly distributed--remains timely in light of the far-reaching and fast-paced changes wrought by the internet. Nevertheless, this Review also recognizes that, as with Baker's prior works, Media Concentration and Democracy makes a serious contribution to the discussion of the political, social, and economic dynamics that challenge the existence of a strong and independent media. Media Concentration and Democracy does a better job of raising questions than of answering them, but this does not prevent it from adding meaningfully to the debate surrounding these issues.

1. BAKER'S THREE REASONS FOR OPPOSING MEDIA OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION: ARGUING FROM POWER, PROCESS, AND PREDICTION

   In Chapter One, Baker describes what he sees as "the three main reasons for opposing ownership concentration." (5) His first reason rests on a "normative conception of democracy" in which political power is equally distributed (p. 6). Baker invokes the "one-person/one-vote institutional principle" as a familiar expression of this concept, and suggests that communicative power should be distributed in a similarly egalitarian manner. (6) His second argument contends that media dispersal is necessary to check governmental authority and protect society from its abuse (pp. 16-19). His third reason is that evenly dispersed media ownership produces higher quality journalism (pp. 28-37). Although Baker's rationales merit consideration, I believe he does an inadequate job of defending them, both theoretically and empirically.

   1. Baker's Three Reasons

      Baker's first argument for promoting media distribution is based in a concept of normative democracy and what Baker calls "communicative power," by which he means the power to convey preferences, views, and visions and thereby shape public opinion (p. 7). Baker argues that, "[a]s applied to media ownership, this [democratic distribution principle for communicative power] can be plausibly interpreted structurally as requiring ... a maximum dispersal of media ownership" (p. 7). Baker concedes that this argument finds its support not in empirical evidence but in normative appeal (p. 8). But this does not trouble him because he believes that the normative force of this principle makes it a free-standing basis to oppose ownership concentration: "the democratic distribution principle is always a proper, whether or not a conclusive, reason to oppose concentration and favor media ownership dispersal" (p. 10).

      Baker alternatively frames the "democratic distribution principle" as an "inclusionary goal" (p. 11). He contends that "[o]wnership should be distributed in a manner that results in no one feeling that discourses of groups with which she identifies are neglected or subordinated" (p. 11). He maintains that "all groups should have a real share and no one group or individual should have too inordinate a share of media power" (p. 11). And he posits that "[t]his goal is typically furthered by maximum dispersal of ownership" (p. 11).

      Baker's second argument is that dispersal of media ownership prevents the exercise of "enormous, unequal and hence undemocratic, largely unchecked, potentially irresponsible power" (p. 16). He notes that our constitutional structure establishes a separation of powers to reduce the risk of abuses by the government (p. 16). He argues the same considerations apply with respect to the structure of the fourth estate: "It]he widest possible dispersal of media power reduces the risk of the abuse of communicative power in choosing or controlling the government." (7) As with his egalitarian distribution argument, he describes the significance of this approach by reference to process, "independent of any commodity that the media produces and distributes on a day-to-day basis" (p. 16). And, as with his egalitarian distribution argument, he does not rely upon empirical evidence but rather declares that the danger he describes "is a simple matter of logic." (8)

      Baker's third argument is that large media conglomerates, particularly publicly traded ones, are inclined both to focus on profit making, and to do so at the expense of investment in "news and other cultural media content that people want and citizens need" (p. 29). In other words, he claims that ownership concentration results in a decline in content quality. Baker bases this claim on what he calls "sociologically and structurally based predictions" (p. 29).

      One such prediction is that executives at large media companies will seek to maximize profits because that is the primary basis on which they are rewarded (p. 33). Baker argues this is particularly true when those running media corporations are not themselves journalists (p. 33). Baker contrasts these executives with the heads or owners of smaller entities, who he says are "likely to identify more often with the quality of their firm's journalistic efforts and the paper or station's service to their communities" (p. 34).

      Another prediction is that corporations that acquire other businesses will seek to maximize profits in order to cover the debt created by the purchase and to make the merger decision appear wise (p. 35). Baker believes some empirical evidence supports these predictions, though he candidly describes it as "limited and messy" (p. 35). "Still," he maintains, "the most obvious plot line is: publicly traded companies fire journalists, degrade quality, and increase profits" (p. 36).

      Baker's reasons for opposing media ownership thus share two related characteristics: they rest on arguments from theory and logic, and they discount the significance of empirical data. This approach causes problems for Baker. Readers may not share his dismissive view of the relevancy of empirical evidence to the questions at hand. And, perhaps more importantly, Baker's approach shifts the burden of his argument to his theoretical constructs, which do not hold up particularly well under close scrutiny.

   2. A Critique of Pure Reasons: Failings of Theory and Evidence

      Baker's first argument, regarding normative democratic values, has some appeal, but it is not adequately developed or defended. Surely most people would agree that inclusion represents a democratic value. But, as Baker notes, so does the familiar principle that our democracy should foster free competition within the marketplace of ideas. (9) Baker aptly describes the driving rationale (or, as he labels it, the "epistemological hope") behind the marketplace of ideas model: "those speakers with better arguments will prevail over...