Markets and Manpower

• Author: Lindsay P. Cohn,Nathan W. Toronto
• Published date: 01 July 2017
• Date: 01 July 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X16667086
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article
Armed Forces & Society
2017, Vol. 43(3) 436-458
Markets and Manpower:
ª The Author(s) 2016
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The Political Economy
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16667086
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of Compulsory
Military Service
Lindsay P. Cohn1 and Nathan W. Toronto2
Abstract
Economic studies of military manpower systems emphasize the advantages of
voluntarism under all but the most total threats, but this explains neither the per-
sistence of institutionalized conscription in many states nor the timing of shifts from
such conscription systems to volunteer militaries. Traditional explanations focus on
external threat levels, but this has also proven unsatisfying. We theorize that threat
variables establish the state’s baseline need for manpower, but structural economic
variables determine whether the necessary manpower can be more efficiently
obtained by conscription or voluntarism. Using a new data set of 99 countries over
40 years, we find that states with British origins are less likely and those experiencing
greater external threat are more likely to employ conscripts. Most importantly,
states with more highly regulated labor markets are more likely to employ con-
scripts, which suggests that, controlling for a number of relevant factors, labor
markets matter in military manpower decisions.
Keywords
conscription, military manpower, recruitment, labor markets
1 U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, USA
2 National Defense College, Abu Dhabi, UAE
Corresponding Author:
Lindsay P. Cohn, U.S. Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd, Newport, RI 02841, USA.
Email: lindsay.cohn@alumni.duke.edu

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Cohn and Toronto
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Why do some states conscript military manpower, while others rely on volunteers or
mercenaries? How do states decide the best way to distribute the burden of military
service so as to balance security, internal legitimacy, and economic viability? The
basic choice seems to be between systems based on principles of voluntary service
and those based on principles of broad compulsory service,1 but most simple expla-
nations seem to fail. Neither regime type nor the level of development, national
wealth, or external threat has explained this central political choice about military
manpower.
Most studies indicate that there are a number of factors involved in the decision to
conscript, including cultural or ideological concerns (e.g., fairness), estimates of
threat or security needs, legal origin, and cost (Asch & Warner, 2001; Burk,
1992; Cohen, 1985; Flynn, 1998; Kier, 1997; Lee & McKenzie, 1992; Levi, 1996;
Ross, 1994). We acknowledge the relevance of these variables, but argue that labor
market structure plays an important and thus far overlooked role that shapes the
consideration of these other variables. In the following sections, we review the
existing explanations for choice of manpower system, present our theory regarding
the role of labor market structure, test our theory on an original data set covering
both the developed and developing world, and finally discuss the implications of our
findings.
Culture and Ideology
The legitimacy of military recruitment depends in part on the congruence between
general social and political attitudes toward the military, and the rules and regula-
tions governing that institution (Cohen, 1985; Burk, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Levi,
1996; Schiff, 1995). Cohen (1985, pp. 32–35) argues that a culture of liberalism will
tend to favor voluntary enlistment because it is opposed to state interference with
personal liberty on any grounds but emergency. Egalitarian cultures, on the other
hand, should prefer conscription, because it distributes the burden of defense work
more evenly. Cohen does not offer a rigorous test of this hypothesis.
The legitimacy of military recruitment institutions also depends on the society’s
decisions about how to balance military effectiveness with social cohesion. There is
general agreement in the literature that volunteer forces are more economical and
deployable than conscript forces, except possibly when the threat situation requires a
very large proportion of the available cohort (Huber, 1998; Huber & Schmidt, 2004;
Lee & McKenzie, 1992; Warner & Negrusa, 2006). There is also widespread agree-
ment that volunteer forces will tend to be more socially isolated and possibly less
representative than conscript forces (Kuemmel, 2006; Manigart, 2005; Moskos &
Wood, 1988; van Doorn, 1975, p. 153; contra, see Segal & Segal, 2004, pp. 24–25).
In short, conscription may be less economical and result in less military effective-
ness, but it may be more socioculturally appropriate than using only volunteers (cf.
Burk, 1992).

