Martinis, Manhattans, and Maltreatment Investigations: When Safety Plans Are a False Choice and What Procedural Protections Parents Are Due

AuthorRyan C. F. Shellady
PositionJ.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2019; B.A., The University of Iowa, 2016
Pages1613-1648
1613
Martinis, Manhattans, and Maltreatment
Investigations: When Safety Plans Are a
False Choice and What Procedural
Protections Parents Are Due
Ryan C. F. Shellady*
ABSTRACT: Over the last two decades, states have increasingly adopted
differential response approaches as a supplement or alternative to child
maltreatment investigations. This trend reflects growing concerns regarding
the short-comings of traditional, adversarial approaches. Some critics believe
traditional approaches overemphasize the role of parental fault. In response
to these criticisms, a new investigatory tool was born: the safety plan. Safety
plans borrow aspects from both differential response and traditional
approaches. The plans are meant to be collaborative resolutions that alleviate
immediate dangers identified during an investigator’s initial maltreatment
safety assessment while simultaneously allowing a traditional adversarial
investigation to continue. Ideally, safety plans minimize the need for
emergency, ex parte child removals at the outset of a maltreatment
investigation. If, however, investigators abuse safety plans, then, the plans
can deprive parents of fundamental liberty interests without any procedural
due process protections. When investigators give parents an ultimatum—sign
this plan, or I will remove your child—it should trigger due process
protections. Unfortunately, current case law says otherwise. This Note first
deconstructs the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Dupuy v. Samuels to establish
why due process protections are necessarily triggered when child protection
investigators offer safety plans. Next, this Note examines states’ varying safety
plan frameworks to identify what, if any, protections exist for parents
*
J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2019; B.A., The University of
Iowa, 2016. Thank you to Diane Redleaf, Sara Gilloon, and the Family Defense Center staff for
giving me direction and support on this project. Thank you to the University of Michigan Child
Advocacy Law Clinic and the Bergstrom Fellowship staff for providing tools and opportunities
without which this project could not have come to fruition. Thank you to Professors Paul Gowder,
Sacha Coupet, Vivek Sankaran, and Michael Bandstra, and to Carolyn Kubitschek for taking time
out of their schedules to offer their support and guidance. Thank you to my fiancée, Victoria, for
putting up with me. Lastly, thank you to Ghost Dog—you know who you are. The views and
opinions in this Note are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the express views of
the Family Defense Center or of Latham & Watkins, LLP.
1614 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:1613
subjected to a safety plan. Finally, this Note encourages a new legislative
regime that requires the least restrictive solution available, extends procedural
rights to parents subjected to a safety plan, and encourages data collection
quantifying annual use of safety plans around the country.
I.INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1615
II.BACKGROUND ............................................................................. 1617
A.CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED FAMILIAL INTERESTS ............ 1620
B.DUTIES OF STATE AGENCIES AND LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS .......... 1623
C.SAFETY PLANS AND HOW THEY FIT INTO THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM .................................................................. 1624
III.FAILURES OF THE SAFETY PLAN SYSTEM ...................................... 1626
A.CROFT, DUPUY, AND FALSE VOLUNTARINESS ......................... 1627
1.Investigator Lacks Removal Authority; Parent
Refuses Safety Plan ...................................................... 1631
2.Investigator Lacks Removal Authority; Parent
Agrees to Safety Plan ................................................... 1631
3.Investigator Has Removal Authority; Parent
Refuses Safety Plan ...................................................... 1632
4.Investigator Has Removal Authority; Parent
Agrees to Safety Plan ................................................... 1632
IV.VARIED STATE APPROACHES AND DUE PROCESS
IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................. 1634
A.DUE PROCESS ........................................................................ 1634
B.THE ILLINOIS APPROACH ....................................................... 1636
C.THE ARIZONA APPROACH ...................................................... 1638
D.THE LOUISIANA APPROACH ................................................... 1640
V.THE IDEAL APPROACH: A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
EXTENDING PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO SAFETY PLANS ....... 1641
A.THE INITIAL SAFETY DECISION: REQUIRING THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE SOLUTION ......................................................... 1641
1.Is There Time to Obtain a Court Order? .................. 1641
2.Is an In-home Safety Plan Sufficient and
Appropriate? ................................................................ 1642
3.Offer an Out-of-home Safety Plan.............................. 1643
4.Executing an Emergency Removal ............................ 1644
B.PROVIDING NOTICE ............................................................... 1644
C.OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ................................................. 1646
D.POST-HEARING PROCESS ........................................................ 1647
E.EFFECTUATING THIS SYSTEM ................................................. 1647
2019] WHAT PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS PARENTS ARE DUE 1615
F.DATA COLLECTION ................................................................ 1648
VI.CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1648
“[V]nitatem in neceſſarijs, in non neceſſarijs libertatem, in omnibus
caritatem.” – Marco Antonio de Dominis, 16171
I. INTRODUCTION
Few principles are more apt for child welfare law—and indeed all of the
law— than De Dominis’s 17th century observation. His words roughly
translate to “In necessary things unity, in uncertain things liberty, in all things
love.” How precisely does one strike a balance between two competing,
equally indispensable principles? Unfortunately, there is no easy answer; yet,
this is precisely the challenge facing child welfare workers, attorneys, judges,
and state legislators every day. “Under the . . . [parens patriae doctrine], the
state has an obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of children.”2 The
federal government also provides funding to states to support “prevention,
assessment, investigation, prosecution, and treatment” services relating to
child welfare.3 Despite this obligation, a parent’s right to “the care, custody,
and control of their children[] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by th[e] [U.S. Supreme] Court.”4 Undoubtedly,
there are circumstances where children must be removed from their homes.5
1. MARCO ANTONIO DE DOMINIS, DE REPUBLICA ECCLESIA STICA, LIBRI X., 676 (1617).
Marco Antonio de Dominis was a Dalmatian Ecclesiastic with a controversial history of criticizin g
the Catholic Church. See Marco Antonio de Dominis, CATH. ANSWERS, https://www.catholic.com/
encyclopedia/marco-antonio-de-dominis (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
2. Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to
Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 521 (1996). Parens patriae translates to “parent of his or
her country.” Parens Patriae, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The doctrine gives the
state the power to protect those people who would otherwise be unable to protect themselves. See
id. This doctrine is discussed thoroughly in child welfare because children are a parens patriae
class of protected persons.
3. CHILDRENS BUREAU: CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, FACTSHEET—ABOUT CAPTA: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/about.pdf.
4. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Christine Clarridge & Sonia Krishnan, Carnation Couple Charged in “Worst Case”
Child Abuse of Teen Daughter, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 13, 2008, 7:41 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/carnation-couple-charged-in-worst-case-child-abuse-of-teen-daughter (discussing a case
where police found a 14-year-old girl so malnourished she weighed only 48 pounds); Kristine
Phillips, Parents of Skeletal, Infected Infant Twins Arrested in ‘Worst C ase of Child Abuse, WASH. POST
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/12/15/parents-
of-skeletal-infected-nine-month -old-babies-arrested-in-worst- case-of-child-abuse (describing a c ase
where two nine-month-old infant children were extremely malnourished, had various infections,
severe rashes, and bedsores); Michael P. Rellahan, Ex-Phoenixville Sentenced for ‘Worst’ Child Sexual
Abuse Case in Chesco, DEL. CTY. DAILY TIMES (June 18, 2015), http://www.delcotimes.com/genera l-
news/20150617/ex-phoenixville-sentenced-for-worst-child-sexual-abuse-case-in-chesco (recount ing

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