Measuring Reputational Signals Regarding Public Sector Professions: Validation of a Scale and a Research Agenda

• Published date: 01 November 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/02750740241261070
• Author: Gordon Abner,James L. Perry,Sun Young Kim
• Date: 01 November 2024

Measuring Reputational Signals Regarding

Public Sector Professions: Validation

of a Scale and a Research Agenda

Gordon Abner

1

, James L. Perry

2

and Sun Young Kim

3

Abstract

Public administration scholars are devoting increasing attention to the concept of reputation. The emphasis ref‌lects a long-

standing concern in the f‌ield with the sources of power and inf‌luence on administrative processes. This study extends the inves-

tigation of reputation from organizational reputation to reputational signals regarding public sector professions. We begin with a

def‌inition of reputational signals. We then develop a survey instrument that measures reputational signals from two signalers:

elected off‌icials and people close to respondents. Results are presented for internal consistency, exploratory and conf‌irmatory

factor analyses, convergent and discriminant validity, and averagevariance extracted. Next, we conduct a path analysis to test the

effects of reputational signals regarding public school teachers on two outcomes using two staggered survey instruments with

588 US adults. We f‌ind that reputational signals from both types of signalers are positively and signif‌icantly associated with the

perceived prestige of the teaching profession. Furthermore, reputational signals from people close to respondents are directly

and positively associated with support for teacher autonomy. In contrast, reputational signals fromelected off‌icials do not have a

statistically signif‌icant association with support for teacher autonomy. We conclude by discussing avenues for future research.

Keywords

organizational reputation, professionalism, bureaucratic reputation, education, public sector stereotypes

Bureaucratic reputation has garnered increasing attention in

public administration recently (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter

& Krause, 2012; Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2020; Bertelli &

Busuioc, 2021), but the concept is rooted in the f‌ield’s

distant past. Although Norton Long (1949) did not use the

term reputation, there is little doubt that the “administrative

rationality”long associated with “the power to act”was

grounded in reputation. Like Long’s focus in his seminal

essay, the unit of analysis in recent research about reputation

is agencies and programs, exemplif‌ied by research focusing

on the power of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration

(Carpenter, 2010) and the European Union’s regulatory

state (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2020).

A line of researchthat predates both Norton Longand more

recent attention to reputation is Leonard White’s research on

the “prestige value”of public employment (White, 1929).

White, the founding editor of Public Administration Review

and John Gaus were early champions for publicsector profes-

sions. Gaus (1936) argued that the responsibility of the public

administrator was f‌irmly grounded in the “attitude of the civil

servant as an individual toward his work and his profession”

(p. 43). Even the concept of “neutral competence”

(Kaufman, 1956), which dates to the Progressive movement

that gave rise to public sector professions, among them city

managers and social workers, has roots in sustaining the repu-

tation of public sector professionals.

Overall, the study of reputation has focused on the reputa-

tion of public agencies, not reputational signals regarding

public sector professions. Thus, relatively little attention

has been devoted to understanding whether criticisms and

praise of public sector professions from signalers affect

support for public employees, inf‌luence public employees’

behavior and attitudes, or whether reputational signals

relate to organizational or bureaucratic reputation. Public

employees are sensitive to signalers’diverse assessments of

their work and have incentives to protect their reputations

and avoid any reputational damage (Abner et al., 2020).

The way that signalers view public employees matters

because reputation can provide them with a “protective

shield”against antagonistic criticisms from external signalers

(Carpenter & Krause, 2012).

1

LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA

2

School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University,

Bloomington, IN, USA

3

Department of Public Administration, Hankuk University of Foreign

Studies, Dongdaemun-gu, Korea

Corresponding Author:

Gordon Abner, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin,

Austin, TX 78712, USA.

Email: gordon.abner@austin.utexas.edu

Article

The American Review of Public Administration

2024, Vol. 54(8) 717–731

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/02750740241261070

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