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Armed Forces & Society 43(3)
These cultural or ideological explanations all seem to play important contextual
roles, but are difficult to operationalize or measure. We do not argue that culture,
ideology, and domestic politics play no role in this choice; we do offer an explana-
tion that provides both a concrete mechanism and a context in which these variables
may operate.
Security
The international security argument is that states facing high external threats are
more likely to employ conscription in order to generate sufficient manpower (Ander-
son, Halcoussis, & Tollison, 1996; Choi & James, 2008, p. 39; Cohen, 1985; Flynn,
1998). Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James (2008, p. 40) imply that governments
may also choose voluntarism when they have aggressive intentions, in order to avoid
public opinion constraints on their use of force. Posen (1993) observes that France
and Prussia competed with each other during the 19th century to develop the most
effective conscription and reserve systems. Waltz (1979) argues that states will
mimic what they perceive as the best military institutions in the system, and
Resende-Santos (1996) argues that precisely this kind of systemic socialization
occurred in South America during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Although security surely plays some role in military recruitment decisions, one
problem with this international security logic, as with the cultural and ideological
arguments, is that significant variation is left unexplained: Why do India and
Pakistan use only volunteers, despite a dangerous security environment? Why have
Latin American militaries typically clung to conscription despite a generally low
level of external threat? Why did so many North Atlantic Treaty Organization
countries resist abandoning conscription after the end of the Cold War, when the
security environment changed dramatically? Certainly, threat is relevant to military
manpower decisions, but we suggest that its effects are interpreted through an
economic lens, rather than being self-evident.
Legal Origin
Another argument explaining the decision to use conscription focuses on legal origin
(Albert, 1993; Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, & Levine, 2003; Botero, Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Hall & Soskice, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Summing up this literature, Mulligan and
Shleifer (2005a, 2005b) argue that civil law systems are strongly associated with
conscription and note that British legal origin countries are almost always
voluntarist. We do not disagree with this, but argue that this argument does not test
a clear causal mechanism. We hope to expand on Mulligan and Shleifer’s insight by
examining a larger sample size over a longer period of time and by examining a
more specific mechanism.

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Cohn and Toronto
439
Traditional Economics
Economists point out that conscription is an inefficient way of generating manpower,
and that the rational default choice should be a volunteer force (Anderson et al., 1996;
Asch & Warner, 2001; Lee & McKenzie, 1992; Ross, 1994; Warner & Asch, 2001;
Warner & Negrusa, 2006). They tend to accept the argument that high levels of
external threat or involvement in actual conflict increases the utility of conscription
(Anderson et al., 1996; Lee & McKenzie, 1992; Ross, 1994), but that expeditionary or
technology-intensive postures decrease it (Warner & Negrusa, 2006). These positions
have led to a generalized impression that conscription is something belonging to the
age of great power war that countries modernize out of rather than something that may
be appropriate and economical for some states but not others (Haltiner, 1998; Leander,
2004, pp. 571, 583–593; van Doorn, 1975, pp. 150, 152).
This article moves beyond the standard economic conclusion about the super-
iority of volunteer systems based on a simple observation: Economic studies have
typically presumed classically deregulated labor markets to reach their conclusions
(Asch & Warner, 2001; Huber, 1998; Huber & Schmidt, 2004; Lee & McKenzie,
1992; Morris, 1982; Ross, 1994; Tollison, 1970; Warner & Asch, 2001; Warner &
Negrusa, 2006; Warner, Simon, & Payne, 2003). There is, however, significant
variation in the level of labor market regulation across countries (Albert, 1993;
Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Hall
& Soskice, 2001).
Furthermore, a labor market structure explanation can acknowledge the impor-
tance of cultural and legal factors while offering a clear and testable mechanism. We
argue that there are a number of structural economic factors that favor conscription
in more highly regulated labor markets, and that these factors are also likely to
interact with changing threat levels in systematic ways. We also show that labor
market structure affects the choice of military manpower system even...